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On the initiative of the Governments of Switzerland and South Africa which 
acted as facilitators of the strand dealing with irregular secondary movements 
of refugees and asylum-seekers within the framework of the UNHCR 
Convention Plus Initiative1, the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population 
Studies (SFM) was commissioned in 2004 to coordinate an important study 
to obtain a better understanding of irregular secondary movements. The 
longer-term aim of the co-facilitators was to be in a better position to address 
the causes of such movements, amongst other things by clarifying the roles 
and responsibilities of states towards asylum-seekers and refugees through a 
caseload-specific study. To obtain information on different aspects of the 
phenomenon, a combination of different methods and angles of approach was 
adopted, targeting the populations concerned, governments, UN officials and 
key informants from communities as well as NGO’s. As one of the largest 
and most widely scattered diasporas, the Somali community was of particular 
interest in this context. A group of States (core group) established in the 
context of the strand on irregular secondary movements agreed to multi-sited 
research in the following countries: Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, the 
Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland and Yemen. The study was financed 
by Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.  
The present report sets out the overall findings of the study, based on the 
analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data collected in the eight 
countries surveyed. The individual country reports are available on the 
website of the SFM. We hope that a better understanding of the motivations 
and conditions leading to irregular secondary movements will contribute to a 
well-informed discussion on this phenomenon and avoid policies being based 
on assumptions. 
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The purpose of this research on "irregular secondary movements”, conducted 
within the framework of the UNHCR's Convention Plus Initiative, is to 
provide a better understanding of the movements of Somali refugees and 
asylum-seekers, i.e. their trajectories, diverse stages in migration history and 
the underlying causes or motivations, and to elucidate states' responses to 
these situations. 
The findings are based on eight case studies carried out in Djibouti, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland and Yemen. 
Extensive fieldwork was carried out in every country with a total sample of 
814 refugee respondents and approximately 100 diverse experts and 
community leaders.  
At the state and policy levels in all countries examined, there is evidence of a 
shift towards a more restrictive admission policy with regard to refugees and 
asylum-seekers. Somalia's four neighbouring countries have hosted a 
disproportionate share of the refugee population, especially at the height of 
the influxes (beginning in 1989), but are now, for myriad reasons, less 
inclined to accept new refugees or enable them to integrate. All countries in 
the region have high refugee recognition rates, but there are serious gaps 
between policy and practice which deprive the refugee population of the 
rights to which they are entitled (in terms of social assistance, employment 
and education notably). Most governments in the South are implicitly 
opposed to local integration, fearing that generous asylum policies will strain 
meagre resources and act as pull factors for increased refugee intake. 
Moreover, European and other industrialized countries have become less 
willing to accept new refugees and many have imposed drastic measures to 
safeguard their economies through increased border security and policy 
pressures to implement region-based solutions. 
In spite of many differences among the countries surveyed (in terms of 
national refugee laws and institutional frameworks), there were emerging 
parallel trends in all countries which induced onward movements of refugees. 
In terms of refugee movement strategies, in-depth analysis clearly reveals 
that the main reason motivating refugees to undertake secondary movements 
is linked to the lack of a legal status conferring protection. In many countries, 
access to registration is problematic and documentation is often non-existent, 
inadequate or unrecognised by the host states. Appropriate registration and 
documentation are not only essential prerequisites for protection, but they 
also provide identification which is critical in gaining access to employment, 
education and other services available to the refugees in their new society, 
including durable solutions. Identification acts as proof of legal status which 
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is equally critical in protecting refugees and asylum-seekers against police 
harassment, arbitrary detention or possible refoulement. The lack of these 
rights or privileges becomes a major contributing factor in the movement of 
refugees. 
The study reveals that refugees in Somalia’s neighbouring countries tend to 
avoid camps or leave them after some time. The causes for such movements 
are two-fold: (i) in many instances, refugees have a difficult time accessing 
the refugee institutions or UNHCR office in order to register their claim; and, 
(ii) refugees are deterred from camp living simply because conditions are 
extremely inhospitable. Factors such as harsh living conditions in camps 
(inadequate and constantly reduced food and water rations, lack of adequate 
health services, etc.), security concerns, lack of opportunities for self-
reliance, are important motives causing them to opt for urban life, even 
though this does not confer any legal status granting protection. It is worth 
noting that movements from camps to cities, rather than being seen as 
stepping stones to international secondary movements (though they may be 
that in some cases), constitute an alternative to such movements. 
In most cases examined, secondary movements are motivated by the search 
for legal and socio-economic security and can be viewed as collective coping 
strategies aiming at diversifying both the risks related to refugee situations 
and the resources of the extended family. In this sense, relatives sometimes 
deliberately choose to live in different countries or different settings (i.e. 
refugee camps and cities) in order to deal with legal insecurity as well as with 
economic and social vulnerability under conditions which are largely 
unpredictable and beyond the control of the refugees. Furthermore, while 
social networks in the region and abroad most often play an important role in 
the financing and the organisation of the movement, smugglers are equally 
necessary intermediaries when it comes to reaching faraway destinations.  
The analyses of the trajectory taken by the interviewees revealed a tendency 
for the journeys to become shorter and more direct over time. While most of 
the refugees who left at the beginning of the 1990s initially fled to a 
neighbouring country and planned their further movement from the host 
country, it appears that refugees who left more recently (especially after 
2000) reached their final destination much faster and with fewer transits.  
In terms of refugees' aspirations, the study reveals that a majority of 
interviewees wish to leave the African continent, whereas many of those 
already in Europe wish to move to another industrialized country. Despite 
wishful thinking, the findings also show that only a small fraction of the 
population has concrete plans or the means to do so in the immediate future. 
At the same time, a significant proportion of interviewees are simply not able 
to imagine any future plans, or else wish to return to Somalia. With the 
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absence of mechanisms for integration, secondary movement remains an 
indispensable option for those able to secure the means to leave the host 
country and region. 
Although irregular secondary movements are of particular concern to the 
international community, it is worth noting that this form of movement plays 
only a minor role in the overall strategies employed by the Somali refugee 
population. Indeed, with the increased access to information technology and 
human resources, smugglers are able to transport refugees and asylum-
seekers more efficiently and with fewer transit settlements than ever before. 
Though entry into European countries mostly occurs through illegal channels, 
increased resources and efficient planning have in many cases eliminated the 
need for multiple settlements which make up the bulk of irregular secondary 
movement.  
The findings in this study underscore the inextricable connection between 
legal status, which confers protection and socio-economic subsistence, and 
secondary movement of refugees. It is fair to assume that the longer refugees 
and asylum-seekers remain without appropriate legal status, and its 
entitlements, the higher the likelihood that this population will devise 
alternative means to escape their situation as best they can. That being so, 
this study draws attention to the need for host countries to become actively 
involved in (re)defining and implementing refugee policy, in collaboration 
with UNHCR and the international community. It is clear that the challenges 
posed by secondary movements can only be adequately resolved through 
collaboration and partnership between concerned actors: host states, refugees, 
humanitarian organizations and the international community. 




“My father was already in Switzerland. I arrived a year later 
with my mother and my youngest brother. My mother suffered 
a lot because she had to leave her five other children behind; 
they stayed in Somalia with my aunt. I felt responsible for that, 
because she did it for me, to prevent me from being raped. I 
know it was hard for her. Then my aunt said she could not look 
after the five kids, on top of her own. That is when we sent my 
sister (the eldest after me) to another aunt, in Saudi Arabia. She 
was 12 and my mother had the same fears that she had had for 
me. She stayed there for four years, helping in my aunt’s 
house. But it wasn’t a life, she couldn’t go out, she was living 
there illegally. My aunt said that she didn’t have any future 
there, that she was in prison, so she and her husband helped us 
pay someone to bring her here. She has been in Switzerland for 
eleven months now. My three brothers and my sister went to 
Ethiopia when my mother could pay for them to go there. They 
live in an apartment with other people in Addis Ababa. But 
they had to move often because the neighbours knew that they 
had family in Europe and thought they were rich; they used 
blackmail on them. So we saved enough to pay the trip for my 
little sister. I worked a lot, on top of my apprenticeship. We 
paid 4500 dollars cash. She has been here for five months now. 
Before that, we made a request to the authorities in Berne to be 
allowed to bring them all to Switzerland. We just received the 
news that my two little brothers will be allowed to come 
legally, but not the third one, who has turned 18 in the 
meantime. Things are getting better but it is as though there is 
always something that is wrong. We don’t want to leave my 
brother alone in Ethiopia, he doesn’t have any family there.” 




1.1 Context of the Study 
The study on Movements of Somali Refugees and Asylum-seekers and States’ 
Responses Thereto was carried out by the Swiss Forum for Migration and 
Population Studies (SFM) on the initiative of the governments of Switzerland 
and South Africa who acted as facilitators for the Convention Plus Initiative2 
strand on irregular secondary movement. Together with other interested 
states and the UNHCR, they identified a vital need to conduct an assessment 
in an effort to gain greater knowledge about the causes and conditions 
leading to irregular secondary movements which would contribute to a well-
informed discussion amongst relevant partners and policy-makers. The 
objective of the research is therefore to provide a better understanding of the 
movements of Somali refugees and asylum-seekers – that is, their 
trajectories, the different stages in their migration history and their 
underlying motivations. It is also meant to give an overview of different 
protection regimes and practices; in addition, it provides crucial numbers and 
characteristics of Somali refugees and asylum-seekers in different countries. 
The study has been financed by the governments of Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Though it is obviously 
relevant for the formulation of policies, the research process has remained 
independent and impartial. It was clear from the start – and this is confirmed 
in the findings – that a combination of factors influence the movements of 
asylum-seekers and refugees, and not all such factors are state policy-related. 
The study, therefore, adopted a broad pluralistic approach encompassing the 
sub-national micro-level of the communities, individuals and NGOs 
concerned, as well as national and supra-national dynamics.  
It is a multi-sited research project conducted in eight countries: Djibouti, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland and 
Yemen. These countries were chosen according to several criteria: the size of 
their Somali refugee population; policy relevance and particularities; strategic 
position in (presupposed) routes, and political interests. Somalia’s four 
neighbouring countries – Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen – were 
 
2 Convention Plus is an international effort initiated and coordinated by the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which aims at improving refugees 
protection and finding durable solutions for refugees worldwide through multilateral co-
operation in a spirit of solidarity and burden and responsibility sharing. 
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essential because of their important role as primary host states since Somalis 
began fleeing their country at the start of the civil war. Two other African 
countries – Egypt and South Africa – have been included, as these can be 
considered as both destination and transit points to Europe or North America. 
In Europe, Switzerland and the Netherlands were chosen not only because 
both states financed the study and host a substantial Somali population, but 
also because of the dissimilarity of their asylum and integration policies, 
which thus provides for an even more interesting comparative framework. 
1.2 Somali Population, Refugees and Diaspora 
For more than fifteen years, Somalis have been leaving their country and 
seeking asylum and/or better living conditions in other countries for 
numerous reasons – including but not limited to – civil war, breakdown of 
law and order, difficult economic conditions, drought and famine, to name 
but a few. Somali refugees and asylum-seekers are amongst the largest 
refugee populations in many countries in the world, and the Somali diaspora 
is very widely scattered. Although it is difficult to estimate of the total 
Somali population in and outside of Somalia, according to figures from the 
United Nations Population Fund, the population in Somalia in 2003 was a 
little over 10 million3. UNHCR estimates the refugee population at the end of 
2004 at approximately 390,000 persons. These statistics, however, do not 
account for all Somalis living outside Somalia; that figure is considered to be 
much higher since many of them have meanwhile been naturalized, live 
undocumented, or are still waiting for their asylum application to be 
processed and are therefore not included in UNHCR statistics.  
Although Somalis have a long history of migration (Gundel 2002; Piguet 
1994), the majority of exiles left their country as refugees at the outbreak of 
the civil wars: starting in late 1988 in the northern part of the country 
(Somaliland), and from 1991 in the rest of the country when the end of Siyad 
Barre’s regime resulted in a devastating civil war (see map in annex).  
Since then, relative peace has returned to the north-western parts of Somalia. 
Although the region declared its independence in May 1991 as the Republic 
of Somaliland, its sovereignty has not been recognized by the international 
community. Similarly, the north-eastern region, better known as Puntland, 
 
3 www.unfpa.org. This figure is an estimate as no census has been conducted since 1975. 
Data collection is further complicated by the huge nomad population as well as the 
movements of a sizeable refugee population. 
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declared its autonomy in 1998 and continues to be another enclave of peace 
and stability.  
In contrast, the south and central regions of Somalia remain generally 
unstable, although there are intermittent periods of relative peace. The 
formation of a new transitional government – first based in Kenya and then in 
Somalia (but which has not as yet been able to establish itself in Mogadishu) 
– and presided over by Abullahi Yusuf Ahmed has given some impetus to 
hopes of restoration of peace and stability. Since the end of 2005, however, it 
seems that these efforts might be defeated by the resurgence of violence, 
particularly in regions under the control of warlords. 
With regards to asylum-seekers and refugees, there appears to be a clear 
delineation between exiles from the northern part (Somaliland and Puntland) 
and those from the south/central regions of the country, according to the 
international community, specifically the UNHCR. Somalia is currently 
perceived as two separate entities – north and south – and this has important 
implications both for new asylum claimants and voluntary repatriation 
programmes. While the northern regions of the country are considered safe, 
this is not the case for the other areas. A UNHCR position paper published in 
2004, concerning the return of rejected asylum-seekers to Somalia, clearly 
states that due to the human rights and humanitarian situations, no rejected 
asylum-seekers should be involuntarily returned to central and south Somalia. 
The description given is powerful, stating that “throughout the country, 
human rights violations remain endemic. These include murder, looting and 
destruction of property, use of child soldiers, kidnapping, discrimination of 
minorities, torture, unlawful arrest and detention, and denial of due process 
by local authorities. Gender-based violence is prevalent, including rape, 
female genital mutilation and domestic violence” (UNHCR 2004: 2). Such 
civil unrest prompts the continuous surge of refugees from Somalia, not only 
to neighbouring countries, but also beyond4 to Asia, Europe and North 
America.  
Somalis constitute an important diaspora in the world. In addition to 
Somalia’s neighbouring countries (Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen), 
Somalis settled in countries with which they had colonial links (Great Britain, 
Italy); countries in which they had traditional and historical labour 
opportunities (the Gulf states) or regions considered as “lands of plenty” 
(Pérouse de Montclos 2003) such as Canada, the Netherlands, or the 
Scandinavian countries. Today, as many as one million refugees have 
 
4 For instance, more than 10,000 new applications were filed in 2004 only in industrialized 
countries, according to UNHCR figures (UNHCR 2005b). 
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repatriated (UNHCR 2003), especially from African countries, and many 
others have gained citizenship of their host countries, particularly in 
industrialized states. 
The Somali diaspora has sometimes been described as encountering 
integration problems in many host countries, and of always being attached in 
their minds to their country of origin (Pérouse de Montclos 2003). A 
particular feature that has been extensively explored by many scholars is the 
considerable amount of remittances sent by the members of the diaspora to 
Somalia or to members of the family living in neighbouring countries 
(Ahmed 2000; Horst 2002b; Horst and Van Hear 2002). Somalis have even 
developed their own system of transferring remittances, called the Hawalad, 
which is a safe and efficient method of sending and receiving money. 
Although there are no accurate figures of how much money is channelled 
through this system, Gundel (2002) provides an estimation – considered as 
conservative by other authors – that approximately US$500 million are 
remitted annually. 
1.3 Trajectories and Secondary Movements 
While numerous studies have examined the causes of refugee movement and 
the legal/ public policy issues concerning such movements have been 
explored, asylum movements and trajectories have only recently become the 
subject of empirical enquiry. In such cases, the sociological studies tend to 
focus on the decision-making processes - either at the start of the migration 
process or during the following stages (choice of the routes and of the 
intermediaries). Research undertaken within Europe has focused primarily on 
how and why asylum-seekers choose their particular destination or host 
countries (see chapter 6.2.2 for a short review of literature). 
In some instances, the studies focused on the secondary movements of 
asylum seekers, refugees and migrants in general, but exclusively within 
Europe: for instance, the movements of Algerians from France to the UK 
(Collyer 2002, 2003). More recently, movements of naturalized European-
Somalis to the United Kingdom have gained a lot of attention and this is 
currently at the centre of policy decisions (see for instance Momatrade 
Consultancy 2004), as well as many research topics (Bang Nielsen 2004 for 
the case of Denmark; Van den Reek and Igeh Hussein 2003 for the case of 
the Netherlands). 
This study is concerned specifically with the secondary movements of Somali 
refugees both in Africa and Europe. In particular, it explores the underlying 
causes and motivations which prompt refugees to leave the host country (first 
country of asylum), especially in African countries and Yemen, but also in 
two European countries, in order to seek refuge or better opportunities in a 
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second or third country. Secondly, it documents the trajectories and strategies 
the community uses to reach their destination. A specific emphasis is placed 
on all aspects of the asylum system and the rights of refugees – both in theory 
and in practice. It includes a thorough analysis of essential elements such as: 
access to the asylum procedure, documentation, assistance and shelter, health 
services, education, employment and self-sufficiency, and lastly “durable 
solutions”. Since the context of protection and living conditions alone cannot 
explain secondary movements of refugees, our analysis also takes into 
account processes of collective decision-making and transnational strategies; 
the criteria related to the choice of a new host country, as well as social and 
smuggling networks. 
1.4 Content and Structure 
This report presents the overall findings of the study, and although it is based 
on the eight country studies, it is not a condensed and aggregated version of 
these reports. Instead, it analyzes the quantitative and qualitative data 
collected by using comparative analysis.  
After the first methodological explanation, chapter 2 briefly presents the 
eight case studies in order to give the reader an opportunity to grasp the 
social, economic and political contexts of each country study. This chapter is 
essential in that it provides the basis for the comparative nature of this 
analytical work, which is concerned with specific issues rather than the 
countries themselves (although many examples are provided from each case 
study). For each of the countries, the characteristics of the Somali population, 
the national legislation and the state’s general attitude toward Somali 
refugees are described in detail. The situation of the Somali refugees is 
examined in terms of their protection and living conditions. Trajectories, with 
a focus on previous and future secondary movements, are also presented. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the legal frameworks of the countries studied. 
International and national legislations, institutional framework and asylum-
related issues such as registration, documentation, asylum procedure, and the 
rights and entitlement of refugees are analysed. The aim of the chapter is not 
only to describe these aspects in theory, but rather to illustrate the actual 
practices at the national level. The analysis is drawn from interviews with 
key experts and the refugee community itself, and from the literature. This 
chapter also highlights the general conditions of protection and living in the 
different contexts studied, from the standpoint of the refugees. 
In subsequent chapters (4 and 5), movements in general, and (irregular) 
secondary movements of Somali refugees and asylum-seekers in particular, 
are investigated in detail. Again, the data for this analysis is based on the 
interviews conducted with refugees, experts and community leaders. Chapter 
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4 explores the main trajectories found (be they direct or with secondary 
movements). Other issues examined include the aspects linked to camp 
refugees versus undocumented exiles in Somalia’s neighbouring countries.  
Chapter 5 is dedicated to Somali refugees’ secondary movements as such, 
looking at them first from the point of view of their scope, then focusing on 
the motivations that push people to undertake them. The central importance 
of the legal status in the causes of secondary movements will be 
demonstrated, as well as other causes that are linked to the legal status. In the 
last section, the explanatory model of (irregular) secondary movements is 
completed with a paragraph about the elements facilitating or enabling such 
moves (such as social and smuggling networks) and a glimpse of the 
collective livelihood strategies of many Somali families, of which secondary 
movements are often part. 
Concluding remarks (chapter 6) will review the main results of the study, as 
well as shedding light on a few important points. The main trends in the 
attitudes of the host states and societies are summarized, and the 
responsibilities of the different actors involved pointed out. Lastly, the 
importance of understanding the Somali refugees’ strategies and creating 
policies that take these strategies into account will be examined. A few 
general recommendations are presented at the end of the report and concern 
the individual level, the meso level (implementation at the local level) and 
the national and international level of global refugee policies. 
1.5 Terminology5 
The term refugees is used in its generic sense, referring to Somali nationals 
who left Somalia because of the war and settled in another country, 
regardless of their official legal status (for an overview of the statuses 
included in the sample, see Table 38 in the annexe).  
Specific terms referring to legal statuses are also used. Asylum-seekers are 
defined as persons who have applied for international protection and are 
awaiting determination of their claims/applications. When referring to 
persons with formal refugee status, the term recognized refugees is used, 
irrespective of whether they are recognized on a prima facie basis or 
according to a refugee status determination (RSD). Subsidiary protected 
persons are persons who were not granted a Convention refugee status, but 
whose need of protection was nevertheless recognized. As such, their 
 
5 The following terms are used as working definitions in the study and do not have any 
legal or policy implications. 
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protection is assured only on a subsidiary basis. Undocumented persons are 
Somalis living illegally, or without any legal status, in the city/country of 
residence; it does not include camp-based refugees. In contrast, urban 
refugees are individuals living in urban areas (non-camp) and who may or 
may not have formal, legal registration.  
The focus in the legal and political debates is on irregular secondary 
movements (ISM). ISM refer to the illegal crossing of international borders 
which take place without the authorization of the country(ies) involved 
and/or with no or insufficient valid documentation required for travel. In 
addition, the study also includes regular secondary movements in its analysis 
and uses the terms secondary movement and onward movement 
interchangeably throughout the report. Furthermore, there is a time threshold 
for the definition of secondary movements in order to narrow the scope of 
analysis. Due to limitations implied by narrow legal definition6 when 
working with a complex empirical phenomenon, “secondary movement” was 
defined in this research as the onward international movement of a person 
who has settled in a country for at least one month prior to undertaking 
additional movement. A settlement country is defined as one in which a 
person stays for at least one month. Consequently, a direct journey or 
trajectory comprises the series of transit stops made by a mover without 
involving settlement (i.e. less than one month). 
Lastly, an explanatory note on the contentious name Somalia. It is a country 
in Eastern Africa (specifically the Horn) which is bounded by the Gulf of 
Aden to the north and the Indian Ocean to the east. It was constituted as an 
independent republic in 1960 by the union of British Somaliland with the 
trust territory formerly known as Italian Somaliland. In the text, there are 
references to north-east Somalia, (i.e. the current autonomous region known 
as Puntland) and north-west Somalia, (i.e. the self-proclaimed independent 
territory of Somaliland), as well as southern and central Somalia which 
constitute the rest of the country. In all other instances, Somalia refers to the 
entire national territory as currently recognized by the international 
community (i.e. region at independence). Although Somalis (i.e. nationals of 
Somalia)7 are the focus of the research, specific references to region of origin 
 
6 Although Excom Conclusion 57 includes a definition of (irregular) secondary 
movements, it is not unanimously followed in the practice. For a comprehensive 
discussion of definitions and concepts of so-called “safe third countries” or “first countries 
of asylum”, see Legomsky (2003). 
7 The difference between “Somali” and “Somalian” does not always find a consensus. In 
French, for example, the term Somali refers to ethnicity whereas in English it denotes 
either ethnicity or nationality. 
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will occasionally be indicated by the distinction “Somalilander” to denote 
Somalis inhabiting or originating from Somaliland.  
1.6 Methodology 
This report is based on the results of eight country studies carried out by 
independent researchers, in close cooperation with the coordinating team 
(SFM) of the study (see summaries in chapter 1). A research team, preferably 
local, although this was not always possible, was appointed in each of the 
countries surveyed, and the survey was conducted using a common 
methodology, with possible adjustments and flexibility of the research 
instruments when and if necessary in each country study. Three workshops 
were organized at different stages of the research process in order to facilitate 
meetings and discussions between the team leaders and the coordinators on 
the various aspects of the research project. These workshops were crucial in 
enabling a thorough discussion on the research methodology (number of 
interviews and sample, questionnaires, transcription, software, etc.), the 
challenges and problems encountered in the field, and the final results.  
Unlike the other country studies, specific arrangements were made for the 
Dutch and Kenyan studies. The Dutch survey has been included in the course 
of the overall study and consisted, for practical reasons due to particular time 
constraints, of a smaller sample compared to other cases. As for the Kenya 
case, unanticipated events by the selected team caused the cessation of the 
project, thus necessitating the appointment of a new team. For these reasons, 
the case study had to be condensed – in terms of budget, time and 
organisational structure – in order to complete the overall project on 
schedule. As a result, the study is based on interviews in Nairobi city only; no 
interviews were carried out with refugees in the camps, although testimonies 
from refugees who previously resided in the camps prior to moving to the 
city are utilized. Moreover, a relatively large corpus of secondary literature 
on Kenyan refugee camps gives voice to the realities of life for encamped 
refugees and thus partially fills the gap in the composition of the research 
(mainly Campbell 2005; Horst 2003; Human Rights Watch 2002; UNHCR 
2005a). 
The country studies were carried out between September 2004 and July 2005. 
Each of them took on average four months. In each of the countries, three 
major areas of investigation were included in the study:  
• An overview of refugee protection regimes, including law, policy and 
practice; 
• An examination of the motivations and movement strategies of Somali 
refugees and asylum-seekers; and,  
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• A collection of available statistical data (aggregated) and analysis of data 
to describe both movements (indirectly) and the populations concerned. 
The study therefore consisted of the analysis of available statistical data and 
documentation (official and grey literature), as well as of the interviews with 
the concerned parties – refugees, experts, and community leaders – which 
constitute the core data of the country studies.  
1.6.1 Interviews with Experts and Community Leaders 
In each country, interviews were carried out with community leaders, 
“privileged observers” and other experts, including representatives of the 
government, UNHCR, NGOs, lawyers, researchers, etc. These interviews 
were conducted using flexible questionnaires, which were adapted to each 
context and each interviewee. The aim was to achieve good insight into the 
current practice (rather than only the legal provisions) of refugee reception 
conditions and asylum procedures, as well as the state’s overall attitude 
towards Somali refugees. Community leaders, apart from being key 
informants, have also been very useful in helping researchers access and gain 
the trust of potential refugee interviewees. 
Table 1: Sample of experts and community leaders interviewed 





Kenya - 1 1 - 3 1 
Ethiopia 3 6 7 1 10 2 
Djibouti 4 5 2 - 1 3 
Yemen 3 1 2 1 2 - 
Egypt 3 3 8 - 2 1 
South Africa - 2 4 4 - - 
Switzerland 4 - 3 2 5 - 
Netherlands 7 - 2 1 - - 
Notes: More than one interview partner was present in some of the interviews. The category 
“other” refers to UN agencies or international organizations (IOM, WFP, UNESCO), 
representatives of foreign embassies, and a refugee camp doctor. 
 
Table 1 gives an overview of the number of experts interviewed in each 
country. The number and distribution of the interviews between the different 
categories were at the discretion of each country investigator, depending on 
his/her need for information, as well as the concrete opportunities for 
gathering data. For example, despite numerous attempts, the South African 
team was unable to obtain an interview with a government representative. 
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1.6.2 Interviews with Refugees 
In terms of numbers, approximately 120 (to 165) interviews were conducted 
with Somali refugees in each country8, with a total number of 814 interviews 
(Table 2). 
In all countries, the interviews were conducted using the same semi-
structured questionnaire, which contained open-ended questions to allow for 
qualitative analysis, as well as standardized questions for quantitative data 
analysis. The questionnaire was flexible enough to suit very different 
situations, but specific enough to allow for comparisons. Interviewees were 
selected through the researchers’ pre-existing networks or contacts with 
community leaders and NGOs; and in almost all cases, particularly in the 
urban areas, snowballing methods were used to reach potential interview 
partners.  
The overall research sample consisting of 814 refugee interviews is built on 
criteria corresponding to the empirical reality of the contexts (gender, age, 
education, clan, time of departure from Somalia, time of arrival in the host 
country, etc.). These data can thus be considered as portraying a realistic 
picture of the situation of Somali refugees in the eight countries studied9.  
Interviews were carried out by the country team leaders, with the assistance 
of skilled interviewers trained by the country leaders. The issue of building 
trust between the interviewer and the interviewee was critical to a successful 
outcome (Hynes 2003), and different methods (for example, the commitment 
of the principal researcher to volunteer in some of the Somali community 
activities) were used to attain this goal. Particular attention was paid to 
attaining a good mix of gender and language skills amongst the teams. When 
necessary, the interview was done with the help of an interpreter to avoid 
systematic bias in choosing persons proficient in English or in the official 
local language. Anonymity and confidentiality of the interviews were 
carefully stressed amongst the researchers, as well as with the refugees 
during the actual interviews. The research objectives were carefully 
explained in order to avoid giving rise to unintentional expectations10.  The 
neutrality and independence of the research and the researchers – particularly 
 
8 Except in The Netherlands and in Switzerland, where respectively 49 and 60 interviews 
were carried out. 
9 Though it is not possible to claim statistical representativity. 
10 Some interviewees believed, for example, that the researchers were affiliated with 
resettlement programmes. A clear and concise explanation of the interview was thus 
crucial in avoiding interviewee bias. 
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vis-à-vis official bodies (governmental and UNHCR) – was emphasized in an 
effort to gain balanced, impartial information on the refugees’ social 
conditions. Two of the teams were headed by Somalis, while some of the 
teams included Somali assistants. The issue of researcher/interviewer of the 
same origin as interviewees is often discussed in the methodological 
literature (Bloch 1999; Jacobsen and Landau 2003), and is considered to be 
both advantageous – especially in terms of linguistic and cultural knowledge, 
and access to the community – and disadvantageous because it poses 
problems of bias and lack of confidentiality.  














Recording the interviews proved to be a problem for many interviewees and 
this method was discontinued in favour of note-taking. Detailed summaries 
of the transcriptions were made into an Access (software) mask prepared by 
SFM for all country teams. In order to ensure that all transcriptions into the 
Access mask had been done completely, accurately and in the same fashion, 
an extensive “cleaning” of the database was performed before merging the 
eight databases for the overall analysis. The data was then transferred to a 
software also allowing for statistical analysis (SPSS). 
Table 2 illustrates the number of interviews carried out in each country. More 
specifically, the tables describing the sample (annex 1) illustrates gender 
equality – equal number of women and men interviewed in the overall 
survey, although differences exist between specific country studies. The 
majority of the interviewees are young – 64% of them between the ages of 20 
and 40 years old at the time of the interview – and married (55%). The level 
of education (including the education received in the host country) varies, 
with important differences between the host countries. Of the total population 
surveyed, 43% were illiterate (no education at all), with many of these cases 
residing in South Africa, Djibouti and Ethiopia, and fewer cases in European 
countries. Only 7% had attained university level education and they reside in 
all countries surveyed, although Netherlands had a slightly higher population 
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of educated refugees. In terms of their employment/professional activity, 
55% of the sample were unemployed, while the rest were occupied with one 
or more income generating activities.  
The legal status of the interviewees varies according to each context: the 
sample contains Convention, OAU and prima facie refugees, as well as 
undocumented persons, asylum-seekers and subsidiary admitted persons. 
Both camp refugees and urban refugees were interviewed. 
1.6.3 Analysis 
The overall database of more than 800 migration/flight histories is a rich 
source of information, and the combination of methods utilized allows for the 
identification of well-documented trends. Interviews with refugees have been 
analysed using both a qualitative approach – mainly inspired by grounded 
theories (Glaser and Strauss 1967) – and a quantitative one (mainly 
consisting in bivariate and multivariate analyses carried out through a 
statistics software program). Both methods allowed exploratory analyses that 
have provided viable evidence to support existing theories, as well as new 
hypotheses concerning refugee movements. Moreover, the findings of the 
analysis of the interviews have been compared with the results of more than 
100 expert interviews carried out in all settings, as well as with secondary 
literature (scientific literature, administrative, official and grey 
documentation, statistical figures, etc.). 
1.6.4 The Scientific Advisory Board 
A scientific advisory board composed of experts followed the progress of 
the study. Its functions were: 
• To stimulate critical reflection on the research process regarding both 
substance and methodology (in accordance with the project outline) 
• To provide advice on various aspects of the research, including the 
applicable legal frameworks and discussions on managing unexpected 
issues/concerns arising from implementation of the research 
• To facilitate, whenever possible, access of researchers to the field and to 
different actors (governments, NGOs, etc.) through existing contacts 
• To deliver opinions on the presentation of results and relations between 
research interests and the Convention Plus initiative, and deal with 
information strategies towards participants and partner organisations 
The scientific experts of the scientific advisory board are: Dr. Jeff Crisp 
(Global Commission on International Migration), Mrs. Diane Goodman 
(Human Rights Watch), Prof. Walter Kälin (University of Bern) and Prof. 
Rodreck Mupedziswa (University of Zimbabwe). 
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At different stages of the research process, the methods, findings and analysis 
of the project were presented during several workshops with the researchers 
and with members of the scientific advisory board.  
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2 Case Studies 
The summaries of the case studies, presented in alphabetical order, 
contextualize each country study, thus developing a basis for the overall 
comparative analysis11. In every case, the characteristics of the Somali 
population, the national legislation and the state’s general attitude toward 
Somali refugees are briefly described, as well as the situation of the Somali 
refugees, in terms of protection and living conditions. Finally trajectories, 
with a focus on previous or future secondary movements, are presented. 
Table 3 indicates the number of the refugee (or total) Somali population in 
the countries surveyed. 
Table 3: Estimations of Somali refugee population (bold) in 2004 
Country Somali refugee population (estimation) 
Kenya ~154,000 refugees in camps (UNHCR) and 20,000 – 60,000 in urban areas 
(unregistered) 
Ethiopia 13,000 – 17,000 camp refugees (government, UNHCR) and 15,000 to 
45,000 in urban areas 
Yemen 47,000 – 64,000 refugees; majority in urban areas, of which 7,500 in camp 
(UNHCR) 
Djibouti 11,000 – 17,000 refugees in camps (UNHCR); ~3,000 in urban areas 
(unregistered); important reduction compared to 2003 
Egypt ~4,000 registered refugees (UNHCR) 
Sth Africa ~ 7,000 refugees (including 4,700 asylum-seekers) (UNHCR, government) 
Switzerland 3,700 refugees, most with subsidiary protection, 5,000 Somali citizens 
(government) 
Netherlands 11,200 refugees (UNHCR); ~27,000 of Somali origin (government) 
390,000 Somali refugees in the world at the end of 2004 (UNHCR 2005b) 
Note: In several countries consistent figures were not available for various reasons (definitions, 
differences between government and IOs, between IOs at local and global level, etc.); in this case 
we decided to indicate the range of numbers indicated in various sources. Estimates about urban 
population concern unregistered refugees (sources: literature, experts, media, etc.). 
 





Djibouti, being part of the Somali-speaking region (it was called La Côte 
Française des Somaliens before independence in 1977) was a natural 
destination for Somalis seeking refuge and safety since the late 1980s when 
the civil war broke out in northern Somalia (currently referred to as 
Somaliland) and later on when the country dissolved into anarchy and chaos. 
In 2004, according to UNHCR, there were approximately 17,000 Somali 
refugees and asylum-seekers receiving protection and assistance in Djibouti. 
This number does not include undocumented migrants, and approximately 
8,440 refugees who were repatriated back to Somaliland. In addition, such 
figures cannot be considered as fully reliable because all attempts to carry out 
a thorough counting/registration of refugees have consistently failed over the 
last eight years. All registered refugees and asylum-seekers live in three 
camps – Hol-Hol, Ali-Addeh, and Aour-Aoussa – which are based on a range 
of about 100 km from Djibouti City. The majority of Somali refugees hosted 
in Djibouti originated from Somaliland (roughly 70%) while a smaller 
population comes from south/central Somalia.  
Djibouti is a signatory state to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, 
and though it has not signed the 1969 OAU Convention, it applies de facto its 
principles. In 1977, the country adopted a national refugee law which adheres 
to international norms and principles and established ad hoc organizations, 
like the National Eligibility Committee, the Refugee Eligibility Office, and 
the Office of National Assistance for Refugees and Disaster Prevention 
(ONARS), in order to manage refugee matters. Responsibility for reception 
and registration of refugees, as well as the delivery of basic services, are 
shared between the Djiboutian government (mainly the Ministry of Home 
Affairs through the above mentioned agencies) and UNHCR, which occupied 
a prominent role in refugee reception prior to 1999. Until the late 1990s, 
when refugee status determination procedures were sometimes provided, a 
prima facie policy was adopted towards Somali asylum-seekers. 
Although the legal framework for asylum is quite developed in Djibouti 
compared to other African countries, its practical implementation is very 
problematic. While most refugees find entry into Djibouti simple and 
straight-forward (border crossing is facilitated by porous frontiers and 
traditional migration paths), procedures for registration and identification are 
complicated for some, and non-existent for many. After 1999, the general 
decline in refugee flow prompted UNHCR to transfer the acceptance process 
to the country’s authorities and this shift of responsibility has engendered a 
deterioration in the asylum system. Bribes, discriminatory actions favouring 
Issa clan members (due to their kinship with the majority clan in the country), 
and general mismanagement of the offices have been reported by most 
refugees and asylum-seekers surveyed. This resulted in the indefinite closure 
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of the office in charge of registration and identification and, with the 
exception of a temporary and partial RSD session in late 2003-2004, it 
remains non-operational. The closure dramatically affects those who urgently 
require immediate assistance; indeed, asylum-seekers can no longer be 
referred to any governmental authority to attempt registration in Djibouti. 
The situation has been strongly censured by the humanitarian community, 
including UNHCR, which has called for a complete restructuring of the 
asylum institutions.  
In August 2003, the Republic of Djibouti introduced a new policy aimed at 
curtailing the influx of illegal migrants into the country. The new policy set a 
deadline (31 August 2003) for the forcible expulsion of all undocumented 
migrants. Those remaining behind risked detention or deportation to their 
homelands. All urban-based asylum-seekers were forced to accept camp 
settlement at Aour-Aoussa, a newly established refugee transit centre. The 
outcome of this procedure has led to the rejection of all applicants from 
Somaliland, on the basis of peace and stability in their region of origin, 
whereas nearly all south/central Somali refugees were granted prima facie 
status due to ongoing civil strife in the country. 
Apart from education and health services which meet refugees’ basic needs, 
nearly all refugees surveyed revealed that living conditions in Djibouti range 
from sub-standard to inhabitable. Refugees in camps note that of the 
numerous problems they face, lack of adequate food is the primary concern, 
followed by lack of personal security. For the past ten years, refugees have 
received a quota of rations according to family size, but in the last two years, 
a combination of factors has resulted in the drastic reduction of food 
distributions. All interviewees revealed that the rations they receive are 
inadequate for the number of family members in the household. In almost all 
cases, there appears to be a major discrepancy between actual family size and 
the number of dependents indicated in the family ration card – as there has 
not been an accurate re-registration of refugees since 1997. The lack of up-to-
date statistics means that no children born after the last registration have been 
recorded in ration cards and therefore families do not receive the proper 
quantities of food needed.  
As noted in other surveyed countries, WFP has dramatically reduced food 
distributions to all refugees, in addition to blocking food supply to all 
Somaliland refugees living in Aour-Aoussa camp since they rejected the 
initial offer of repatriation. It thus appears that cessation of food aid to 
Somaliland refugees at Aour-Aoussa is a deliberate policy aimed at enforcing 
voluntary repatriation, in addition to conserving limited food stockpiles. At 
present, this group remains status-less and has no access to food and medical 
care, although it continues to live in the camp. Most affected by the food 
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ration policy are the vulnerable groups – children, elderly, pregnant/lactating 
women. 
Personal security has been reported as a major concern especially by refugee 
women living in Aour-Aoussa: more than half of the women surveyed 
expressed fear of rape in or around the camps. According to respondents, 
conditions are slightly better in Ali-Addeh and Hol-Hol camps, but they are 
still deemed to be unsatisfactory.  
The situation of urban exiles is not much better than those in camps. 
Although many Somalis consciously choose to live in the city and avoid the 
asylum process, they nevertheless suffer from the harsh living conditions of 
working illegally in a foreign country. Police harassment, threats of detention 
for engaging in illegal employment, and threats of consequent refoulement, 
exploitation and mistreatment make refugees’ life particularly challenging.  
Less than a third of the individuals surveyed reported that they had 
undertaken multiple movements from one country to another in search of 
better asylum opportunities. Most of them had previously sojourned in 
Ethiopia or in Kenya. Those who have experienced secondary movement are 
generally refugees from south/central Somalia, who initially fled to Ethiopia 
because it was the closest zone of safety. After reaching Ethiopian frontiers, 
most refugees undertook multiple movements until they either temporarily 
settled within the country, or began their secondary move towards Djibouti. 
A frequent explanation for many secondary movers from Ethiopia to Djibouti 
includes the desire to be amongst Somalis in a Somali setting. Others simply 
found living conditions in Ethiopian camps unbearable and opted to move on 
to a “Somali territory”, where better treatment was expected. Many assumed 
that resettlement opportunities were available in Djibouti. 
In contrast, those not having experienced any movement are mainly rural 
people who led extremely difficult livelihoods as pastoralists and who find 
the immobility in camp life, although poor, somewhat preferable to their 
previous existence. Allegedly, the refugees not having experienced secondary 
movements or not willing to do so fall into two categories: (i) Somalilanders 
who have acquired Djiboutian citizenship, or (ii) Djiboutian citizens who are 
desperate to escape their poverty and thus claim asylum as Somalilanders. 
Considering the size of this population, such allegations have prompted 
humanitarian agencies to demand government action in undertaking a 
thorough counting and re-registration of refugees or else risk the possibility 
of certain camps being permanently closed.  
Finally, almost all the interviewees surveyed are willing to leave Djibouti for 
another place (one third for the homeland and the rest for various 
destinations), although only few had concrete plans to leave. The dramatic 
impact of such outcome can be better appreciated if we consider the lack of 
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durable solutions in this country. Indeed, the lack of economic opportunities 
makes local integration impossible; there has been no resolution to the 
suspension of UNHCR resettlement programmes which have effectively 
curtailed legal migration from Djibouti since 2001, and lastly, voluntary 
repatriation is an opportunity available to Somalilanders at present. 
UNHCR’s goal for 2005 is to repatriate 8,000 refugees to Somaliland, 
although the great majority often withdraw their initial consent because of the 
lack of concrete development opportunities in their homeland which, 
unfortunately, makes Djibouti more habitable than Somalia.  
2.2 Egypt 
After the Palestinians and the Sudanese, Somalis are the third largest group 
of refugees in Egypt, with approximately 4,000 persons registered by 
UNHCR12. Egypt has signed both the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1969 
OAU Convention and the commitment to these international conventions 
translates into fairly generous admission rights for refugees, namely, 
renewable temporary residence permits and the right to non-refoulement. 
However, five reservations made to the 1951 Convention, notably on the 
articles concerning labour legislation and access to education and the lack of 
comprehensive national legislation regulating refugee affairs, suggest that the 
Egyptian government would prefer Egypt to be a transit country rather than a 
permanent host country destination for its refugee population. The 
“transitory” situation of refugees is also perpetuated by the fact that they are 
not eligible for Egyptian citizenship.  
The Egyptian government delegated the management of asylum procedures 
for all refugees (with the exception of Palestinians) to UNHCR Cairo office. 
These activities include registration, status determination procedure, durable 
solution interviews, etc. UNHCR works closely with the ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and of Interior Affairs in the administration of refugee affairs 
(e.g. distribution of residence permits and matters relating to detention). 
UNHCR staff are aware of many of the problems encountered by refugees in 
Egypt and have been undertaking efforts to address them, both by negotiating 
and lobbying the Egyptian government, and by working directly with refugee 
associations. 
A small number of Somalis lived in Cairo before the civil war; some were 
students, some were diplomats and their families, and others were 
 
12 An unknown number of unregistered Somali migrants reside in Cairo, mostly awaiting 
emigration to the industrialized countries. 
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transnational Somali families whose breadwinners worked in Gulf countries. 
The first large wave of refugees arrived in the early 1990s, either directly 
from Somalia or from Saudi Arabia/other Gulf countries where they had been 
living previously. The majority of this group had a high educational level, 
and most of them have since resettled in the industrialized countries. The vast 
majority of those currently residing in Egypt arrived after 1999 and they have 
a much lower educational level, many of them being single mothers with 
children.  
According to UNHCR data, refugees with a history of secondary movements 
constituted a large sector of the total Somali refugee group in the late 1990s, 
while the majority of the Somali refugees who arrived recently came directly 
from their homeland. A recent trend, however, is that of Somali families 
resettling in Egypt after obtaining citizenship in industrialized countries. 
Approximately 200 Somali families (often mothers and children) live in 
Cairo in an effort to raise the children in an environment culturally 
comparable to that of Somalia. These moves are also methods by which 
families maximize available resources.  
Somali refugees are predominately concentrated in two poor neighbourhoods 
in Cairo and their vicinities (Ard il Liwa and Nasr City) where they mostly 
share small, shabby apartments with many other families or single people. 
The current recognition rate of Somali refugees is close to 100%. They are 
recognized either on the basis of the 1951 Geneva Convention or on the basis 
of the 1969 OAU Convention13. This very high recognition rate is a fairly 
new trend, based on a UNHCR position paper published in 2003 that 
recommended giving refugees originating from southern Somalia a refugee 
status or at least a complementary form of protection. 
To assist refugees with sustenance and access to educational and health 
services, UNHCR offers recognized refugees several forms of assistance 
through partnership with NGOs. However, only a small number of vulnerable 
refugees are financially assisted by UNCHR and many note that obtaining the 
funds is often problematic while the health services are insufficient. 
Education grants provided by UNHCR only partially cover the school fees 
and are only reimbursed after the parents prove payment. A government 
decree in 2000 allowed Somali refugee children access to free education in 
public schools but this has not been implemented on a regular basis and 
 
13 The main difference between the two statuses is that under 1951 Convention refugees 
may qualify for resettlement while OAU Convention refugees are not considered for a 
durable solution interview with UNHCR officials. 
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remains unclear in terms of what and how many institutions are involved in 
this programme. Few families can afford to send their children to private 
schools; in many cases, refugee children attend schools run by Al-Azhar 
University which offer a combination of religious and secular curriculum to 
non-Egyptian Muslims. Still, many Somali refugee children remain without 
any kind of formal schooling. Many Somali families have a negative opinion 
of the public schooling system in Cairo. Many believe that these institutions 
are inadequate in preparing their children for life and schooling in 
industrialized countries, which is where most families want to resettle14.  
With regard to employment, Egyptian law treats refugees like foreigners; in 
other words, refugees must go through a difficult and costly procedure in 
order to obtain a work permit and, as a result of these legal and economic 
constraints, none of the refugees are able to obtain a work permit and work 
legally.  
Many Somali refugees in Egypt are secondary movers. According to experts 
interviewed, the secondary movements of asylum-seekers do not legally 
influence their status determination, especially if they had “valid reasons” for 
moving from the former country of settlement15. In practice, however, these 
movements make it less likely that they will be granted recognition according 
to the 1951 Convention, which ultimately reduces their eligibility for 
resettlement. In the sample, the primary countries of settlement prior to 
arriving in Egypt were Saudi Arabia and Kenya, followed by Ethiopia, 
Yemen and Libya. In these cases, a majority of refugees spent, on average, 
about two years prior to undertaking a secondary movement.  
Most of the Somalis who lived in Saudi Arabia were undocumented and 
worked illegally, and their motivation for further movement was lack of legal 
protection, abuse and exploitation by employers, and the lack of education 
for their children. Interviewees who migrated from Kenya noted abuse by 
police officials (harassment, money extortion, and intimidation), difficult and 
unsafe living conditions in refugee camps, precarious legal status in the cities 
and the lack of employment possibilities as crucial reasons for moving 
onwards. Refugees from Ethiopia noted difficult camp conditions 
(particularly insufficient food), lack of education for the children and lack of 
access to employment as key reasons for moving. Interviewees who stayed in 
 
14 This view was expressed both by some refugees, NGO representatives and government 
officials. 
15 “Valid reasons” are, according to UNHCR, risk of refoulement, arbitrary detention, 
physical assaults, absence of educational and employment possibilities, and the non-
availability of long-term solutions. 
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Yemen complained about the living conditions in the camps (lack of basic 
needs such as food and health services) and the difficulties in finding a job, 
especially for the male refugees. The main problems reported by refugees 
who had lived in Libya include lack of protection by UNHCR, abuse by 
employers and public experiences of racism. All these reasons were motives 
for moving and seeking protection, access to better education and healthcare, 
and an opportunity to seek resettlement elsewhere, namely in Egypt. 
In order to enter Egypt, whether by air, land, or sea, all refugees were 
required to display a visa and passport. In most cases the visa was purchased 
with the help of middlemen or family members already in Egypt. For the 
most part, refugees travelled with Somali passports purchased in an unofficial 
office in Mogadishu which were nevertheless recognized by the Egyptian 
government16.  
Since access to the labour market is very difficult, if not impossible, the 
refugees’ main sources of income are remittances, small income generating 
projects17, and community-based assistance. Most refugees lead harsh and 
precarious lives and feel they have no viable future in the country. The 
challenging economic conditions and the lack of opportunities for integration 
thus contribute to the desire to seek better perspectives elsewhere, mainly 
through resettlement programmes in industrialized countries. Frequently, this 
search for the possibility of a life with long-term stability is part of the 
refugees’ collective strategies. In other words, refugees often move not only 
for themselves but also for a transnational circle of inter-linked family 
members, which makes the desire (or necessity) for resettlement even 
stronger. However, the resettlement rate of Somali refugees remains very low 
(between January and September 2004, only 271 Somali refugees were 
resettled) and industrialized countries seem more and more unwilling to 
resettle Somali refugees for a number of reasons, including previous 
experience of unsuccessful integration of resettled Somalis, fear of terrorism 
and anti-Muslim sentiments among local populations.  
2.3 Ethiopia 
Ethiopia has been an important asylum country for Somali refugees. Since 
1988, it hosted an estimated 630,000 Somali refugees, including an important 
 
16 This is a rare gesture of goodwill given that the international community rejects Somali 
passports as valid travel document 
17 These are mostly informal activities such as domestic work, petty sales, teaching and 
are contained within the Somali community. 
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number of Ethiopian returnees who had fled from Ethiopia to Somalia mostly 
during the Ogadeen war in 197718. Large repatriation schemes have been 
implemented in Ethiopia with a degree of success. According to UNHCR 
statistics in 2002, approximately 250,000 Somali refugees had voluntarily 
repatriated from Ethiopia, mainly to Somaliland. Moreover, a large number 
of camp refugees have been locally dispersed, which suggests that many 
locals or returnees had settled in the camps. Out of the eight original refugee 
camps, only Kebribeyah camp remains open as of May 2005.  
Today, Somali refugees in Ethiopia can be divided into three major 
categories – encamped, urban and undocumented. According to UNHCR 
statistics, there are officially 10,344 camp-based refugees, although in reality 
this figure could be upwards of 14,000, since children born after 1997 have 
not been registered. Statistics also note that there are 229 urban refugees 
living in Addis Ababa (mainly for medical or protection reasons). According 
to unofficial sources, however, there are 30,000-45,000 unregistered refugees 
living illegally in the capital city.  
Ethiopia’s 2004 Refugee Proclamation has incorporated the fundamental 
principles of the 1951 Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention, to which 
it is signatory, into domestic legislation. However, several articles remain 
ambiguous in terms of their practical implementation while in other cases, the 
implementation of the policy has been delayed19. Ethiopia has also made two 
reservations to the Geneva Convention, regarding access to employment and 
education, which is a clear indication that the Ethiopian government is not 
interested in enabling the refugee population to integrate locally.  
The Agency of Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) is the governmental 
agency charged with all matters pertaining to refugee affairs – including 
decision-making on refugee claims and management of refugee protection 
and assistance programmes. Officially, UNHCR has observer status only, but 
in practice it is heavily involved in all refugee matters, including the 
 
18 These persons are officially not considered as refugees by UNHCR, although a number 
of them settled in the Somali refugee camps in Ethiopia. Somali-Ethiopians and Somali 
refugees share the same cultural background and language and some even belong to the 
same clan or sub-clan. This makes it difficult to differentiate between genuine refugees 
and the local opportunists.  
19 Article 17 of the Appeal Hearing Council is for example not implemented yet and its 
implications in practice are still unclear, particularly as regards the “reasonable” period of 
time within which the refugee will be notified about the Council’s decision which is not 
specified in law. 
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financing of ARRA. Both agencies are interdependent as neither is able to 
accomplish its mandate without financial or political support from the other. 
During the large influx of Somali refugees fleeing the civil war, collective 
admission on a prima facie basis was the rule. In 1996, an RSD procedure 
was set up for all new refugees with RSD reviewing performed for all camp 
refugees20 in 2004. In theory, the procedure was designed to identify 
“genuine” refugees who required protection and assistance; to repatriate 
refugees originating from north-west and north-east Somalia (Somaliland and 
Puntland, respectively, as these regions were deemed to be safe zones), and 
lastly, to disperse the locals who had settled in the camps and received 
assistance since the arrival of the refugees. In reality, the initiative was 
confined to a simple re-registration rather than an actual RSD review and no 
revalidation of the camp population was done at the same time (e.g. no 
adaptation of the ration cards to the actual family size was made). A 
computerized revalidation, a Progressive Profile Project, is envisioned for the 
near future. 
Camp refugees as well as experts report major hardship in the camps due to 
insufficient food rations, scarcity of water and firewood, and insufficient or 
incompetent health service. Different official and unofficial reasons are 
mentioned for the constant reductions of the food rations: budget reductions, 
lack of up-to-date statistics on family size, fraud and corruption surrounding 
food distribution. Many interviewees also report abusive behaviour by the 
ARRA staff toward refugees (especially harassment, abuse, and intimidation) 
and the non-intervention of UNHCR in those incidents.  
In terms of access to education, while primary and secondary education is 
available, school enrolment remains under 50% according to official 
statistics. This is notably due to the high level of child labour: children, 
especially girls, are sent to work as domestic servants in nearby towns to help 
supplement family income and to supply essential items such as clothes. The 
situation of youngsters above school age is also highly problematic, as they 
have no opportunity for education, training or employment. This leads to 
high levels of frustration amongst teenagers, often resulting in violent 
behaviour. 
As for unregistered refugees, they live in the capital city on relatively 
peaceful terms as their stay, albeit illegal, is tolerated by the government 
(which is on good terms with the Somali government), by the police forces 
 
20 In reality, only the head of the family, mostly male, was interviewed on behalf of his 
dependents/family. 
  36 
and by the general population. However, since they are not considered as 
refugees by the government or UNHCR, they have no access to protection or 
assistance. They rely on their own networks for survival, with their social 
conditions ranging from grave, especially for the most vulnerable persons 
(widows and single mothers with children notably) to fairly good for those 
who can obtain employment, send their children to private schools and 
finance their medical care and other basic needs. Although many urban 
refugees receive remittances from abroad, some resort to purchasing 
Ethiopian ID cards (which seem easy to obtain especially in the Somali 
region of Ethiopia) in order to gain access to legal residence and 
employment. Those unable to access such resources are forced to live in 
difficult conditions, with very little income, insufficient food, no access to 
education or health services or adequate housing. 
There are numerous reasons for the high number of Somali refugees who did 
not register in the camps. The primary rationale is that many believe that 
Somali refugees are not accepted in the camps anymore. It is difficult to 
ascertain the accuracy of this idea, although many refugees report that they 
were unable to register at the camps in recent years. The small number of 
applications (none in 2003, 26 families in 2004) officially registered by 
ARRA provides a clue as to the challenges many refugees face in accessing 
the asylum system. On the other hand, many refugees prefer not to register 
because they know of the harsh living conditions in the remote camps and the 
lack of opportunities for self-sufficiency (higher education, vocational 
training, and working opportunities) and durable solutions. 
In terms of trajectory, most of the Somali refugees in Ethiopia came directly 
from Somalia. However, among the unregistered refugees, a significant 
number spent a few years in refugee camps in Kenya, returned to Somalia 
and, because of the ongoing civil strife, moved to Addis Ababa where they 
hoped to find a better livelihood than in Kenya. Other refugees spent time in 
Djibouti, Yemen or Saudi Arabia before coming to Ethiopia and their reasons 
for leaving the first country of settlement are akin to those found in the other 
country studies: difficult living conditions (particularly in the camps), 
restrictive policies limiting mobility of refugees (Djiboutian directive 
expelling all undocumented migrants), and the common expulsions of illegal 
residents from Saudi Arabia to Somalia.  
The majority of refugees choose Ethiopia chiefly because of its proximity 
and ease in crossing borders without documentation. Unregistered refugees 
specifically choose Ethiopia because they have the possibility of living and 
working there without penalty, as well as the prospect of raising and 
educating their children in a relatively peaceful environment. Yet others opt 
to come to Ethiopia in order to have access to the resettlement opportunities, 
particularly through family reunification programmes.  
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Regarding prospects for future movements, a distinction has to be made 
between camp refugees, unregistered urban refugees and recognized urban 
refugees. Camp refugees find living conditions in the remaining camps so 
inhospitable that if given the option they would prefer to return home rather 
than remain in exile. Given that refugees from south and central Somalia are 
ineligible for voluntary repatriation, they are forced to remain in the camp, 
unless they can secure the resources required to return independently, which 
happens rarely. Local integration is not possible and resettlement 
programmes are becoming increasingly infrequent and are available to urban 
refugees only. As a result, encamped refugees are literally bound to remain in 
the camp unless or until alternative solutions are created.  
Unregistered urban refugees, on the other hand, can be categorized in three 
groups (equal in our sample): those who wish to remain in Ethiopia; those 
who would prefer to move onward to an industrialized country, mostly 
through family reunification programmes, and lastly, those who remain 
uncertain about their future, and who belong mainly to the poor and 
vulnerable sectors. Very few unregistered refugees consider returning to their 
homeland, while nearly all urban refugees hope to resettle abroad. On the 
whole, only a few refugees reported plans to leave the country by their own 
means or through smuggling agents. However, this is countered by findings 
in further countries (Egypt, Switzerland and the Netherlands) that Addis 
Ababa appears to be a relatively important transit country for Somali 
refugees wanting to move onward. Moreover, only a small percentage of 
those hoping for family reunification will succeed: those who fail might well 
turn to illegal ways to travel and join their family members abroad. 
In conclusion, it appears that refugees with personal resources or networks 
can find a way toward durable solutions by themselves, either because they 
have family members abroad with whom they can be reunified (in a few 
cases through irregular means), or because they purchased an Ethiopian ID 
which allows them to live and work legally in the city21. In contrast, few 
amongst the most vulnerable refugees can hope to access UNHCR 
resettlement programmes. The remaining population consists of refugees 
with limited or no resources leading difficult lives in the camps and cities, 
without any protection at all if they are unregistered, and with very 
insufficient and inadequate protection if they are recognized refugees. 
 
21 The high number of refugees who preferred to be “dispersed” rather than voluntarily 
repatriated when the camps closed, although probably mostly composed of Ethiopian 
locals, also shows a possible local integration for a few “genuine” refugees who chose this 
option. 
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2.4 Kenya 
For Somalis forced to escape the civil war, Kenya, like all other neighbouring 
countries, represented a safe destination. Due to its geographic proximity and 
traditional migration paths (a large Somali-speaking population lives on the 
Kenyan side of the border between the two countries), hundreds of thousands 
of Somali exiles crossed the border since the Somali civil war began. 
According to UNHCR, by March 2005 Kenya had hosted some 245,000 
refugees, of which 162,000 were Somalis. Since Kenya has an encampment 
policy, the largest majority of Somali refugees and asylum-seekers reside in 
Dadaab camp (145,000 in March 2005); there is also a substantial population 
(approximately 22,000) based in Kakuma camp. While a small number of 
refugees are allowed to reside in Nairobi for medical or security reasons, a 
substantial population (ranging from 15,000-60,000) live without 
authorisation in Nairobi, mainly in the Eastleigh area. The overwhelming 
majority of these exiles originate from south and central Somalia, whereas 
most of those originating from the northern regions of Somalia have since 
returned. 
Kenya is a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention, its 1967 New York 
Protocol and the 1969 OAU Convention, although it has never incorporated 
these principles into national legislation. Hence, there is no national, legal or 
institutional framework for refugee protection available. As a result of 
intensive co-operation between the Kenyan government and UNHCR, a 
Refugee Bill has been presented in Parliament in 2003, though it has not yet 
been approved. Consequently, refugee matters fall under the general Aliens’ 
legislation even if de facto local authorities take into account prescriptions of 
international refugee law such as the non-refoulement principle. There is a 
National Refugee Secretariat, responsible for the management of refugee 
matters, which is currently under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Immigration and Registration of Persons. However, due to the lack of staff 
and enforceable legislation, the role of this office remains unclear.  
Despite the lack of national law, Kenya had, until the early 1990s, a refugee 
status determination procedure under the 1951 Convention. According to 
UNHCR, in mid 2004 about 12,500 refugees still enjoyed that protection 
(which allowed for freedom of movement and right to employment). But 
following the massive influx of refugees from Sudan and Somalia from 1993 
onwards, the responsibility for refugee registration and status determination 
has shifted to UNHCR and a prima facie policy has been adopted. Whether 
recognized after an individual status determination or on prima facie basis as 
is the case for Somalis, the great majority of the refugees and asylum-seekers 
registered in Kenya are regarded as ‘mandate refugees’. Such status foresees 
a more limited standard of treatment of refugees. However, a limited part of 
the refugee population (20% according to UNHCR) holds individual 
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documentation which confirms their status and thus protects them from 
potential abuses. Furthermore, different types of documents produced over 
the past years such as alien identity cards for government-registered 
Convention refugees, Refugee Certificates for mandate refugees living 
outside camps, movement passes for refugees in need of transit between 
camps or city, and ration cards for camp-based refugees, do not contribute to 
improving the situation.  
Life in camps is reported to be harsh in Kenya, as in other surveyed 
countries. The most salient concerns raised by refugees are: food scarcity 
(malnutrition dramatically increases cases of neonatal deaths); physical 
insecurity and sexual abuses suffered by women collecting firewood; and 
scarce or non-existent opportunities for education and jobs. Primary school is 
attended only by a limited number of children and the offer of secondary 
education is well below the refugees’ needs. However, the survey also 
illustrates that education opportunity, although restricted to a part of the 
refugees, is the main reason families with children register and remain in the 
camps while the husbands seek work in the city. Indeed, employment in the 
camps is limited to income generating activities, short-term stints with 
humanitarian actors or menial odd jobs in or around the camps. Local 
authorities recently imposed a ban on animal husbandry and farming in 
Dadaab camp when refugees began fencing land belonging to the Somali 
Kenyan host community.  
To escape the situation in the camps, a considerable portion of Somali exiles 
move to urban centres like Nairobi or to the small towns of the North-eastern 
province, which are populated by Somali-Kenyans. However, this movement 
entails the loss of protection guaranteed by UNHCR and access to basic 
services offered in camps. Moreover, local labour laws which prohibit 
refugees from engaging in economic activities oblige them to seek 
employment in the informal market. Hence, most Somali refugees are 
employed as casual workers in shops, lodges, households and restaurants, 
while a minority, mostly comprising refugees from the early influxes, are 
able to engage successfully in business activities in partnership with Kenyan-
Somalis (i.e. shopping malls in Eastleigh) and thus appear to be well 
integrated in the urban context.  
Refugees who choose to live outside the camps (‘illegals’) are exposed to 
severe risk of detention and police persecution: almost all the Somali 
interviewees based in Nairobi had been arrested at least once since their 
arrival in the city. Somalis seem to be a particular target for local police: 
indeed, most of the interviewees admit to having paid bribes to the Kenyan 
police to avoid detention. It appears that recent threats by the Kenyan 
government to repatriate Somali refugees are encouraging similar deviant 
behaviour by police officers.  
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Two types of movements emerged in this case study: one relating to 
displacements within the country, mainly from camps to cities, and the other 
concerning movements from Kenya to other countries. Because of the 
difficult conditions refugees encounter in camps, those who possess 
intellectual and material resources (including remittances) prefer cities to 
camps. As in other surveyed countries, the most resource-deprived 
individuals remain in the camp whereas others try to find a better life in 
town. Reasons for in-country movement relate to: difficulties in camp 
registration (25% of the refugees interviewed in Nairobi applied for asylum 
in camps but their request was never registered); physical insecurity, 
especially for cultural minorities; and search for employment opportunities. 
However, once in Nairobi, 40% of those interviewed still did not experience 
any significant improvement in their situation and therefore envisage further 
movements. Such movements will only occur if they can assemble resources 
required to undertake the journey (i.e. family or kinship networks abroad as 
well as some savings). Though the majority of interviewees declare 
willingness to live elsewhere, only a strict minority appear to possess the 
means to prepare such concrete plans. UNHCR maintains that resettlement is 
the only effective, durable solution for refugees in Kenya, but that it 
represents a real solution for only a residual part of the people in need.  
The situation presented above helps illuminate why, both in this study and in 
other research, Kenya emerges as a major platform for onward movements. 
Indeed, almost half of the Somali interviewees having undergone such a 
movement mentioned Kenya as the country where they settled before 
reaching their current destination. Hence, Kenya hosts the largest component 
of Somalis seeking refuge but it cannot offer them long- term solution (i.e. 
inadequate protection and integration), and as a consequence refugees remain 
in the country as long as they need to organize their departure towards a 
preferred destination. Finally, such movements are facilitated by an 
experienced network of brokers, based mainly in Nairobi, which is able to 
facilitate non-authorized migration. 
2.5 The Netherlands 
The national law which provides the legal basis for asylum and immigration 
in the Netherlands is the Aliens Act of 2000. The Ministries of Immigration 
and Integration and of Foreign Affairs are responsible for migration and 
asylum policies, while different departments of the Ministry of Justice are 
involved in their implementation (status determination procedure, reception, 
issuing of documentation, etc.). The Netherlands grants asylum according to 
the 1951 Convention, but also on subsidiary grounds, as stipulated in Article 
3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; under Article 3 of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
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Treatment or Punishment; on humanitarian grounds, or more generally as a 
result of a particularly difficult situation facing the asylum-seekers in the 
country of origin (group-based protection). Asylum-seekers who are granted 
asylum (on whatever ground) receive a temporary residence permit for a 
period of five years, after which they can apply for a permanent residence 
permit. Refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are provided with 
the same level of rights and benefits as those of Dutch citizens. These include 
the right to welfare assistance, access to education, employment, and access 
to health services.  
The Netherlands hosts the largest Somali community in Europe, second only 
to Britain. In 2001, the Somali population in the Netherlands reached its peak 
with an estimated 30,000 exiles; since then, however, the figure has been on 
the decline, with approximately 27,500 persons in 200322. The decline has 
been attributed to the substantial number of Somalis who, after obtaining 
Dutch citizenship, have moved on to the UK. Exact numbers are hard to 
establish since not all persons notify the municipalities of their departure, but 
experts estimate the exodus to range anywhere from 10,000 to 23,000 
persons.  
Practically all Somalis applied for asylum upon entry into the Netherlands. 
The recognition rate – with the great majority obtaining subsidiary protection 
– reached its highest in 1992 at 66%; since then the figures have tended to 
fluctuate, with an average recognition rate of 39% being granted between 
1989 and 2004.  
Many successive changes have occurred in the policies regarding Somali 
asylum seekers. While all were granted a “tolerated status” until 1994, this 
was formalized in a resident permit on humanitarian grounds that same year. 
In 1996, this policy was changed due to the amelioration of social and 
political conditions in the northern areas of Somalia, whereby policymakers 
considered this region as safe areas for return, depending on the clan or sub-
clan affiliation. This resulted in a rather complex status determination and 
increased the duration of the overall procedure. Since then, gradual 
restrictions have been introduced in the asylum policy, particularly for 
Somali applicants, which amount to a complex scheme of persons entitled to 
an asylum status. First, individuals ineligible for refugee status but who 
cannot be forcibly returned (persons belonging to minority clans without 
protection in the safe areas); and secondly, persons capable of returning to 
the homeland. Together with the UK and Denmark, the Netherlands is one of 
the only countries within the EU to carry out forced returns to Somalia. 
 
22 These figures include all persons in the asylum system as well as naturalized Somalis. 
  42 
In comparison to Switzerland, the other European case study, the Netherlands 
tries to apply a policy of strict and rapid selection of its asylum seekers. For 
example, while the authorities grant extended rights for accepted cases 
(subsidiary form of protection), they are quite strict with those rejected, 
notably by eliminating assistance and returning some Somalis to the northern 
areas of the country of origin23. 
The great majority of Somali interviewees (88%) are secondary movers and 
had made a long and complex journey before entering the Netherlands. Most 
of them arrived in the Netherlands or another European country by plane 
from one of Somalia’s neighbouring countries, with a transit stop in the 
Middle East (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt). While some interviewees asked an 
agent to organize their journey and accompany them on the trip, the majority 
resorted to intermediaries only to buy or rent travel and identification 
documents. Unlike the Swiss study, many interviewees organized their 
journey through their personal networks, often borrowing passports 
belonging to family members or friends already established and naturalized 
in the Netherlands (or in rarer cases in another European country), a practice 
known as the use of “look-alike passports”. A few interviewees had stayed in 
other European countries, mainly Germany (but also France, Italy and 
Romania), and had sometimes lodged an asylum application, before moving 
to the Netherlands either because of a negative decision regarding their 
application or by choice (for instance for family reunification).  
The primary country of settlement for exiles in the Netherlands is Kenya, 
followed by Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti and Saudi Arabia. Only a minority of 
interviewees (10%) applied for asylum in their first country of asylum, 
mainly in Kenya, and some noted that they had returned to Somalia before 
undertaking additional movements. Although a few were unable to file an 
asylum claim due to lack of information, the majority preferred not to register 
because doing so would have implied staying in a refugee camp, a situation 
considered as generally harsh, unsafe and without employment opportunities. 
Therefore most interviewees resided, and often worked, illegally in the cities 
of their first countries of settlement. The main difficulties encountered in the 
cities are linked to the lack of any legal status: harassment, summary arrests 
and bribery in the police force (especially in Kenya) and among locals, 
difficulties in accessing employment, exploitation and (sexual) abuse by 
 
23 On the contrary, Switzerland grants subsidiary protection to most Somali asylum 
seekers, but the rights they are granted are just slightly better than those of asylum-




employers and fear of being returned to Somalia (particularly for those 
coming from Saudi Arabia). These are clear and compelling motives for 
Somali refugees to seek better protection and living conditions in other 
countries of residence.  
The choice to live in the Netherlands often depends on the presence of family 
members or on specific expectations (high standard of living and social 
welfare). In many instances, such decisions are made or influenced by the 
agents or middlemen. However, the Netherlands is not always the desired 
choice for all its refugee community. One in five persons in the sample ended 
up in the country as a result of illegal entry and police detention while en 
route to the sought-after destination, which is usually the UK.  
Having obtained an asylum residence permit or Dutch citizenship, the 
majority of interviewees enjoy a stable legal status and the rights and benefits 
endowed to nationals. However, while a few are satisfied with their social 
conditions, many are clearly not. All feel that their general situation in the 
Netherlands, as immigrants as well as Muslims, has worsened in recent years, 
notably due to the rise of anti-immigrant political discourse and its echo in 
the society. The majority point to the lack of, or limited, employment 
opportunities as a crucial problem, despite the fact that there are no formal 
restrictions preventing their access into the labour market. Many Somalis 
obtain temporary, unskilled, menial jobs, and are generally unable to obtain 
accreditation for their previous educational qualifications. Others simply 
have no access to higher education, particularly at the university level, which 
forces them to remain in the low-skilled job markets.  
In other arenas, the exiles bear the brunt of an interventionist state. The 
state’s selection of asylum-seekers’ housing, the complex procedures entailed 
in establishing private enterprise, as well as the narrow definition of the term 
family for family reunification purposes are a few illustrations of what 
asylum-seekers refer to as “imprisoning” rules. This sentiment is 
corroborated by experts interviewed for the study, who support the view that 
Somalis’ integration in the Netherlands is problematic. As a result, only half 
of the surveyed population envisages living in the Netherlands in the next 
years. The others remain uncertain, with many contemplating a possible 
return to their homeland or further movement to another industrialized 
country. Currently, the United Kingdom is the most attractive destination for 
all the interviewees, followed by the USA, Canada and Scandinavian 
countries.  
As noted previously, the movements of Dutch Somalis and Danish Somalis to 
the UK are being closely monitored. The interviews, along with a recent 
Dutch study, reveal numerous motivations for this new trend in migration. 
First, economically-motivated Somalis believe they will have better 
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opportunities to have their diplomas and skills recognized, to access higher 
education or to set up their own enterprise in other countries. Secondly, many 
Somalis object to the segregation of the Dutch education system which 
isolates their children in so-called “special schools”. This system of residence 
and education also denies the community the possibility of diversifying the 
education of the children, which includes the espousal of traditional, cultural 
and religious values within the curriculum. Thus, the wish to establish a 
strong Somali community becomes critical and, by no coincidence, this is 
one of the motivations underpinning the desire to resettle in a culturally 
diverse society such as that in the UK. This society allows newcomers the 
freedom to live life following their own rules and customs. According to 
experts and refugees interviews, families, especially those headed by women, 
tend to migrate more easily to the UK, whereas young, skilled persons are 
interested in countries which pose little or no barriers to their quest for 
educational and economic independence and self-sufficiency24.  
2.6 South Africa 
Although South Africa became a destination for refugees only after the 
democratic transition in 1994, it nevertheless hosts a considerable refugee 
and asylum-seeker population. According to the 2003 World Refugees 
Survey, 65,000 refugees and asylum-seekers – among which approximately 
7,000 Somalis – reside in South Africa, the majority coming from the 
continent’s long-lasting and most cruel conflicts: the Congo, Somalia, 
Angola, Burundi and Rwanda.  
Due to its history of isolation and apartheid regime, adopting and enforcing 
asylum policies are a relatively new phenomenon in South Africa. Before the 
adoption of the Refugee Act of 1998, the only legislation dealing with cross-
border entry was the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 which is widely 
considered by immigration, refugee and constitutional lawyers as an 
impractical and unconstitutional piece of legislation. The post-1994 
government established the bases for a thorough legal framework of asylum 
and in 1996, South Africa became a party to the 1969 OAU Convention on 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa as well as the 1951 
Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The first democratic government 
further established a Task Team to draft a Green Paper on International 
 
24 Although illegal movements of rejected asylum-seekers also exist, the movements 
described are regularly undertaken by new EU citizens. This trend is interesting in 
illustrating the “need for additional needs”, despite having access to adequate protection 
and assistance benefits.  
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Migration, which provided the basis for new migration policy and legislation, 
including refugee law. Later on a ‘Refugee White Paper Task Team’ was 
created to draft the White Paper on those issues.  
The Refugee Act of 1998 enforces the right to apply for asylum in South 
Africa and makes provisions for a hearings-based determination procedure. A 
most controversial clause prohibits asylum-seekers from accessing 
employment and education services during the application process. This is a 
contentious position, given the lack of subsistence or welfare support for 
asylum-seekers from either UNHCR or the South African government. 
Officially, this clause has been scrapped, instead allowing asylum applicants 
the right to study and apply for employment if their status is not determined 
within six months. However, the law is silent on how other public services 
such as housing or health care can be accessed during this time. The 
Constitution states that every person is entitled to welfare rights, but it refers 
mainly to permanent residents. The Bill of Rights enshrined in South Africa's 
Constitution clearly affirms that equality means the full and equal enjoyment 
of all rights and freedoms, although no constitutional jurisprudence yet exists 
on the rights of asylum-seekers. The Refugee Act of 1998 also stipulates that 
a refugee is entitled to the same basic health services and basic primary 
education as the inhabitants of the Republic. Not surprisingly, there is 
incongruence between the law and its actual implementation, enforcement, 
protection and provision of these rights. Many South African citizens lack 
access to even the most basic of rights, freedoms and services. It is, therefore, 
inconceivable to imagine that refugees will fare better in accessing these 
restricted services. 
A problem that is systematically encountered by applicants in the early phase 
of their status determination is that no permit is granted until the first 
interview. Hence, asylum-seekers remain exposed to arrest as a ‘prohibited 
person’ under the Aliens Control Act before the first interview.  
Although South Africa applies a full Refugee Status Determination (RSD) 
based on individual interviews with asylum-seekers, a form of prima facie 
asylum determination is de facto also in use for applicants whose country of 
origin is considered as a ‘refugee generating country’. Somalis belong to such 
a category (along with Angolans, Rwandans, Burundians, Sudanese, etc) thus 
their acceptance rate is higher than others (90%). However, lodging an 
application is not easy; indeed, the study shows that public officers limit the 
number of applicants by refusing them entrance to the building or by 
demanding bribes from asylum-seekers. Moreover, bribes seem to be a 
widespread practice in this field – interviewees also revealed that they had to 
pay in order to obtain proper refugee documents. 
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Having said that, it is understandable that the most relevant problems 
refugees and asylum-seekers face in South Africa concerns documentation 
and inefficiencies in the refugee application process, as these aspects deeply 
affect their lives. Moreover, xenophobic and discriminatory behaviour 
towards them is becoming more frequent. In fact, in the last few years 
Somalis living in South Africa have been the target of xenophobic attacks, 
their shops have been often burned or destroyed. This has been most 
prevalent in Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape. 
According to current legislation, recognized refugees are entitled to services 
offered at municipal levels such as safety, housing, clinic services, libraries, 
etc. In reality, however, not only is there a lack of awareness at the local 
government level of the rights of refugees, but there appears to be no plans 
for ensuring that services are extended to refugees. The lack of access to 
public low-cost housing is problematic for asylum-seekers, who are not 
allowed to work. They have to rely on friends, relatives and their social and 
religious community networks for assistance. The homeless, forced to remain 
on the streets, are exposed to frequent and violent attacks and harassment, 
particularly in the Johannesburg area. 
As regards settlement within the country, the majority of Somalis tend to live 
in the urban centres of Cape Town, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and 
Pretoria, with important differences in the living conditions existing among 
diverse urban settings. Johannesburg is cited as the nexus of the most 
dramatic and pressing concerns, whereas Cape Town and Laudium, a suburb 
of Pretoria, are home to a more cohesive and organized community. These 
urban hubs are an important destination for Somalis due the relative ease in 
finding employment, particularly in small business sectors such as shops or 
restaurants which enable them to gain a decent livelihood. In general, 
Somalis based in South Africa not only tend to live amongst other Somalis, 
but they interact almost exclusively within their community. Due to 
language, religious, and cultural barriers they tend to group in specific 
sections of town, typically amongst Indian communities, where they feel 
‘protected’ by religious associations. For instance, the study reveals that the 
Somali community in South Africa feels more comfortable amongst Muslim 
Indians than in the black communities. Furthermore, the Mosques and 
Muslim networks in general play a crucial role in that they act as alternative 
to state-public services. These networks welcome new arrivals, advise them 
about the host country asylum system and provide for basic needs. 
Compared to other countries included in the survey, a considerable portion of 
Somali refugees interviewed in South Africa can be categorized as 
“secondary movers”. The trajectory linking Somalia to South Africa includes 
a stop-over in Kenya and Tanzania or Mozambique by boat from the Somali 
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coasts. The majority of refugees crossed the South African border without 
documentation, although only a few utilized the services of smugglers.  
Similarly to European countries, South Africa is considered a final 
destination or at least a country of long settlement, which is evidenced by the 
disproportionately high number of Somalis willing to remain in this country 
as compared to other African host countries. South Africa is not only one of 
the few democratic and socially and politically stable countries in the 
continent, but, unlike other African states, it does not employ encampment 
asylum policies, which contributes to making it a natural destination for 
Somali exiles. The lack of mobility constraints enables refugees to live and 
work (to some degree) in the city with relative freedom of movement. 
Finally, the relative economic wealth of the country strengthens South 
Africa’s appeal as the “land of milk and honey”, an inaccurate image which 
quickly wears off once exiles become conscious of the harsh reality of trying 
to make a living in a foreign country. 
Despite its relative attraction, the survey also indicates that there is a 
component, though residual, of interviewees willing to leave the country for 
other destinations which are mainly in northern Europe. Indeed, the 
possibilities of durable solutions in South Africa remain rare because of the 
drastic reduction in opportunities for resettlement in the last few years. Local 
integration is even more infrequent, given that most of the interviewees have 
little or no information concerning the possibility of acquiring permanent 
residence after the initial period of legal settlement.  
2.7 Switzerland 
Although known for its humanitarian tradition, Switzerland has seen its 
legislation regarding asylum matters become more restrictive in recent years. 
The legislative power over asylum matters (and over foreigners in general) 
lies with the Confederation, which is responsible for the Asylum Act of 1998 
and the Law on the Stay and Sojourn of Aliens of 1931, as well as many 
other decrees, which are currently under review. The most important actor is 
the Federal Office for Migration (FOM), which is a branch of the Federal 
Department of Justice and Police. FOM is mainly responsible for the 
determination of asylum applications at first instance, although it works in 
tandem with the cantons (states) in areas such as asylum procedure, 
reception, social welfare, and promotion of voluntary repatriation, to name 
but a few. In the past years, an average of 10% of all asylum-seekers were 
granted refugee status, while approximately 25% received subsidiary status 
(provisional admission); the applications of the remaining 65% were rejected. 
Switzerland is not a traditional or historical host country for Somalis, and the 
current population arrived as refugees in the last 12 years, with a total 
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population of about 5,000 persons. According to 2003 statistics, the majority 
(67%) possessed subsidiary form of protection, while the rest held an annual 
residence permit (16%), a permanent residence permit (9%) or are asylum-
seekers (8%). 
Contrary to EU States, the definition of refugee applied by Switzerland is still 
limited to persecution attributable to state agents25 and, given that Somalia 
has been without a recognized government since 1991, Somali exiles cannot 
claim to be suffering from such persecution. This means that, with the 
exception a few beneficiaries of resettlement programmes (176 persons 
between 1992 and 1999, and none since) or those accepted through family 
reunification with those previously resettled, Somalis are not granted refugee 
status according to the Geneva Convention. However, because of their need 
for international protection, most of them receive a subsidiary form of 
protection, called provisional admission (F permit). Since 1997, single and 
adult Somali men who belong to a clan from Somaliland or Puntland, or who 
used to live in those regions, are increasingly having their asylum claims 
rejected. Despite the lack of appropriate legal status, no Somalis have been 
forcibly returned to Somalia (including to the northern parts) by the Swiss 
authorities, presumably because of the technical difficulties such a move 
would imply. 
The rights and benefits to which provisionally admitted persons are entitled 
are subject to many limitations, and are only slightly better than those of 
asylum-seekers, even after many years of residence in the country26. 
Interviewees mentioned many of these limitations among the main problems 
they encounter in the long term, and often consider them as important reasons 
for a secondary movement from Switzerland to other European countries or 
beyond.  
Apart from the difficulties linked to living with an insecure status and in a 
precarious situation for many years, Somali interviewees reported the 
restricted access to employment and to higher education among the main 
issues of concern to them. Provisionally admitted persons (with an F permit) 
are subject to various limitations in their access to the labour market, where 
priority is given to holders of other statuses (except asylum-seekers) or due to 
regional restrictions in regard to specific economic sectors. In reality, this 
means diplomas and previous working experience are not recognized or 
 
25 A change of this practice is however envisaged. 
26 Switzerland’s subsidiary protection scheme is different from that of other European 
countries, notably the Netherlands, which entitles subsidiary protected persons to rights 
similar to those of recognized refugees. 
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useful, relegating refugees to low-skilled, low-paid jobs. Similar barriers 
exist with regard to higher education. As vocational education is based on 
apprenticeships, young people with provisional admission face preferential 
and restrictive rules when they seek access to advanced education, as they do 
in the labour market.  
Lastly, family reunification remains another contentious issue. Provisionally 
admitted persons are not entitled to family reunification, even if they are 
close relatives (spouses and children). An unintended consequence of this is 
that refugees will find illegal – often dangerous and costly – ways for 
relatives, especially their children, to join them in Switzerland. Even more 
restrictive is the fact that F permit holders are not entitled to travel documents 
and this lack of freedom of movement outside of Switzerland is considered as 
a form of “imprisonment” for transnational families who live in various 
countries.  
An analysis of the journey of Somalis living in Switzerland shows that the 
more recently they arrived, the shorter the journey was. In comparison to 
exiles leaving in the first years of the civil war, it appears that refugees who 
left the homeland more recently had better opportunities to organize a more 
direct journey to their intended destination, using networks and paths opened 
up by earlier refugees. 
Somalis who arrived in Switzerland during the 1990s came mainly from 
Somalia’s neighbouring countries (mostly Kenya, but also Ethiopia, Djibouti 
or Yemen) as a result of unsatisfactory living conditions in the first country 
of settlement, combined with loss of hope in the political situation of 
Somalia. When concrete opportunities to travel materialized, many of the 
refugees opted to leave the continent. The great majority arrived illegally in 
Switzerland, mostly with the help of agents who organized the journey and 
the travel documents, and then accompanied them. The majority reached 
Europe by plane, often from a country neighbouring Somalia and/or via an 
Arab country (UAE or Saudi Arabia), while a minority undertook the risky 
journey across the Mediterranean Sea by boat. The journey from the arrival 
point (often Italy) to Switzerland is made by car or train. 
The reasons pushing refugees to leave the camps or the cities and move 
onward are similar to those described in other case studies: difficult general 
conditions of living, lack of safety within and outside the camp, lack of 
opportunities for employment and self-sufficiency, and difficult access to 
education. Unregistered urban refugees are generally motivated to migrate by 
the lack of legal status and protection in urban areas, which leaves them at 
the mercy of police and surveillance authorities.  
The choice of Switzerland as a settlement country is a by-product of a series 
of circumstances. While a large segment of the population is the result of 
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family reunification efforts, many others relied on an agent’s choice and 
advice in choosing Switzerland as a host country. In several instances, 
interviewees arrived in Switzerland inadvertently, having been promised a 
different destination by the agent. The importance of Italy as an arrival point 
in Europe27 also seems to play a role, given its proximity to Switzerland 
which is easily accessible (through the green border) and offers comparably 
good living conditions and access to the social welfare system. 
Switzerland is commonly considered by the refugees as a transit country, 
even though the transition is often a long one. Similarly, Swiss experts 
consider the Somali community as secondary movers who are likely to 
undertake another migration, although many do not have concrete plans or 
the means to carry out such a scheme. Such a movement is likely because 
interviewees are often extremely disappointed with their situation in 
Switzerland, for the above-mentioned reasons, and are tempted to move on to 
countries which they feel will offer the legal, social and communal 
advantages they deem necessary to their well-being. So-called “dream 
destinations” are, most notably, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, 
Scandinavian countries, USA and Canada, which are seen as offering 
permanent legal status, larger Somali communities, better employment and 
education opportunities, and more freedoms in general. Despite these 
temptations, not all refugees heed the call to undertake irregular secondary 
movements because of the increasingly restrictive asylum policies being 
adopted in many European countries (e.g. the Netherlands) and improved 
cooperation between states regarding border control and asylum-seekers. 
2.8 Yemen 
Somalia and Yemen have a long history of migration and communication 
which existed prior to the collapse of the Somali state. This link is rooted in 
the close proximity between the two countries and in their cultural and 
religious affinities28. This bond has enabled the Yemeni authorities and 
society to demonstrate a generous welcome to the exiled Somali population. 
Thus, when the civil war forced Somalis to leave their homeland, the choice 
of going to Yemen appeared to most of the exiles as a ‘natural’ one. For its 
part, the Yemeni government opened its borders to the asylum seekers by 
adopting a policy of prima facie recognition towards Somalis, from the early 
stages of the conflict to the present, although authorities are considering 
 
27 Somali refugees consider Italy as a transit point only and rarely as a destination of 
settlement.  
28 There are hypotheses which suggest that Somalis might have originated from Yemen. 
 
 51
revising the regulations. According to the prima facie policy, all Somalis are 
recognized as refugees simply by virtue of their nationality. 
According to UNHCR’s 2004 figures, Yemen hosted 66,384 refugees, of 
which Somalis accounted for 63,511 (including 16,000 new arrivals); the rest 
comprised Ethiopians (1,990), Iraqis, Palestinians and Sudanese. Yemen is a 
party to the Geneva Convention of 1951 as well as to the 1967 New York 
Protocol, although it does not have a national refugee law. A draft Refugee 
Bill prepared with the assistance of UNHCR was indeed discussed in 2004, 
but it has yet to be approved. However, Article 46 of the national 
Constitution makes particular reference to refugee protection in its adherence 
to the principle of non-refoulement.  
Responsibility for refugee administration is shared amongst different 
governmental bodies, including the Ministry of Human Rights, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, and the recently established 
National Committee for Refugee Affairs which is composed of 
representatives of the above-mentioned ministries and the UNHCR, although 
there is an apparent lack of coordination between the institutions. UNHCR 
and its implementing partners (mainly NGOs such as the French Triangle) 
are responsible for: (i) the management of asylum procedures, from the 
reception of asylum-seekers at the most important arrival port (Maifa); (ii) 
the distribution of refugee cards, which is done with the cooperation of the 
Yemeni Government; and, (iii) the administration of the only refugee camp in 
the country, including the delivery of basic services.  
Due to systematic reports of serious mismanagement in the asylum system 
(inappropriate distribution of refugee cards; local authorities’ refusal to 
recognize temporary papers, etc.), UNHCR and the Yemeni authorities 
launched a mass registration exercise for all Somali refugees from June 2002-
May 2003, registering more than 47,000 persons during that period. An 
objective of this initiative was to establish a comprehensive refugee 
registration system by setting up six new registration centres, to which the 
government initially agreed, before later rejecting it and refusing to sign the 
agreement.  As a result, refugees arriving after May 2003 (approximately 
30,000 Somalis) have not been registered, while those previously registered 
possess refugee cards which have expired. At present, roughly 77,000 Somali 
refugees live in the country as undocumented refugees, despite the prima 
facie policy of the government. 
Although Yemen has a refugee camp, compulsory in-camp residence is not 
fully applied and refugees can legally live in the towns. In fact, upon arrival, 
exiles are informed by UNHCR and the Yemeni police about the option to 
live in the refugee camp, Kharaz, or to live independently in urban areas with 
limited assistance. The large majority of Somalis opt for the towns, whereas a 
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minority, mostly women and children, accept the camp option. Kharaz camp 
is located in a desert area where living conditions are harsh and access to 
basic services such as health and education is limited. As in other countries 
examined, the World Food Programme’s decision to reduce food rations has 
further jeopardized refugees’ living conditions, making Yemen a country that 
is not conducive to any form of local integration.  
Apart from the city of Taiz, where long-term refugee populations have 
become well-integrated, living conditions in cities are not always better than 
those in Kharaz camp. Refugees who chose to settle in towns live in 
unhealthy suburbs such as Basateen, in Aden, where access to basic services 
is even more difficult than in the camp. The advantage offered by life in the 
towns is the possibility of finding work and the networking necessary to 
organize onward movements. Income generating activities in towns are 
limited to informal employment as domestic workers, car cleaners, tailors, 
and small manual jobs. In general, refugee women are much better integrated 
than men through the informal economy as the demand for housekeepers is 
still high, whereas men are hardly able to find jobs.  
Furthermore, to obtain a working permit refugees have to apply to the 
Ministry of Labour (although this Ministry recently informed UNHCR of the 
government’s intention to issue regulations allowing recognized and 
documented refugees to take up gainful employment without having to obtain 
a working permit). However, employment authorizations are expensive and 
they require an HIV/AIDS test, which, if positive, leads to immediate 
expulsion from the country. This extreme policy, combined with employers’ 
interest in maintaining cheap, illegal labour, explains why Somali refugees 
are concentrated in the informal labour market. However, working in the 
informal sector and lacking proper documents exposes Somali refugees, 
especially women, to exploitation (often sexual) and other forms of abuse, 
which reinforces their reasons for wanting to leave Yemen for other 
destinations. A further constraint motivating the onward migration is the lack 
of free universal education in the country, which forces parents to send 
children to private schools, an arduous challenge given their social and 
economic circumstances. 
As a result, many interviewees consider Yemen as a transit country, a 
perception strongly supported by the quantitative data which show the 
percentage of refugees willing to live elsewhere to be higher than in any 
other country. It must be noted that, while proximity with the homeland and 
the relatively easy and cheap, albeit dangerous, passage to Yemen makes it a 
preferred destination for Somalis seeking refuge, it is also a transit point for 
onward movement. Such movement is encouraged by the harsh living 
conditions and the absence of opportunities for local integration or 
resettlement (few cases). The situation thus transforms what was once 
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considered as a “natural destination” to a “natural bridge” to other, more 
attractive targets. 
Although the survey documented Somalis willing to leave Yemen for 
industrialized destinations such as Europe, the most attractive destination was 
the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and Oman, where Somali refugees hoped to 
gain access to the informal job market. In so doing, they follow a traditional 
migration path of previous migrants who have been (illegally) employed in 
oil producing industries since the 1950s. Despite a modicum of success in 
accessing such informal markets, the mass influx of undocumented refugees 
in this region is being closely monitored, even restricted, because of the 
possible economic repercussions in the job markets and its impact on social 
cohesion. Such restrictions are also influenced by xenophobic attitudes 
towards Somali refugees among the native populations of different host 
countries, which have led to international pressure for the Yemeni 
government to increase and secure its border controls. A negative 
consequence of this international outcry has contributed to the government’s 
decision to alter its asylum policy and its traditional openness to Somalis 
seeking refuge.  
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3 Legal Framework, Asylum Policies and Practices 
The following chapter provides an overview of the legal frameworks and the 
rights granted to refugees in surveyed countries. Although it focuses 
specifically on the rights of refugees in a comparative perspective, reference 
is also made to enforcement and protection in practice at a national level. The 
viewpoints and perspectives of the refugees in various contexts are also 
presented in this chapter. While the legal framework is obviously intended to 
determine the rights and obligations of the legal residents (refugees, but also 
asylum-seekers and subsidiary admitted persons), this chapter also includes 
information on the situation of undocumented Somalis living in urban 
settings. 
3.1 Legal and Institutional Framework at National 
Level 
All countries surveyed in this study are parties to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and to its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. In 
addition, African states are also signatories to the 1969 OAU Convention on 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, with the exception of 
Djibouti, although it has applied the law in principle. While the international 
treaties have been incorporated into extensive domestic legislation and have 
contributed to the emergence of a large body of case law in the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and, since 1996, in South Africa, legislation specifically 
addressing refugee issues29 is limited or non-existent in the other countries. 
Egypt refers to the right of political asylum and non-refoulement in its 
Constitution, although asylum policies are not codified in the law. Both 
Kenya and Yemen have discussed the adoption of national asylum bills, 
whereas Ethiopia and Djibouti have only summary national legislations30 and 
institutions responsible for the implementation, although their actual 
operation is limited or depends on external financing. Overall, the 
constitution – or the reconstitution – of functioning state capacities are 
influenced by the deteriorating economic and sometimes difficult political 
situation, especially in Kenya, but in Yemen and Djibouti as well. A 
controversial political debate has been emerging concerning refugee affairs, 
with striking similarities to policy developments in the Netherlands and 
 
29 Aliens Act 2000 in the Netherlands; Asylum Law of 1999 in Switzerland. 
30 Refugee Proclamation of 2004 and Ordinance 77053 of 1977. 
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Switzerland.  Refugees are viewed by the host population and/or depicted by 
politicians as a threat to security, specifically due to trafficking of arms or 
drugs; they are perceived as taxing social services and straining the 
environment, particularly in the case of large camps in Kenya and Ethiopia.  
In spite of differences in national law, it can be stated that refugees are, to a 
very large extent, subject either to ad-hoc government decisions or to 
regulations under the aliens and immigration law. This holds true for all 
African countries and Yemen except South Africa. In addition, with the 
exception of South Africa, UNHCR plays an important role at various levels 
of governance, irrespective of the governing institutional framework. In 
many instances, UNHCR intervenes in policy elaboration, assists in the 
drafting of asylum laws, as well as in the implementation of asylum 
procedure and financial arrangements. In all Southern countries except South 
Africa, reception and aid to refugees is to a large extent financed by 
international organisations or NGOs. For example, ARRA, the external state 
body responsible for the provision of assistance to refugees in Ethiopia – 
reporting (indirectly) to the Prime Minister – is financed by UNHCR.  
The Kenyan government conducted individual refugee status determination 
until the early 1990s, but since then such duties have been transferred to 
NGOs and then to UNHCR, following the influx of refugees from Somalia. 
The necessary involvement of international actors may have been a catalyst 
for the decline in existing state structures and expertise in the refugee sector 
(HRW 2004, Kagwanja 2002). Today, the National Refugee Secretariat, 
which reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs is clearly under-staffed (only 
one officer in charge in 2004) and faces a somewhat conflictive relation with 
the more powerful Department of Immigration, which was formerly 
independent of the ministry. Similar difficulties have been noted in other 
countries such as Yemen, where responsibility for refugee affairs is shared by 
three ministries (Human Rights, Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs); the 
outcome is incompetence due to coordination problems. In Egypt, the 
ministries of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior are the main governmental 
entities working with UNHCR which remains responsible for the 
management of refugee issues.  
The de facto division of competencies among national and international 
actors in the area of refugee registration, documentation and asylum 
procedures is illustrated in Table 4, even though differences exist between 
sub-sectors of refugee policy and there are changes over time. In simplified 
terms, one can state that governments play a minor (direct) role in Kenya, 
Yemen and Egypt, where the function of UNHCR and other international 
actors is clearly dominant, even if states are responsible for security issues, 
amongst other things. In Ethiopia and Djibouti, there is close collaboration 
between the two main protagonists (UNHCR and governments), whereas in 
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South Africa, the Netherlands and Switzerland, the government is in charge 
of refugee protection and reception. In these last three countries, UNHCR has 
a much more limited role in the asylum procedure, though it can intervene in 
individual cases. In all states, NGOs are involved as implementing partners 
commissioned either by governments or international organisations. 
Table 4: De facto role of major actors in registration, documentation and 
asylum procedure* in surveyed countries 
 Yemen Egypt Kenya Ethiopia Djibouti ZA CH/NL 
Govern-
ment 















Interior Interior Justice 
UNHCR dominant dominant dominant important important subsidiary subsidiary 
Camp 
policy 




no camps no camps 
* In some cases assistance to refugees is also concerned. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this survey to analyse and project the optimal 
institutional framework for refugee protection and its impact on secondary 
movements, but the findings in this study clearly suggest that an active state 
role is indispensable in improving the situation. This holds particularly true in 
protracted refugee situations when critical issues such as refugee self-
reliance, local integration opportunities and challenges related to 
development affect the well-being of refugees and enhance the need for 
further movement.  
The collaboration between different, and sometimes changing or conflicting, 
actors also calls for coordination and information-sharing, which appears to 
be insufficient in several countries surveyed – e.g. Yemen, Djibouti, Kenya, 
Egypt. This aspect is well depicted in the process of admission to the territory 
and registration, which may have far-reaching consequences for the situation 
of refugees and other actors. 
3.2 Admission of Refugees 
Broadly speaking, entering Somalia’s neighbouring countries is not and has 
never been a major problem for Somali refugees, even those without valid 
identity documents. Either the checks are summary or else Somalis are 
accepted on the basis of their presumed right to protection. However, cases of 
bribery being essential in order to gain entry into the country have been 
reported, particularly in Kenya, where refugees are often accused of illegal 
entry, and in Djibouti, which has recently reinforced border controls in order 
to fight terrorism in the region. The situation is somewhat different in 
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Europe, where entry controls are strict, especially at airports. Hence, most 
refugees who are not accepted on the basis of resettlement or family 
reunification (which concern only a limited numbers of persons) enter the 
Netherlands or Switzerland with “borrowed” documents or with the help of 
smugglers, with very few of them applying for asylum at the borders. 
The right of non-refoulement is, in principle, well respected in all countries 
surveyed. In practice, forced returns of (potential) refugees at the border are 
few and have only been reported in Kenya31 and recently in Djibouti, when 
crossers have been considered to be undocumented immigrants. Roughly 
two-thirds of all interviewees consider their protection against refoulement to 
be satisfactory, but this proportion varies considerably between different host 
countries. Only 25% of the urban refugees in Kenya – most of whom are 
unregistered32 – felt protected against forced return, as compared to 97% of 
the interviewees in Yemen (see Table 5). Obviously, the answers to this 
question reflect the situation as perceived by the refugees interviewed. 
Table 5: Interviewees satisfied with host country’s protection scheme against 
refoulement (in %) 
Host country Total KE ET YE DJ EG ZA CH NL 






















The Netherlands is among the few European countries undertaking a limited 
number of forced returns, and these primarily concern rejected asylum-
seekers from the northern part of Somalia. 
3.3 Registration and Asylum Determination  
The findings concerning registration and documentation of refugees reveal a 
series of problems in most developing countries surveyed. For various 
reasons, which will be explained below (chapter 4.5), more than half the 
refugees did not try to file an asylum application or register at camps in the 
first country reached (Table 6). This figure increased significantly between 
1991 and recent years – 46% to 66% in the sample. The proportion of 
applications filed and actually registered by the competent bodies, according 
 
31 For the case of Kenya, see also UNHCR 2005a. 
32 For recall, due to practical problems, interviews with camp refugees in Kenya could not 
be included in the sample.  
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to the statements of refugees, also decreased over time (from 97% in 1991 to 
74% in 2002-2005; see Table 7).  
Table 6: Asylum applications filed in first countries reached (in %) 
 N
Asylum application filed 42 332






Table 7: Asylum applications registered according to time of departure from 
Somalia (in %) 
 N
Application registered before 1991 97 119
1992 – 1996 91 76
1997 – 2001 76 82
2002 – 2005 74 46
 
Total (N 814*)  87 323
* In 491 cases no application was filed or response is missing. 
 
Numerous expert and refugee interviews point to the fact that registration has 
not always been possible, especially when camps or registration offices in 
urban areas were closed, or at least reported to be so. Evidence from refugees 
who tried in vain to access the authorities or UNHCR offices is reported in 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa and, to a lesser extent, in Yemen. 
The results suggest that the fewer the opportunities provided for registering 
an asylum claim, the less likely refugees are to attempt registration. In other 
words, during periods when – or in countries where – the registration rate 
(number of applications registered) is lower, fewer attempts to register are 
actually made, which is not necessarily a reflection of a reduced flow of 
refugees in the country33.  
 
33 As will be stated later, problems in access to registration are only one explanation for 
refugees not registering in the first host country. 
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The police often harassed me. There was also a computer virus at the Home Affairs 
offices, which wiped out records of refugees, but they have refused to enter these 
refugees’ details again! My application was one of the records they refused to enter 
back into the system, so I basically do not exist and could be arrested or worse -- be 
deported (South Africa, female). 
Broadly speaking, a deterioration has been observed in registration and 
access to recognised documentation. This development is said to be 
influenced both by declining resources, particularly investments by 
international organisations, and by weakening national economies which 
compel governments to be less receptive to incoming refugees34. 
It is a fact that providing proper registration and documentation is a complex 
issue, particularly when different actors are involved – governments, 
UNHCR, and implementing partners. In all Southern countries examined, the 
practices for registration fall far short of the recommended standards of 
modern registration methods. Specifically, only heads of families – mostly 
men – were interviewed and only one ration card issued; (re)validation of 
cards was done intermittently or not at all in some camps; lack of 
identification for other family members, including newborns.  
In practice, the procedures for registration at camps and the distribution of 
ration cards differ greatly and are often complex and incomprehensible for 
both applicants and observers. The lack of communication forces refugees to 
seek additional information from community sources, which often proves 
inaccurate or misleading. Others opted to bypass the official registration 
procedures and simply purchase ration cards instead of enduring the long 
waiting periods, which were presumably designed to discourage local 
candidates from trying to gain access to assistance. Yet others avoided the 
asylum system in order to move on and apply in another country. Many 
interviewees recount situations where favouritism and frequent, inappropriate 
modifications in the system rendered it ineffective and thus susceptible to 
misuse. 
There were additional problems associated with registration in Ethiopia, 
Djibouti and Kenya, including lack of up-to-date statistics.  In these 
situations, new family members who are not included in the ration card – 
particularly newborns or spouses – do not receive assistance. Some experts 
justify this concern by noting an overall decline in the World Food 
Programme’s available food stockpiles which necessitates a reduction in 
 
34 In Yemen and Djibouti, for example, refugees found jobs in the regular labour market 
and in the shadow economy during the 1990s and were thus self-reliant. At present, the 
economic situation and political climate reduces or eliminates such possibilities. 
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ration quantities. Others cite the large presence of impoverished 
natives/nationals in the camps masquerading as refugees in order to receive 
humanitarian assistance. Despite these justifications, it is evident that a 
reduction in food ration leads to discrimination; as a result, many families 
turn to community networks to pool resources while others resort to child 
labour as a means of survival.  The lack of trust in the humanitarian system 
forces many to turn to deception or even abuse in order to maintain an 
adequate supply of food/assistance.  
The case studies reveal several large-scale re-registration and revalidation 
initiatives, which could have served several purposes: (i) to assess camp 
population, excluding natives/nationals, which means locking up the camp; 
(b) to provide individual documentation; and, (c) to screen the reasons for 
continued protection and assistance (short refugee status determination). It 
appears that priority was given to substantiating the need for continued 
protection in an effort to commence the repatriation process for those eligible 
to return to north-east and north-west Somalia (Puntland and Somaliland, 
respectively). However, the strategies for conducting such assessments were 
poorly implemented and ended in failure, as was the case in Ethiopia (2004), 
Djibouti (2003/4) and Yemen (2002/3). According to experts, the reasons for 
such failures include insufficient financial and human resources, lack of 
political will to enforce such policies and lack of cooperation by the refugee 
population concerned.  
Only 41% of interviewees consider their registration and legal status as 
satisfactory. This low figure indicates a significant concern among the 
refugees, even though the widespread discontent has different meanings in 
different contexts, as reflected in many individual testimonies. In 
Switzerland, which has a 37% satisfaction level, the discontent is linked to 
the limitations posed by a person’s legal status (with 70% granted subsidiary 
protection) rather than to deficiencies in the registration/documentation 
process.  
The highest rate of satisfaction related to registration, documentation and 
legal status is found in Yemen (81%) and the Netherlands (73%). The 
particularly high satisfaction rate for Yemen reflects the official policy which 
recognizes all Somalis as prima facie refugees on the basis of their 
nationality. In the Dutch case, the approval rate is linked to the legal status of 
the interviewees, most of whom were permanent residents or, in some cases, 
even citizens (cf. Table 36 in the annexe).  
Although a considerable segment of interviewees in African states are 
recognised refugees – either prima facie or through individual status 
determination (South Africa and Egypt) – many others continue to live 
without documents in urban areas.  
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In South Africa and Egypt, Somali refugees must undergo a lengthy status 
determination process and remain asylum-seekers for some time before 
receiving a proper refugee status (or - in rare cases – a rejection of their 
claim). During this period, their means of survival are restricted to illegal, or 
under-employment and communal support networks, in the absence of 
government support mechanisms35. While asylum claims are usually rapidly 
processed in Egypt, the situation is much more difficult in South Africa, 
where asylum-seekers’ documents are not always recognized, often leading 
to police harassment, summary arrest and detention. Acquiring official status 
is problematic as asylum-seekers are subjected to endless waiting periods of 
months, even years, before a decision is reached on their cases. 
Such differences in legal status reflect discrepancies in asylum and 
immigration policies and also have an impact on the rights of the persons 
concerned in their host countries, which must be borne in mind when 
interpreting the results of the study. For example, social assistance is usually 
only provided to individuals in possession of legal documents which confer a 
legal status.  
When all the consequences deriving from insufficient or inappropriate 
registration are considered, this aspect actually makes it a major problem for 
all stakeholders. Indeed, registration is linked to various other protection-
related issues: protection against arbitrary arrest or refoulement, access to 
asylum procedure, distribution of food (ration cards) and a series of other 
rights (education, health care, sometimes employment, etc.). In most cases, 
the absence of proper registration dramatically increases the vulnerability of 
refugees or asylum-seekers. Hence, registration is an important instrument 
for states, NGOs, and the international community which can be used in 
programme design, monitoring and evaluating the population, and in 
implementing durable solutions (resettlement, voluntary repatriation and 
local integration). 
3.4 Basic Assistance and Health Care 
In several countries (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen), refugees are 
directed to camps where basic assistance and health care are provided. 
However, the degree of camp confinement varies from one country to 
another, depending on its asylum policies. Camp confinement is, in principle, 
 
35 A similar situation is reported in the Kenyan camps, where recent arrivals have to 
endure long waiting periods, often years, before being registered. This forces refugees to 
rely solely on the support of other refugees for immediate assistance.  
  62 
compulsory in some countries (Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya) but not in 
others (Yemen). In most cases, the camp policy is not enacted in law or 
regulations promulgated by parliament. Administrative exceptions to camp 
confinement also exist and the movement of refugees between camps and 
cities or urban areas is sometimes tolerated in practice by local authorities. In 
Yemen, refugees are allowed to settle in the camp and cities, but assistance 
(food and shelter) outside the camp is minimal. In 2003, Djibouti introduced 
compulsory camp confinement by forcing all refugees, asylum-seekers and 
undocumented migrants living in the city to register at a camp. In Ethiopia 
and Kenya, only a limited number of refugees are allowed to live in the major 
cities, mainly for medical reasons. However, both countries have a 
disproportionately high number of undocumented Somalis living in urban 
areas. 
Refugee camps were set up to cope with the influx of Somali refugees at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Originally, their purpose was mainly practical 
(effective distribution of humanitarian assistance), but later they came rather 
to serve a political or economic purpose (keeping potential competitors away 
from a poor labour market). To ensure adequate separation, encampment 
policies legally or practically limit freedom of movement for all refugees, 
thus engendering tremendous frustration amongst the population, particularly 
for those living in protracted situations. In most cases, those who bypass 
regulations forfeit protection and assistance, with many losing their status if 
living outside the camp area36. Undocumented urban refugees are particularly 
vulnerable, although some manage to obtain employment in the informal 
labour market and enjoy a relatively better livelihood than the encamped 
population. 
The majority of interviewees – both experts and refugees – concur that the 
conditions of material aid in the camps have deteriorated over the last few 
years. They agree that food rations are insufficient to meet the basic needs of 
refugees, especially those of the most vulnerable categories (mainly infants 
and children, the old and elderly). Continuous reductions in rations, the 
inequitable distribution methods (inaccurate family statistics) and 
inappropriate delivery schedules engender discontent and distrust in the 
asylum system, in addition to fostering illegal modes of obtaining resources. 
Furthermore, non-food items are not equitably distributed, which compels 
refugees to sell portions of their rations in order to purchase these. A critical 
problem is the non-availability of cooking fuel, which forces females to 
 
36 In many cases the camp ration card is used as documentation. 
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collect firewood in the remote areas surrounding the camp and risk great 
physical insecurity, besides causing irreparable ecological destruction.  
My family has 14 members and the ration card we have is for seven people. We 
have been here for 15 years but we got means for shelter only twice. When we are 
taking the food we are ordered by ARRA to bring back the jerry cans in which they 
put the food. But we need them to fetch water; plus we are entitled to get the new 
ones and keep them. The food we get is only wheat and oil, sugar and some salt. 
The food is not balanced. The health care we receive is very bad. Two of my 
cousin’s children got bitten by a dog, but they didn’t get any treatment and they 
were not transferred to Jijiga either. This is just one example (Ethiopia, male). 
As previously noted, the reduction in assistance is attributed to numerous 
factors, not all of which are comprehensible to the population concerned. 
And although the decline in international assistance - colloquially termed 
‘donor fatigue’ - and corruption/fraud37 in the camps are quite real, there is an 
inherent strategy underlying the call for asylum policy reform in all countries, 
particularly in Africa.  
In both Djibouti and Ethiopia, expert interviews reveal that the reduction of 
food rations is meant to encourage refugees from Somaliland and Puntland, 
who are deemed to be “non-genuine” recipients of protection, to repatriate. 
Given the lack of official support for this controversial strategy, it is difficult 
to assess the validity of such allegations. However, an indication of the 
rollback in refugee protection can be seen in the signs of malnutrition 
amongst children and infants. This is substantiated by health professionals 
interviewed, although this is officially denied by the states and the 
international organisations concerned. 
 
Dadaab camps (Kenya), a particular case among the camps studied? 
If the rights of encamped refugees are theoretically similar in all camps and 
countries surveyed, important differences can also be discerned, most notably 
in the degree of NGOs engagement in refugee camps and on implemented 
projects aimed at improving specific aspects of camp life.  
However, Dadaab camps (Kenya) obviously show striking differences in the 
type of social structuring which can occur in a heavily populated camp in a 
protracted situation, in comparison to the other camps studied. 
 
 
37 Interviewees in Djibouti and Ethiopia had suspicions that the majority of recognized 
refugees are actually nationals who live in camps in order to access free food and health 
care. 
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Even though power struggles and discrimination undoubtedly exist in all 
refugee camps, it appears that more sophisticated socio-professional 
stratification is present in Dadaab camp, where a large segment of refugees 
seem to be better off than their counterparts in other camps observed. This 
structural difference seemingly lies in the refugee community’s ingenuity 
which has enabled them to establish an informal economy within the camp 
(small businesses, farming and herding, and services such as cleaning, 
driving, building, etc. for others) with clients that are not only from the local 
areas, but also among the camp population itself (Horst 2003). The size of the 
encamped population, plus communities in outlying areas, enable refugees to 
obtain employment and earn the additional income necessary for survival and 
self-sufficiency, particularly for those unable to access external financial 
assistance.  
Refugees’ autonomy is further advanced by the establishment of reliable 
means of transportation which enable them to move between camp and 
neighbouring cities.  It appears from the Kenya study that (irregular) travels 
between camp, Nairobi and other important cities is quite common, 
reflecting, on the one hand, a relatively loose encampment policy, and on the 
other, the presence of financial resources that makes travel possible38.  
A tentative explanation of the “Dadaab effect” lies in the legal limbo refugees 
in Kenya are subjected to, in comparison to other countries examined. For 
example, in other cases, refugees are eligible to reside and work in the cities 
either legally (Yemen) or illegally but with an informal acceptance by the 
local population and authorities (Addis Ababa and – until recently – Djibouti 
City). This means that, generally speaking, those with sufficient resources 
chose the city to make their living, while the very poorest stayed in the 
camps. In Kenya, on the other hand, living in the capital city, with the 
exception of the Somali neighbourhood, appears much more difficult, with 
frequent police harassment and arrests, whereby refugees and asylum-seekers 
are forced to buy their freedom via bribes. For relatively more affluent 
refugees, such an existence is not problematic because financial resources 
allow them to “buy” police cooperation, in addition to other services such as 
health and education. Poorer refugees must contend with the paradoxical 
situation of living with “better” personal security (no police harassment) but 
meagre assistance in the camps vis-à-vis an urban setting which is highly 
insecure but offers better incomes.  For the many, the choice is to split family 
 
38 Campbell’s description of the important movements of refugees between the camps and 
the city, and the fact that Somali entrepreneurs have even established bus lines between 
these different places, pleads in favour of this (Campbell 2005). 
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time between the city and camp in order to maximise available resources in 
both arenas (Campbell 2005). 
 
In summary, the fact that these movements are possible, unlike in Ethiopia, 
and that urban living (in Nairobi) for the whole family is an option for only a 
minority explains – at least partially – the development of a more 
sophisticated social structure in Dadaab camps. Moreover, it must be noted 
that while the study does not contain direct data from the Kenya camps, 
interviewees who previously resided in the camps, in addition to important 
secondary literature, enable this comparison. 
 
As for undocumented refugees, they are generally not entitled to any support 
from UNHCR. However, small-scale NGOs offer different services 
(emergency financial help, medical consultations, schools, literacy courses, 
etc.) to unregistered refugees. Assistance is offered on discretionary grounds 
and is generally available to the most vulnerable groups. The situation of 
undocumented refugees living in South Africa, Egypt and the European 
countries in the study are similar: individuals who are illegal residents and 
who lack financial support can only turn to private networks, charitable and 
religious organisations – and not the state – for assistance. 
Thus, the standard of living of undocumented urban refugees, especially in 
Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, varies greatly according to the personal 
situation: while exiles gain financial success through flourishing businesses 
ventures (see Campbell 2005 for the case of Nairobi), others survive 
marginally better than counterparts in the camps by means of illegal 
employment and remittances. The vast majority of vulnerable asylum-seekers 
live in miserable conditions in overcrowded houses or on the streets, with 
little or no food. Widows or divorced women with children, non-
accompanied minors and orphans, disabled people constitute the majority of 
this group. All other aspects (access to health services, children’s schooling, 
etc.) similarly depend on the economic situation of each person but, in 
general, the majority are not able to meet these needs at all. 
Table 8: Interviewees satisfied with their standards of living in their host 
country (in %) 
Host country Total KE ET YE DJ EG ZA CH NL 
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The level of satisfaction of interviewees (both camp refugees and 
undocumented persons) regarding their general standards of living in the 
African countries and Yemen is extremely low, with an average of less than 
one person in ten being satisfied (Table 8). 
A variety of health services are available at all camps for permanent 
residents, as well as – in some instances – for inhabitants in neighbouring 
communities. The degree of satisfaction for services provided varies, with 
many interviewees complaining about difficulty in accessing care or 
improper treatment in Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen. In Kebribeyah camp 
(Ethiopia), the situation is described as very tense due to the understaffing of 
the health centre and the reported abuses of power by the only doctor 
responsible for all camp refugees. In Kenya, many refugees living in the 
camps still awaiting registration do not have access to the health centre, 
which often compels them to move to Nairobi where they can expect to be 
treated. In contrast, health centres in the Djibouti camps are considered to be 
relatively better due to the presence of an Asian medical NGO (AMDA) 
which works in partnership with UNHCR. This agency is in charge of the 
treatment of both refugees and non-refugee patients from the region. 
In Egypt and South Africa, where most refugees live in urban areas, 
governments plead scarcity of resources to justify the limited assistance 
offered, insisting that the generous admission policies towards Somalis 
impede their capacity to offer high levels of support. Hence, only individuals 
who are considered as particularly vulnerable are provided with monetary 
assistance from UNHCR and its implementing partners. In South Africa, 
whilst the asylum application is being processed, which can take several 
months or years, no subsistence or welfare support is provided (either from 
UNHCR or the South African government). Recognized refugees are entitled 
to welfare and health care, but given the disparity between the law and actual 
practices in effect, a majority of refugees and asylum-seekers remain without 
assistance, a problem which also affects South African nationals. Moreover, 
refugee services are not always accessible because of poor coordination 
between government ministries and implementing agencies. Refugees in 
these two countries therefore live in poor conditions in segregated “Somali” 
neighbourhoods, with little or no interaction with the local population.  
In the Netherlands and Switzerland, asylum-seekers are provided with basic 
assistance and health care, and are housed in collective reception facilities or 
private flats. In Switzerland, the assistance provided for asylum-seekers and 
persons under subsidiary protection is substantially lower than that granted to 
nationals or recognised refugees. Given that the majority of Somalis hold 
subsidiary protection permit, their situation is considered difficult because of 
their protracted dependency on social assistance. The social system was 
designed for short-term recipients; the duration of assistance is increasingly 
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problematic in light of their inability to find adequate employment to 
substitute government assistance. Furthermore, asylum-seekers and 
foreigners under provisional admission are assigned to particular cantons 
(states) which limit their ability to move, reside or seek employment in an 
alternative area. This situation is reflected in the relatively low level of 
satisfaction (50%) of the Swiss sample regarding their general standards of 
living (Table 8). In contrast, subsidiary admitted persons (as well as 
Convention refugees) in the Netherlands are entitled to rights similar to those 
of Dutch nationals, with increased access to social services and primary and 
secondary schooling. 
3.5 Employment and Education 
At the time of flight, access to labour market opportunities and education for 
children or young adults was not a priority. However, after the initial period 
of shock and grief, acquisition of resources and skills is an essential survival 
strategy for all refugees, irrespective of country of origin. This need is further 
compounded in protracted refugee situations.  
Legal regulations concerning access to the labour market for refugees are 
rather restrictive in African countries, with the exception of South Africa. 
Ethiopia and Egypt have placed reservations on the 1951 Geneva Convention 
concerning the right to work. In Ethiopia and Kenya, employment is 
prohibited; in Egypt, employment is possible, in principle, but necessitates 
extensive administrative and financial measures which are often unavailable 
to refugees. The situation is de facto similar in Djibouti, which officially 
allows employment to refugees, even providing for professional accreditation 
for qualified refugees, although in practice this proves to be not only 
impractical, but impossible.  In Yemen, the practice is – or at least was – 
more liberal, though administrative barriers to obtaining work permits are in 
place and are becoming increasingly important. 
Legal or administrative constraints further complicate the precarious 
employment situations in the surveyed countries. In essence, and with a few 
exceptions, most refugees either have no professional activity or are 
employed in the informal economy (domestic labour, small business, etc.). 
This insecure environment frequently exposes them to exploitation, abuse or 
general harassment. In Yemen and Djibouti, for example, an important share 
of Somali refugees have found activities in the informal sector as domestic 
workers, car cleaners, tailors, and in small manual jobs. In general, refugee 
women appear to be more integrated economically than men; they are able to 
participate in the informal economy because the demand for house-keepers is 
still high; men on average experience more difficulties accessing the informal 
job market. This economic and psychological instability is a fundamental 
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reason underpinning the need to migrate and attain a more secure and safe 
environment, particularly for families with children. In practice, work 
conditions and risks for refugees are therefore comparable to those of asylum 
seekers (especially in South Africa39) or undocumented foreigners, who are 
not allowed to work.  
Some refugees undertake occasional humanitarian activities in the camps 
(e.g. food distribution, teaching) or volunteer work, but income-generating 
activities and labour opportunities remain restricted. Limited income and 
assistance often results in the creation of informal employment (small 
businesses in camps or in surrounding towns) and the decision to split the 
family and have some members (often young girls and husbands) seek work 
where such opportunities exist in cities. 
This explains why only a minority (26%) of interviewees are satisfied with 
the opportunities of employment and education in their host country, as 
illustrated in Table 940. According to interviewees, the higher satisfaction 
rates in Ethiopia are a reflection of the high degree of tolerance of informal 
employment shown by the government and the public, which has been 
reported by several interviewees. 
Table 9: Interviewees satisfied with employment and education opportunities 
in their host country (in %) 
Host country Total KE ET YE DJ EG ZA CH NL 






















Formal access to the labour market for recognized refugees is guaranteed in 
South Africa, the Netherlands and Switzerland, though in the latter, fairly 
heavy restrictions are imposed on beneficiaries of subsidiary protection 
(limitation to certain sectors, priority of residents). Many refugees find it 
difficult to obtain a job in practice. This is also true in South Africa where the 
competition for work opportunities frequently exposes refugees to 
xenophobic attitudes from the local population. 
 
39 Officially, if the status of the applicant is not determined within six months, the asylum-
seeker is entitled to apply for permission to work and receive education. 
40 In the standardised part of the questionnaire, satisfaction concerning work and education 
was treated as one item. 
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Access to the labour market is prohibited for unregistered refugees, who turn 
to the informal sector, and mostly illegal employment. While some 
opportunities are available, they have no adequate protection, which results in 
numerous types of exploitation and abuse by employers. Among these abuses 
are below – minimum wages, irregular or non – payment of wages, 
harassment and sexual exploitation of women. Similar treatment has been 
reported in all countries examined, with women depicted as more vulnerable 
to such abuses, although legally authorized employees also suffer similar 
exploitation. This is particularly notably in Yemen, where an unclear labour 
legislation results in the hiring of many Somalis who find themselves at the 
mercy of abusive employers.  
The situation of illegal residents and workers in Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates is described as particularly difficult. These countries are not 
signatory States of the 1951 Convention and therefore do not offer any 
protection to refugees. Somalis have historically provided a low-skilled work 
force in this region, largely as undocumented residents (Kleist 2004), and 
many have continued to do so since fleeing the civil war. Fear of being 
arrested and deported to Somalia is a daily experience; lack of a legal status 
also means that it is difficult (if not impossible) to gain access to education 
for children; while unregulated working conditions mean that employees are 
subject to all types of abuse. 
In terms of education, the situation greatly varies from one context to the 
next. Though access to primary education should be guaranteed for all 
refugee children, as it is in the Netherlands and Switzerland, this is not 
always the case in developing countries. Egypt and Ethiopia make specific 
reservations to the Geneva Convention regarding access to education.  
Primary schools exist in all camps, with the notable exception of Aour-
Aoussa camp in Djibouti, which was set up in 2003 as a temporary transit 
centre but which continues to host thousands of refugees, including many 
children. The presence of schools, however necessary, is not sufficient to 
their development. It is impossible to indicate precise figures, but it appears 
that only a portion of school-aged youth actually attend schools, especially in 
Yemeni, Kenyan and Ethiopian camps. Furthermore, the proportion of 
uneducated girls is particularly high, though there are programmes in place to 
reduce gender inequality in education. In the case of Djibouti, NGOs and UN 
agencies are working together on crucial programmes to increase the 
enrolment of girls in school by providing individual material assistance 
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which can be used to supplement their family income41. This strategy is 
designed both to reduce the probability of girls dropping out, and to curb the 
desire to seek employment as domestic workers in the urban areas. In most 
camps, many children, a majority of them girls, are required to work in order 
to contribute to the family’s meagre resources. Children work either in the 
camp (helping in small family businesses, or other odd jobs) or in the towns 
around the camp, as well as in the capital cities, usually as maids. Secondary 
education and professional/vocational training programmes are rarely 
available in the camps. Upon completion of primary level, the majority of 
youngsters remain unemployed and unskilled. This has earned them the label 
of a “lost generation”. 
In Ethiopia, better-quality education facilities are located in urban areas and 
refugees who can afford the fees generally send their children to private 
schools. In so doing, they are able to settle in the capital city rather than “sit 
and wait” endlessly in the camps where conditions are inhospitable and there 
is little hope of change. In South Africa, Yemen and Egypt, numerous 
problems associated with local authorities and the reimbursement of school 
fees complicate the position with regard to education, thus reducing or 
cancelling the possibility for school-aged children to receive knowledge.  
In almost all countries, including the European ones, access to secondary, 
higher and adult education is problematic from both the legal and practical 
point of view. A combination of various factors, including legal status, 
income and country of residence generally work together to limit the social 
advancement of refugees and asylum-seekers, preventing them from 
acquiring education and other social development skills. Despite these 
constraints, some refugee families sacrifice much of their income in order to 
educate one or more of their children, especially at higher levels of education, 
in an effort to improve their prospects for the future. 
It must be emphasised that despite the numerous obstacles facing the exiled 
population, there are important differences within the refugee community 
itself, with certain groups being more disadvantaged than others, particularly 
minority clans or castes. 
 
41 In order to strengthen girls’ interest in education, UNESCO partnered with WFP to 
supply each student with a monthly take-home ration of one gallon of high-grade 




Although ensuring the physical safety of the refugees is the primary role of 
the agencies in charge of asylum affairs, security issues are one of the major 
concerns in the discourse of camp refugees. On a general level, many camp 
refugees are afraid of raids by Somalis from across the border (especially in 
Kenya and Ethiopia), and of attacks by the local population when they leave 
the camp, notably to fetch wood. Women are particularly at risk and face 
regular sexual assaults or harassment. Insecurity and violence within the 
camp are also widespread. Coupled with discriminatory mechanisms, 
insecurity is a serious problem for refugees belonging to minority groups, as 
well as for members of the Somali clans fighting for power in southern 
Somalia, since representatives of all clan schemes are present in the camps 
and clan/political enmities are reproduced there. Kenyan and Djiboutian 
camps have often been described as notoriously dangerous for women, with 
high levels of sexual violence both inside and outside the camps.42.  
Girls are often raped when they go to fetch firewood. Men who have tried to get 
firewood have been badly beaten and sent back without any wood. Girls are raped 
but allowed to collect the wood and so girls and women continue to be exposed to 
danger because we need to eat to survive. The rapists are almost always local 
people who live in the area (Djibouti, Aour-Aoussa camp, female). 
Important tensions exist in both Ethiopian and Djiboutian camps between 
refugees and camp management staff, the former being afraid of the latter 
and reporting the use of intimidation, harassment and abuse of power to 
silence the population into compliance. 
Since they live with no official status, undocumented persons living in the 
cities of Somalia’s neighbouring countries are very much exposed to all sorts 
of harassment and abuses. As previously described, the issue of security is 
particularly important in Kenya, where undocumented refugees live in very 
unsafe conditions, being subject to police harassment, in a xenophobic anti-
refugee climate (Campbell 2005; Human Rights Watch 2002).  
One day, the Kenyan police arrested me when I was selling clothes in Garisa Lodge 
Market in Nairobi.  Many times I was caught and they would beat me and put a 
wooden stick under your cheeks and lift you up, which hurts your body.  Nobody is 
protecting you in Kenya and your money is your only protection whether you are in 
a house or in a camp or in a market (Egypt, male). 
 
42 Campbell’s (2005) recent observations, however, challenge UNCHR statistics by noting 
a significant decrease in sexual violence or rapes in the Kenyan refugee camps. 
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On the other hand, undocumented Somalis in Addis Ababa live relatively 
peacefully, being tolerated by the local population and the authorities 
(including police officers), due to political affinities between the authorities 
in both countries. Exiles in Djibouti were likewise acceptably treated by the 
state and public until 2003, when the expulsion of illegal economic migrants 
indirectly targeted refugees and asylum-seekers as well. Currently, many 
refugees in the country report increased police harassment and extortion, in 
addition to a high level of labour and sexual exploitation by local employers.  
Safety is also a concern for refugees in Egypt and even more in South Africa 
(with only 34% of interviewees feeling physically secure), where the local 
population in some instances espouses xenophobic and anti-immigrant 
tendencies, often resulting in violent attacks in the South African case. 
Although work for refugees is not forbidden in both countries, they are in the 
practice exposed to discriminatory practices which force them into the 
informal labour market.  
On a different level, in Switzerland and the Netherlands, while personal 
safety is guaranteed, interviewees nevertheless mentioned discriminatory and 
xenophobic experiences and feelings from their encounters and interaction 
with employers, police officers, apartment owners, etc. 
I sometimes feel more Dutch than Somali. I enjoyed a Dutch education. 
Nevertheless, I’m afraid that I will not get the same chances as a Dutch person. I 
noticed that when I started looking for a job. Some potential employers told me that 
they see me as an insecurity factor because I’m black and Moslem. That was a 
wake-up call for me. I was naïve, and thought that I would be treated like any other 
person. But now I realise that I will never belong to Dutch society. I have Dutch 
citizenship but I will never be part of it. That thought never goes away. I feel more 
suspicious now in my contacts with Dutch people (the Netherlands, male).  
The sense of “not belonging” was frequently reported in Switzerland, as well 
as in the Netherlands. In the latter, even naturalised Somalis mentioned this 
feeling, which has – in their eyes – become stronger in recent years, 
particularly since the assassination of film-maker Theo Van Gogh by a Dutch 
man of Moroccan origin, who presumably belonged to an extremist Islamic 
group. 
3.7 Access to Durable Solutions  
In many cases, restrictions regarding access to employment and education, as 
well as camp confinement are clear signs of host governments’ unwillingness 
to allow the local integration of refugees. This is confirmed by interviews 
with officials in Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia and Kenya, who underscore their 
countries’ incapacity to accept permanent settlement of large refugee 
populations who are perceived as competing for public services or tight 
labour markets. Though self-reliance and employment in the informal sector 
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is sometimes tolerated de facto, as is the case in Ethiopia or Yemen, most 
governments stress their reluctance to promote any form of local integration. 
Although this stance does not preclude small refugee populations who have 
integrated without state approval, it shows that both African and European 
countries have concerns about the negative economic, political and cultural 
impact of refugee presence. This growing reluctance to accommodate large 
numbers of refugees also results from a perception that the more prosperous 
members of the international community are not duly committed to burden-
sharing, particularly with poorer nations (Crisp 2003a).  
Given this context, it is not surprising that local integration is not perceived 
as a durable option by the majority of refugees. The only exceptions are 
individuals who have close family or cultural links in the host country which 
makes settlement a viable option, as is the case for the members of certain 
clans in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Yemen. A clear example can be drawn 
from the Djibouti case, where a segment of the Issa refugees population from 
northern Somalia (Somaliland) have been granted access to legal and 
economic integration by virtue of their clan origins, as well as through their 
clan and kin linkages with native Djiboutians. Understandably, similar 
opportunities are not available for members of other clans, even if they wish 
to stay or are in urgent need of protection. 
Apart from local integration and voluntary repatriation, resettlement in a 
third country is commonly referred to as one of the three ‘durable solutions’ 
available to refugees. According to the UNHCR (UNHCR 2005b), 
approximately 66,000 Somali refugees have been resettled by industrialized 
countries since 1990, with or without UNHCR assistance. The United States 
was the main resettlement destination for Somali refugees (84%), followed 
by Canada (7%) and Australia (6%).  
In terms of surveyed nations, only 176 Somali refugees have been resettled 
by Switzerland since 1992, the majority of them in 1993. Switzerland has 
officially frozen its quota since 1998, although single cases are still regularly 
brought to Switzerland by this method. Traditionally, the Netherlands have 
had a small annual quota for “invited” refugees, limited to 500 refugees at the 
request of UNHCR. When the number of asylum-seekers rose significantly in 
the mid-1990s, there was public discontent at the maintenance of the 
resettlement quota. In the end, the annual resettlement quota was sustained, 
but new provisions were added stipulating that family members would 
henceforth be included in the quota. According to UNHCR figures, 18 
individuals were resettled in the Netherlands in 2001, 7 in 2002, and 15 in 
2004. 
Whereas significant resettlement programmes have been implemented in 
Kenya, Egypt and Djibouti, very limited numbers of Somalis have been 
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resettled from Ethiopia, Yemen and South Africa, and only then if they had a 
severe medical reason or an exceptional protection case. In Kenya and 
Djibouti, the UNHCR suffered a major credibility crisis because of 
corruption scandals in the late 1990’s involving resettlement officers who 
sold resettlement opportunities to affluent nationals or wealthy Somalis 
instead of giving them to needy refugees. 
Furthermore, the US, being the most important resettlement country in the 
world, became more restrictive in its admission requirements after the events 
of September 11, 2001, which had a knock-on effect, with other countries 
adopting similarly restrictive policies and becoming increasingly reluctant to 
receive Somali refugees. In Djibouti, the programme is still non-operational, 
not only because of organizational mismanagement, but also because of the 
attitude of external states which have become suspicious of refugees and thus 
reduced the opportunities available to Djibouti-based refugees. However, the 
overall resettlement level increased significantly in 2004, with more than 
14,100 arrivals after a long bout of inactivity or low numbers43. This figure is 
nevertheless a fraction of the overall numbers – an estimated 270,000 Somali 
refugees in the four neighbouring countries. 
As alternative means of emigration are rarely available to refugees, it is not 
surprising that the vast majority of respondents consider access to legal 
emigration opportunities as unsatisfactory (87%, cf. Table 10). Several cases 
of family reunification have been reported, especially in the USA, but these 
figures remain extremely low because many refugees, particularly in 
Switzerland, cannot request reunification, irrespective of the duration of their 
stay in the country, because of restrictions related to their legal status.  
Table 10: Interviewees satisfied with opportunities for legal emigration (in 
%) 
Host country Total KE ET YE DJ EG ZA CH NL 






















Finally, the third “durable solution”, which seems to be the most acceptable 
option to both host countries and the international community, is voluntary 
 
43 During 2004, Somalis resettled abroad accounted for 17% of the global number of 
resettlement recipients, making Somali nationals the largest diaspora community, followed 
by Sudan and Liberia (UNHCR 2005b). 
 
 75
repatriation. UNHCR (2005) estimates that 460,000 Somali refugees have 
already repatriated since 1993, the majority of them from Ethiopia and 
Kenya. In most cases, these refugees returned to the northern regions of 
Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland). But for many of those remaining behind 
in the camps, voluntary repatriation is not an immediately attainable solution 
because of the armed conflicts in their region of origin.  
It also remains a controversial issue whether all refugees from northern 
Somalia are “genuinely” in need of protection or whether they have the 
potential to return, even though they belong to minority clans. In Djibouti and 
Ethiopia, refugee and expert interviewees observe increasing pressure to 
return the “Somalilanders” through what are often perceived as deterrent 
policies and practices on the part of UNHCR and its implementing partners 
(e.g. decreasing food rations, camps closures, and “food-for-repatriation” 
schemes). Unfortunately, concrete information about the actual purpose of 
such policies is not available, although many refugees state they are subject 
to an increasing push for repatriation. There are additional conflicting 
interests between national and international actors who diverge on the 
method and speed of the repatriation process for various reasons. On the one 
hand, the international community appears to support an expedited 
repatriation process, while on the other, national institutions are concerned 
about the loss of international support and employment opportunities 
associated with refugee maintenance.  
*** 
Many of the findings in this study underscore the far-reaching consequences 
of insufficient or inappropriate registration, especially in protracted refugee 
situations. Indeed, registration is not only relevant for access to asylum 
procedures or distribution of food (ration cards), but it is also linked to 
various protection-related issues, for instance security against arbitrary arrest, 
as well as enjoyment of a series of other rights, such as access to education, 
health care, employment, etc. As an example, nearly half of all refugees 
interviewed (44%) considered their physical safety to be at risk of attack, 
robbery, rape or detention, with a significantly higher number of respondents 
in South Africa, Kenya and Djibouti. Though insecurity (in a broad sense) is 
also widespread in camps, arbitrary detention is linked to a lack of recognised 
documents and thus greatly affects urban refugees. 
In this sense, proper documentation proves to be particularly important in 
protracted situations where refugees live outside camps (Crisp 2003b). The 
absence of documents conferring protected status greatly increases the 
vulnerability of refugees in a broader environment, not only in legal terms, 
but also in social and economic terms. In fact, it is this vulnerability which 
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stands out as a motivating factor for onward movements, both by the refugees 
concerned and by their relatives abroad, as will be described below. 
While there is a technical aspect to be taken into account, proper 
documentation refers, above all, to the ability or willingness of host countries 
– in partnership with international actors – to grant the protection and rights 
conferred on refugees by international law and national legislation. In 
protracted situations, which are typical in the case of Somalis, it is imperative 
to acknowledge that neither long-term “warehousing” of refugees nor 
immediate repatriation is a credible and sustainable option. Therefore, 
possibilities for local integration and resettlement, including family 
reunification, have to be explored from a new perspective. This vision should 
incorporate the unique and effective coping strategies devised by the refugees 
into a wider creative dynamic, rather than shifting responsibilities between 
states and various levels of governments. Such an approach involves a joint 
effort through a constructive North-South dialogue between states, as well as 
cross-mandate collaboration between international organisations and refugee 
communities. It may precisely be through the growing awareness of global 
interdependence, as illustrated by secondary movements of Somali refugees 
that a common commitment can be fostered (Betts 2005). 
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4 Trajectories of Somali Refugees 
This section is dedicated to the description of the trajectories followed by the 
Somali refugees interviewed, whether direct (without a stop in one or more 
settlement countries) or indirect (with intermediary stops). It starts with a 
sub-section on the causes and the ways and means of the flight from Somalia, 
and goes on to describe the main types of travel routes, as well as the 
characteristics of these trajectories.  
In the frame of this research, it was necessary to make a choice on what is 
considered a country of settlement, consequently of what is defined as a 
secondary movement. A country of settlement is defined as the locale where 
a refugee stayed for a period of at least one month (see chapter 1.5 on 
terminology)44.  
4.1 Leaving Somalia 
The analysis of the sample illustrates that a majority of interviewees in this 
survey came from Mogadishu, used to live there prior to the civil war, or are 
from other towns/regions in central and southern Somalia. A minority of 
interviewees is from the northern part of the country (Somaliland or 
Puntland). 
Table 11: Year of departure from Somalia (in %) 
Year of departure Total KE ET YE DJ ZA EG CH NL 
Before 1991 29 13 61 21 48 7 18 22 35 
1992-1996 26 27 6 33 36 24 30 20 35 
1997-2001 28 28 15 30 12 42 38 27 26 
From 2002 
 
17 32 18 16 4 27 14 31 4 
N 801 60 117 120 119 114 165 60 46 
 
 
44 This methodological choice does not always correspond to the reality of the persons 
concerned, who may not consider themselves as having really “settled” in a specific 
country. In other words, the term can refer to several very different situations:  a 10-year 
sojourn in a Kenyan refugee camp or the 1 month it takes a person to cross Tanzania or 
Mozambique on his/her way to South Africa. However, we considered one month a 
reasonable space of time for a refugee to lodge an application for asylum and/or to 
establish basic social ties which would allow him/her to consider viable opportunities for a 
permanent settlement. 
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The time of refugee flight or departure varies greatly (see Table 11). A few 
people left before 1991, especially from northern Somalia to Ethiopia and 
Djibouti after the outbreak of violence in 1988. The majority, however, left 
their home country either in the months following the fall of Siyad Barre’s 
regime or the full eruption of the conflict in 1991; some left much later and 
are still continuing the onward flight. 
Whatever the time of departure, the reasons that pushed Somalis to leave 
their country are all related to the civil war and its consequences: physical 
threats, extreme violence, persecution, general lawlessness, and anarchy. 
Many interviewees experienced attacks, rapes or kidnapping, and most of 
them had had members of their families killed or wounded in the anarchy. 
Often, the decision to move is prompted by an event that is particularly 
significant. 
I endured the war for many years; the lack of security, the fear that my family 
would be harmed or that my property would be destroyed and my house looted. But 
it was when my wife and one of my sons got killed by bandits that I decided to 
leave. It was too much. I couldn’t bear it anymore (Ethiopia, male). 
Although the direct consequences of the political situation played a crucial 
role in the movement of refugees, many people mentioned the lack of 
education and employment opportunities, the absence of facilities such as 
schools and hospitals, and more importantly, the unfeasibility of building a 
future in Somalia as important reasons for leaving. As Efionayi-Mäder et al. 
(2005) explain in their study of West Africans’ trajectories to Switzerland, it 
is the loss of hope in the country’s social, economic and political 
development, rather than an individual’s particular situation, which often 
pushes people to leave. The economic responsibility toward the family is also 
an additional burden prompting individuals to devise ways of moving45.  
There are, however, differences in the methods of the flight. Generally 
speaking, while those who left at the outbreak of the war mostly did not have 
the opportunity to plan the journey, those who left later were often able to use 
existing routes, resources and networks to at least partially organize their 
itinerary. This also means that refugees who fled at the beginning of the 
1990s mostly went to the nearest country to find safety, while those who left 
later – although they also often ended up in Somalia’s neighbouring countries 
– could more easily make longer-term plans. In some instances, these 
individuals were able to choose more distant destinations, even if they 
 
45 Moreover, the migration is sometimes supported by family members already abroad, 




involved transit stops in other countries, or make more concrete projects 
involving direct travel routes. Based on the distinction by Kunz (1973) 
(further elaborated by Johansson 1990) of anticipatory and acute refugee 
movements, Havinga and Böcker (1999) find similar results with patterns of 
anticipatory flight with more options on trajectories and destinations, and at 
the other end of a continuum, acute situations with less choice and greater 
role of immediate opportunities and circumstances. Richmond (1994) also 
built a continuum between what he described as “proactive” versus “reactive” 
migrants – the main difference lying in the degree of choice available – but 
noted that the majority of migrants found themselves somewhere along the 
line of the continuum.  
Moreover, the increasing movements from developing to developed 
countries, rather than regional movements, in recent years mark a general 
tendency in all types of migration, facilitated notably by technological 
innovation in the fields of communication and transport and more effective 
networks (Martin 2001).  
Table 12: Intended destination at the time of the departure from Somalia 
(in %) 
Year of departure Africa Europe Did not know Elsewhere 
Before 1991 66 4 11 19 
1992-1996 45 10 16 29 
1997-2001 42 16 19 23 
From 2002 
 
40 26 14 20 
Total 49 13 15 23 
Note: the category “elsewhere” includes all non-African and non-European countries, i.e. Yemen, 
Persian Gulf countries, USA, Canada, etc. 
 
These two tendencies – from acute to anticipatory movements and from 
regional migrations to industrialized destinations – appear when analysing 
the intended destinations of interviewees at the moment of the departure 
(Table 12). The earlier refugees fled their homeland, the more they intended 
to stay in Africa (although in many cases, they did not think of any other 
possible alternative); while conversely, the longer they remained in Somalia, 
the higher the likelihood that their destination included Europe or beyond. An 
analysis of this data by host country shows variations in this general 
tendency, which is particularly clear in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and 
South Africa, and for urban undocumented refugees in Ethiopia. This means 
that interviewees in Europe who arrived recently had planned their 
destination from the start, which is less likely to be the case for those who 
arrived earlier. For interviewees in South Africa and Ethiopia, the study 
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confirms the “transit” character that these two countries have gained over the 
years, with many Somali refugees choosing them with the intention to move 
onward. 
Naturally, the destination does not only depend on the time of leaving, but on 
other factors such as the social and economic resources of the refugees. 
Personal financial means, remittances, and social networks play a crucial role 
at the time of leaving, but also in the decisions made at a later date. These 
facilitating factors are important in the primary movements as well as in 
secondary movements, and will be analysed in a further chapter (chapter 5.4). 
4.2 Travelling Routes: Direct and Indirect 
Trajectories 
While it may be self-evident, it is nevertheless worth mentioning that the 
trajectories described in this chapter did not exist prior to fleeing since the 
majority of refugees did not have the luxury of time to plan their complete 
journey in advance. Most simply fled to the nearest zone of safety, or headed 
to a particular neighbouring country for personal reasons, with the intention 
to make subsequent decisions about their future – staying, moving within the 
current host country or to another one, going back to their home country – 
depending on new events, knowledge and opportunities. 
Table 13: Interviewees who settled in at least one country before their 
current host country46 (in %)  
Current host country % of secondary movers 
The Netherlands 88 
Egypt 87 
Switzerland 55 











46 Settlement refers to a stay in a country for at least one month. 
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This sample reveals that more than half of the interviewees are currently 
residing in the first country they settled in after leaving Somalia, without 
having moved at all (Table 13). This population is disproportionately hosted 
in one of Somalia’s neighbouring countries – primarily in Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Yemen. The others settled in at least one other country, in many 
cases more than one (see Table 16), and/or moved from their first country of 
settlement only to return at a later time. This, however, is only a description 
of the sample and cannot be regarded as being representative of the general 
scope of secondary movements among Somali refugees (for the detailed 
discussion on the scope of secondary movements refer to chapter 5.1). 
Table 14 shows the first country of settlement of the secondary movers of our 
sample. It may be that a trajectory includes a movement to one or more 
countries, with a possible return to the first country of settlement. When this 
happens, many secondary movers will count their current host country as first 
country of settlement, despite the fact that they have undertaken multiple 
movements since. For example, a refugee might have settled in Ethiopia, then 
moved to Kenya and later decided to return to Ethiopia. It simply means that 
they settled in a different country (in many cases, they returned to Somalia) 
in between their various movements. 
Table 14: First country of settlement for secondary movers interviewed 
(in %) 
 Total KE ET YE DJ ZA EG CH NL 
First country of settlement          
Kenya 42 (57) 71 26 (6) 76 29 55 51 
Ethiopia 21 (43) -- 30 88 (5) 15 21 12 
Djibouti 5 -- (12) 22 (3) (3) 4 (6) (7) 
Yemen 8 -- (12) (9) (3) -- 10 (12) (9) 
Saudi Arabia 13 -- (6) (13) -- -- 28 -- (7) 
UAE 2 -- -- -- -- -- 4 -- -- 
Other* 
 
9 -- -- -- -- 16 10 (6) 14 
N 363 7 17 23 35 62 143 33 43 
* The category “other” refers to Tanzania (5) Mozambique (4) and Zambia (1) for interviewees in 
South Africa; Libya (10), Sudan (2) and Syria (1) and Egypt (2) for interviewees in Egypt; Italy 
for interviewees in Switzerland; Egypt (2), Germany (2), Bahrain (1) and Rumania (1) for 
interviewees in the Netherlands. Figures between ( ) should be interpreted very carefully due to 
small sample size. 
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Kenya is clearly the principal first country of settlement, with 42% of all 
interviewees having stayed there for at least one month after having left their 
home country, with the exception of interviewees in Yemen and Djibouti. 
Naturally, the trajectory also depends on the region of Somalia from which 
the decision to seek refuge is taken47. Refugees fleeing from the northern 
parts of the country tend to go to Ethiopia, Djibouti or Yemen first. The 
central role of Kenya is confirmed in all periods studied, which is surprising 
in view of the fact that Ethiopia hosted the majority of Somali refugees until 
2000, when it was overtaken by Kenya (UNHCR 2005b). This can perhaps 
be explained by the fact that, apart from those in Djibouti, the majority of the 
interviewees in this survey originate from southern Somalia.  
A return to Somalia after having stayed in a first country of settlement is not 
uncommon. In the overall sample, 131 interviewees (16%) settled in two 
countries before their current country of residence; among them, 36% (47 
persons) opted to return to Somalia. Most returnees stayed for a relatively 
long time (between 9 months to more than one year) before leaving again, 
often to a different place than the first country of exile. Using the above 
typology, this movement can be interpreted as showing that the first 
movement from Somalia was emergency-based (reactive), whereas second-
time movers are able to gather other information and resources in the 
meantime that allow them to plan a more organized and detailed second exile 
(proactive manner). 
It is clear that there is no such thing as a typical trajectory since it is 
influenced by many different factors: time, motivations, personal resources 
and networks, luck, etc. It is, however, possible to draw a typology of the 
main trajectories, keeping in mind that this is not exhaustive since only eight 
countries have been examined.  
4.3 Typology of Main International Trajectories 
Based on the research, we can identify four main typologies of trajectories. 
These may be direct – though possibly including airport transit or a stopover 
of a few days in a third country – or indirect, when they comprise secondary 
movements. It is important to recall that secondary movements are defined as 
previous stays of at least one month in another country. 
 
47 International movements are often preceded by internal movements where refugees first 




4.3.1 Somalia’s Neighbouring Countries 
The majority of Somali refugees in the world fled to and are still residing in 
Somalia’s four neighbouring countries: Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and 
Yemen. However, while the bulk of the Somali refugee population is located 
in these four countries after the mass outflows (since 1988), this percentage 
has gradually decreased and stood at 68% in 2002 (UNHCR 2005b). 
In the first years following the outbreak of the war, Somalis fleeing their 
country mostly passed the borders without too many problems, and were 
even welcomed by international staff driving them to the refugee camps. 
Later, while those who fled to Ethiopia and Djibouti rarely mention any 
problems passing the border, those who went to Kenya often encountered 
harassment and extortion by border officials, police officers or even locals, 
on their way to the camps or to the city. The case of Yemen is slightly 
different since, unlike other neighbouring countries, smuggling is an essential 
element in crossing the sea. The hazards associated with the journey, which 
are minimum or non-existent in other countries, are incredibly high as 
countless people suffer or die, mainly from the heat or drowning during the 
voyage. 
This type of trajectory, although characterized by short duration in 
comparison to other types of trajectories, is not always direct and simple. In 
the sample, movements between neighbouring countries have sometimes 
been reported, especially between Ethiopia and Djibouti (31% of the 
Djiboutian sample), and between Kenya and Ethiopia. In the latter case, the 
“typical” trajectory goes from Kenyan camps back to Somalia, with a 
subsequent movement to the capital of Ethiopia when returnees realize that 
the situation in Somalia is not conducive to permanent settlement. This is 
explained by the non-willingness to return to camp life and possibly the 
acquisition of new information and resources, or the setting of a new 
migration project in which Addis Ababa appears as a better opportunity than 
a return to Kenya. 
Somalia’s neighbouring countries offer two main types of opportunities, 
which are not mutually exclusive. First, protection (especially in refugee 
camps) is relatively accessible, although not always without problems. 
Secondly, working opportunities are to be found in safer conditions than in 
the country of origin, even though this does not confer legal status; this is 
true especially in Yemen, Djibouti until 2003, and Ethiopia, and to a lesser 
extent in Kenya. Besides the urgent need to find a safe place, most 
interviewees explain their choice of these countries by their geographic (and 
sometimes ethnic) proximity, as well as by the possibility they offer of 
crossing borders without the need for identification or travel documents. 
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For the secondary movers, these countries are almost a compulsory first step 
to further destinations48. The main cities in these countries (principally 
Nairobi and Addis Ababa, but also Djibouti City and Aden) are transit points 
for Somalis on their way to Europe. The journey, by plane, is often organized 
from there, after a stay that can vary from brief to relatively long (see further 
in this chapter). 
4.3.2 The “Arab” Route 
Some specific trajectories include one or several Arab countries, mainly 
Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in this specific order49.  Apart from a 
cultural and religious link with Somalia, these countries were also 
destinations of historic labour migration, especially the Gulf States (Gundel 
2002; Kleist 2004; UNHCR 1999), and higher education for wealthier 
Somalis prior to the civil war.  
Another characteristic shared by theses countries is the relative ease of 
entering their territory, provided those refugees who choose these 
destinations have financial resources at their disposal. Many Somali refugees 
entered Saudi Arabia legally with an “umra” visa50 and a Somali passport 
because Saudi Arabia is among the few states to formally recognize Somali 
official documents, together with Egypt and Arab countries. The journey 
from Saudi Arabia to Egypt is relatively easy, with documents readily 
available from Somalis living in Egypt; umra and entry visas are for the most 
part illegally purchased. In the interviews, it was often difficult to identify 
whether they were fake, borrowed or, in some cases, authentic. Moreover, 
interviewees themselves did not always seem to be aware of the type of 
documentation they travelled with. Prices of visas cost around $300 for the 
umra visa and $450-700 for an entry visa to Egypt, according to the Egyptian 
study. Those who cannot afford to fly opt for entering Saudi Arabia by land, 
through Yemen, under riskier but cheaper travel arrangement51. Egypt can 
also be reached by land through different African borders, either uncontrolled 
or with the resort to bribes. 
 
48 Although the (flying) route via countries of the Arabic peninsula (Saudi Arabia and 
United Arab Emirates especially) is an alternative, especially in the recent years. 
49 The United Arab Emirates, Libya, Syria and other countries most probably also fall in 
this category, although we focus on those cited above because they are the ones on which 
we gathered the most information. 
50 The religious journey Muslims undertake to the holy sites in Saudi Arabia. 
51 According to various sources, as many as 60% of the Somalis in Yemen are in transit, 
mainly on their way to Saudi Arabia (see country report on Yemen). 
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When I came to Yemen the first time, I was with a group of women who knew the 
way to go to Saudi Arabia. We went together to Basaten and took a car to the 
border of Yemen. It took us 4 days to reach it. We were stopping before the 
checkpoints, going around avoiding them and taking the car back. We crossed the 
Yemeni border without problems, but we were finally arrested by the Saudis. They 
sent us back to Somalia. I could not stay in the country. I decided to go to Ethiopia. 
Finally, I left, less than one year after, to Yemen. I was looking for stability and a 
job (Yemen, female).  
The importance of this trajectory is reflected in the Egyptian study, where 
30% of all interviewees in Egypt settled in Saudi Arabia before coming to 
Egypt. Of this number, more than two thirds (68%) are women, who in many 
cases left their husband in Saudi Arabia for economic reasons while the 
family seeks a durable solution in Egypt. An important element of the 
trajectories including Saudi Arabia (and other countries such as the UAE) is 
the high probability of forced returns to Somalia, since these countries are not 
signatory States of the Geneva Convention and are not bound to the non-
refoulement clause. The high percentage of interviewees in Egypt who 
returned to Somalia after a stay in Saudi Arabia (40% of those having settled 
in Saudi Arabia) is a clear indication of this, although it may be possible that 
some returned voluntarily to their home country.  
In some cases, the “Arab route” is a stage in a trajectory to further countries 
(e.g. European countries), either with a long-term stay, or only as a transit 
point from Somalia or one of its neighbouring countries. The United Arab 
Emirates is often depicted as a transit point, rather than a settling country. 
4.3.3 South Africa 
South Africa constitutes a particular case in the typology. It was reached 
directly (i.e. without a stay longer than one month in an intermediate country) 
by half of the sample, while the other half entered the country following stays 
in one or many of the countries along the land route. South Africa is the only 
African country (along with Egypt) with both an asylum system and an 
economic and political situation somewhat comparable to that of 
industrialized countries. It is the only country which can be reached at a 
relatively affordable price (since it is possible to avoid buying a plane ticket 
and resorting to smugglers) and is perceived by refugees as a country 
conferring reasonably good legal status and providing better living conditions 
and work opportunities, in comparison to the other African countries. This 
case suggests that refugees’ trajectories are also determined by rumours and 
by ‘mythical’ testimonies. Indeed, the study shows that, in reality, South 
Africa falls far short of the illusion of fortune that refugees had imagined 
before they got there. 
Comparatively speaking, South Africa is chosen by more males than females, 
the majority being single. An explanatory factor can be the long, treacherous 
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land route exiles use to reach the country, which is not conducive to family 
travel. 
4.3.4 Europe 
Travelling to Europe requires substantial resources, both monetary as well as 
considerable social and smuggling networks (Koser 2004; Van Hear 2004). 
While direct paths between Somalia and Europe have been open over the 
years, via air routes from one of the neighbouring countries or the Arabian 
peninsula, most journeys to Europe consist of multiple steps and stops, some 
very short (transit) while others are much longer (settlement). The majority of 
interviewees – and this is supported by other studies – reveal that entry into 
Europe was done via air travel. In the great majority of cases Europe is 
reached by plane, as our interviews and the statistics of European countries 
reveal52: when the European country of landing is not the destination planned 
(which is often the case), the rest of the journey is then done by land, either 
by car, truck or train.  
Those unable to fly to Europe cross the seas by boat (mostly through the 
Mediterranean Sea and after crossing Africa by land) in highly dangerous 
trips organized by smuggling networks and reach Europe via ports in Italy or 
Greece. Only a minority of interviewees, mostly young and single, entered 
Europe in this manner, despite numerous media reports of dramatic 
immigrant drownings on the high seas while attempting to enter Europe.  
The opportunities for entering Europe legally are limited to instances of 
family reunification, resettlement, and certain limited cases. Increasingly 
restrictive policies are pushing refugees to resort to securing illegal means of 
travel, particularly the costly and risky use of smugglers, regardless of the 
legitimacy of their claim to refugee status (on this topic, see notably Nadig 
2002; Noll 2003). This means that the majority of Somalis currently living in 
European countries, regardless of their status, travelled and entered the 
continent illegally. In an effort to curb this trend, travelling illegally by plane 
has become much more difficult in recent years, having in part been 
facilitated by the post-September 11th events, which have prompted stricter 
controls at airports requiring appropriate identification documents. The use of 
“look-alike” passports – the borrowing of documentation of individuals who 
“look alike” – particularly those of naturalized European Somalis, has 
 
52 For example the unpublished report of INDIAC (Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service Information and Analysis Centre, in the Netherlands) estimating that 76% of the 
Somali asylum seekers arrived in Amsterdam by plane. 
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become – or was at least until  recently – the most common method of 
travelling, despite the possibility of arrest or detention if caught.  
Some interviewees reported that they borrow or rent passports through their 
own networks, while others pay agents to supply them. In the Netherlands, 
for instance, 20% of the interviewees found the necessary documentation 
through their personal networks, while 69% resorted to an agent; in 
Switzerland, 75% of the interviewees travelled with documents provided by a 
smuggler, with only a couple of persons able to furnish their own illegal 
documents.  
Agents or smugglers offer a range of services, from selling and/or renting 
documents to the complete organization of the journey. In the latter case, the 
agent, also known as a “carrier” by Somalis, accompanies the person or 
family on the trip to the destination country (see also Farah 2000). A 
specificity of the agents and carriers used by Somalis is that they mostly, if 
not always, belong to the Somali community. The price of such a trip to 
Europe with a carrier varies from $3,000 to $10,000 according to the 
interviewees of the Swiss study (no estimation can be made of the interviews 
in the Netherlands)53.  
Agents often play a role in the choice of the European country of destination, 
either by advising their clients according to possible resources and 
opportunities or based on the real needs/benefits of the refugees. It is a 
common knowledge that refugees who do not possess clear information about 
their intended destination are susceptible to fraud by such agents who often 
abandon them in a different destination than the one chose and paid for. 
Many interviewees in the Netherlands suffered from this deception, and 
although they did not intend to remain in the country, they nevertheless had 
little choice other than to apply for asylum when caught by the police at the 
airport of arrival. In total, roughly 20% of all interviewees in the Netherlands 
found themselves in such a predicament. The situations we found can be 
referred to the study of Van Liempt and Doomernik (forthcoming) describing 
three types of interaction between smuggler and smuggled persons: (i) the 
smuggler facilitates the journey chosen by the migrant; (ii) the choice of the 
destination country is solely in the hands of the smuggler; and (iii) 
negotiation takes place between the two actors. 
 
53 Similarly, Koser (2004), in a study on illegal Pakistani migrants in the UK, finds that 
smuggling is acting as filter selecting only the more resourceful and better educated 
persons. The price of such a trip is estimated at around $7000. 
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Regarding secondary movements within Europe, it can be stated that the EU 
development makes irregular movements increasingly difficult, especially 
with the Eurodac Database which allows identification of illegal migration, 
while at the same time facilitating the regular movements of Union citizens. 
This particularly affects naturalized European Somalis who enjoy expanded 
mobility rights on a par with other natives. In this sample, 14% of the 
interviewees in the Netherlands and 8% in Switzerland had settled in at least 
one other European country before entering their current host state. Intra-
European trajectories depict a south-north tendency, where, for instance, a 
considerable segment of the refugee population in Switzerland entered from 
Italy (and less frequently from France). 
However, the most striking fact is the desire of many interviewees, both in 
Switzerland and in the Netherlands, to move beyond continental Europe into 
the UK or, to a lesser extent, to the Scandinavian countries. The following 
testimony from a refugee woman in Switzerland who tried to travel to 
Denmark in 1999 expecting to find better opportunities for family 
reunification, is an example of the motivations behind such movements. 
I had been in Switzerland for about six months by then and I really missed my 
children. At that time, other Somali refugees told me that in Denmark it would be 
possible to bring one’s own children along after six months. That is when I decided 
to go to Denmark. I met a smuggler at the train station and gave him $1000 for 
some papers. I didn’t understand the documents because they were in German. I 
don’t know if it was an ID or a passport but the man told me that I would be able to 
travel to Denmark and stay there with these documents. I went together with 
another Somali woman who also bought the same papers and wanted to go to 
Denmark as well. We took a train to Berlin and from there wanted to go to 
Denmark, but the police checked us in Berlin. They said that we had illegal 
documents and brought us to prison. We stayed in prison for 18 days! Most of the 
time I was in a shock. They took me to the hospital. I didn’t want to stay in 
Germany. After 18 days, they brought me and my girlfriend back to Switzerland 
(Switzerland, female). 
 
Figure 1 shows the main patterns of movements found in the study. Although 
not fully exhaustive, it provides an overview of the main trajectories, 
including secondary movements. An arrow ending in a box implies a 
"settlement" according to the research’s definition, i.e. a stay of at least one 








4.4 Length of Stay 
The figures of the time spent in the different countries of asylum show that, 
whatever the “rank” of the country in the trajectory (i.e. whether it is the first, 
second, or third country of settlement), the majority of the Somali 
interviewees tend to stay either for a short time (less than 6 months), or for a 
longer period of two years or more (Table 15 and Table 16). A closer 
analysis of the interviews indicates that the subsequent moves are often 
contemplated or partially organized before the arrival in a particular country, 
with the necessary means already partially available, or are decided after a 
lengthy period of time, when the situation seems unalterably dissatisfying 
and/or resources become available to undertake additional movement. The 
two following quotations are illustrations of both cases. 
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First, I went to Kenya to gather information on how I could go to Switzerland. I 
stayed there two or three days and met an agent but he said I didn’t have enough 
money. So I went back to Somalia so my family and I could earn more money. 
After many months, I went to Ethiopia where I asked an agent to try to contact my 
daughter who was living in Switzerland, but I didn’t know where. My aim was to 
go to Switzerland to get treatment for my health problems. Ethiopia was just a 
transitory situation. I stayed three months in Ethiopia, just enough time to organise 
my trip and then I left with the agent (Switzerland, female). 
I stayed five years in Ethiopia, until I could not take it anymore. Life was so 
difficult. During my stay in Ethiopia, I planned to go to the US. I have relatives 
there who promised me their support. I did not choose to come here. My family in 
the US decided to help me to go to the US. A cousin of mine, who lives there, came 
to Addis to help me to leave the country. He had travel documents with him for me. 
And he also booked my flight. He could not get a direct flight to the US, but only 
one via Amsterdam. At Amsterdam airport I was stopped by the authorities, 
because my travel documents were not in order. I was afraid that I would be sent 
back, so I decided to apply for asylum (the Netherlands, male). 
Table 15: Time spent in the first country of settlement (excluding current host 
country) (in %)  
 
 
Less than 6 
months 
Between 6 
months and 1 
year 
Between 1 and 
2 years 
More than 2 
years 
N 
Kenya 19 17 12 52 110 
Ethiopia 38 22 13 27 69 
Djibouti (23) (31) (8) 38 13 
Yemen 20 (12) (12) 56 25 
Saudi Arabia 11 (9) (7) 73 44 
UAE (33) -- -- (67) 6 
Other 
 
32 20 (12) 36 25 
Total 24 17 11 48 292 
 
Table 16: Time spent in the previous countries of settlement (in %) 
 Less than 6 
months 
6 months to 1 
year 
1 to 2 years More than 2 
years 
N 
First country of 
settlement 
24 17 11 48 292 
Second country 
of settlement 
34 9 20 37 131 
Third country 
of settlement 
43 (8) 22 27 37 
Fourth country 
of settlement 




Moreover, the further forward the country is in the ranking (i.e. first, second, 
third country of settlement), the shorter the time of settlement appears to be, 
as established in Table 16. 
The analysis of the differences between the countries of settlement in terms 
of length of the stay shows at least two striking results. First, short-term 
settlement in Ethiopia appears to be relatively more important than in other 
countries studied. The transit character of Ethiopia, or more precisely of 
Addis Ababa, appears often in the interviews, whereby the city is considered 
as an important setting for organizing long-term travel plans. This is evident 
not only from interviewees who transited through Ethiopia to Europe and 
beyond, but also from those who continue to live in the city and hope for 
similar opportunities. Interestingly enough, Nairobi more than Addis Ababa 
is the city considered as the principal transit point in eastern Africa according 
to the literature in this field and is particularly known for its smuggling 
activities (as documented notably by Van Liempt and Doomernik 
forthcoming). However, while Nairobi’s importance as a major transit point 
will continue to be observed, this study also establishes Addis Ababa’s 
emerging influence as an important transit point for refugee and asylum-
seeker movement.  
Secondly, the high percentage of the Somalis’ extended stay in Saudi Arabia 
appears worthy of analysis. The populations in Yemen, Djibouti, and the 
UAE also yield higher percentages, but not as striking or as statistically 
significant. It is in these countries that most Somalis find employment 
relatively easily and are not confined to refugee camps. Though access to the 
informal labour market is possible, it is mostly through illegal channels and 
with very poor wages for the uneducated majority. Despite these constraints, 
it is evident that the potential to obtain employment and maintain relative 
mobility rights fosters the likelihood of longer-term settlements. A possible 
interpretation can also be that such long-term settlements are not necessarily 
a reflection of general satisfaction, but rather a temporary reprieve to 
assemble the requisite financial and human resources and networks in order 
to organize more complex movements from the Middle East to Europe or 
beyond. This aspect will be developed further in the chapter on the causes of 
secondary movements (chapter 5.3). 
4.5 Registered Camp Refugees and Undocumented 
Urban Refugees 
In the four countries bordering Somalia, refugee camps were set up to cope 
with the influx of Somali refugees at the beginning of the 1990s. Most of 
these camps have now been closed, with the remaining refugee population 
grouped in the few remaining camps (see map in the annex for the location of 
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the remaining camps). Except in Yemen, strict encampment policies have 
been imposed on Somali refugees, and such policies continue to remain in 
force.  UNHCR acknowledges that this situation is unsatisfactory, but has 
been unable to convince host governments to implement viable alternatives. 
While camps offer basic assistance and services to refugees, although these 
are not always sufficient or adequate, encampment policies also restrict their 
freedom of movement and deprive them of the opportunities to develop self-
reliance. Only a few refugees are officially allowed to leave the camps, 
mainly for increased protection and medical reasons, and to remain 
temporarily or permanently in the cities. However, large numbers of Somalis 
did not register in the camps or have since left and now live and work 
illegally in the cities54. This sample reveals that nearly half of the surveyed 
population (46%) which reached one of Somalia’s four neighbouring 
countries registered as refugees (Table 17). 
Many Somali refugees choose not to register for reasons that have nothing to 
do with their objective right to do so or with the reasons for their flight. Their 
undocumented situation is often the result of a conscious decision not to 
register, but it can also derive from other factors including lack of 
information on the asylum system or the denial or obstruction in registering. 
Table 17: Percentage of interviewees who applied, or tried to apply for 
asylum in the first country reached (including those still living in the country) 
First country reached % N 
Kenya 39 238 
Ethiopia 42 199 
Djibouti 32 97 
Yemen 77 129 
Saudi Arabia 0 42 




Total 41 813 
* The category “other” includes the main following countries: Mozambique (36), Egypt (21), 
Libya (11) and Tanzania (5). 
 
 
54 Diverse unofficial sources estimate undocumented persons at 30,000-45,000 in Addis 
Ababa; 15,000-100,000 in Nairobi (not exclusively, but mostly Somalis), and about 3,000-
4,000 in Djibouti. 
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Indeed, many interviewees reported that they did not know about the 
opportunity to register as refugees, or that they learned about it when they 
arrived in the city, but did not have means to travel on their own to the camps 
in order to register. In Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, some refugees tried to 
register but were reportedly denied access. In many cases, they waited to be 
registered – sometimes for many months – but eventually gave up and moved 
to the city. Others, having heard of these experiences, did not attempt to 
register in camps and instead headed directly to the cities. 
We tried to register in Hagadera in 2002. They said they were not registering. After 
seven days, my wife died. We had no shelter, no water, no food. Other refugees 
helped us. They had a ration card. We stayed with them two years. Two of my 
children went with a family and the other three with another family. I decided to 
come to Nairobi (Kenya, male). 
The direct or reported experiences of camp life are another motivation for 
Somali refugees to avoid it altogether and live in the cities, even without 
appropriate documentation. Difficult living conditions (inadequate food and 
water rations, lack of health services), lack of opportunities for employment 
and the issue of security are the main reasons given for leaving or avoiding 
camp life.  
Another important reason for settling in the city is linked with trust in the 
protective measures put in place by the host government and humanitarian 
agencies, as well as – more generally – with security. Some refugees – 
particularly those who served in the military – noted that they feared 
registration as it would make them “visible” to other refugees, especially 
those who suffered under the actions of the government55. Yet others who 
belonged to minority clans or historically marginalized clans were hesitant 
about registration and their ability to fare well with other refugees. Groups 
like the Bantus and Gaboye feared they would experience similar 
discriminatory mechanisms in the camps as was the case prior to the conflict. 
Depending on migration plans and economic resources, going to a city can be 
a strategic choice for those who already intend to continue moving for 
various reasons. Cities offer more opportunities for earning money, 
communicating with embassies or international organisations for family 
reunification cases (an important proportion of interviewees in Addis Ababa, 
notably, are waiting for their cases to be processed), or organizing illegal 
ways to travel (access to information, communication facilities, and 
 
55 In Djibouti for instance, some interviewees reported insecurity in Ethiopian camps and 
eventually left because they feared retribution from other refugees, given their former 
profession in the armed forces and their clan affiliation with the old regime. 
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intermediaries such as agents). In essence, illegal residence is not only a 
mechanism to avoid state regulation (encampment policies) but is a 
contributing factor to agency and self-sufficiency. 
The presence of family members or friends in the city is also a factor of 
attraction, as refugees can expect to be better off through family or 
community support in cities than would otherwise be possible in the camps. 
The following testimony, from an urban refugee in Addis Ababa, 
demonstrates how these reasons may interlink and result in the bypassing of 
the registration system in the camps. 
We are urban people; many of us come from Mogadishu. We cannot live in rural 
areas, like the camp is. Then only certain clans reside in the camp. If you don’t 
belong to that clan, you will encounter a security problem. Besides, in Addis you 
can do business. You can work, open a shop, a restaurant or something like that. 
There are many Somalis that we can do business with and the police don’t bother 
us. In camps you can’t work. You just sit around and wait. Another issue is the 
schools in the camp. They are not good, but we want to educate our children. Plus, 
in Addis we have relatives. Many of us are called to Addis by our relatives abroad 
for family reunification and a few get resettled. And the infrastructure in the camp 
is very bad, the camp is not attractive. Many refugees also believe that the 
registration procedure in Kebribeyah camp has stopped because of the ongoing 
repatriation from Aisha camp (and until June 2004 from Hartisheik camp) to 
Somaliland. I know of people who reported to Jijiga in 2003 and got rejected by 
ARRA. This information spreads around very fast. So why should we go all the 
way to Jijiga, pay for the bus ticket just to get rejected by ARRA? (Ethiopia, male). 
Refugees in urban areas who remain undocumented do so either voluntarily 
or as a result of difficulties in accessing the registration system. For those 
who opt to avoid the asylum system altogether, the question of economic and 
social resources plays a crucial role, as those living in the cities can often 
afford to do so because they had savings or because they receive support 
from family members abroad or already living in the city. As Table 18 
shows, the difference in the percentage of remitted refugees in both settings 
is striking in the case of Ethiopia, less so in Djibouti and not Yemen. It is also 
confirmed in the literature regarding Kenya, notably by Horst, who found 
that the Somali refugees who receive remittances often choose not to stay in 
the camps, being able to find better conditions in the cities with such support 




Table 18: Refugees receiving remittances in current host country 
Country Place of living % N  
Ethiopia Camp refugees 4 49 
 Urban refugees 51 70 
 All 32 119 
Yemen Camp refugees 15 26 
 Urban refugees 15 94 
 All 15 120 
Djibouti Camp refugees 1 101 
 Urban refugees 5 19 
 All 2 120 
Kenya All 14 57 
South Africa All 9 119 
Egypt All 67 165 
Switzerland All 10 59 
The Netherlands All 0 48 
Table 19: Interviewees who applied for asylum in their current host country 
by year of arrival (in %) 
 Ethiopia Kenya Djibouti 
Before 1991 94 97 98 
1992-1996 (60) 81 93 
1997-2001 44 82 75 
After 2001 37 53 (22) 
Note: Yemen is not included in the table because all Somalis are accepted as prima facie refugees 
upon entering the country. 
 
A chronological perspective (Table 19) reveals that the more recently Somali 
refugees arrived in neighbouring countries, the less often they applied for 
asylum, especially since 2002. Deteriorating living conditions in the camps 
(especially in terms of food rations) and more difficult access to registration 
are among the main explanations for this trend.  
4.6 Movements Between Camps and Cities 
Not all refugees registered in the camps live there on a permanent basis and 
not all camp refugees are officially registered56. Many families are separated, 
some with members living and working in the city (mostly men, and 
 
56 Locals, but also Somali refugees, could for instance settle in the camps simply by 
buying a ration card entitling them to the different services provided. 
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sometimes older daughters), while women and children stay in the camps. 
Movements between camps and cities are therefore inevitably frequent, 
though difficult to quantify. The findings, which are confirmed by other 
researchers (notably Campbell 2005; Horst 2003), show that such movements 
are very common in Kenya, where they are fostered by good connections 
between Dadaab camp and Nairobi and authorizations to travel to the capital 
for specific reasons (medical, protection, education, etc.). Such movements 
also exist in Yemen and Djibouti, as the distance between camps and cities is 
relatively small, and the cities offer considerable work opportunities. In 
Ethiopia, on the other hand, such movements are not as prevalent because of 
the remote location of the camp. Furthermore, the relatively liberal attitude of 
the government towards undocumented Somali refugees living in the capital 
city underscores the fact that refugees remaining in the camps do so because 
of lack of alternative resources and coping mechanisms to enable them to 
move to the city (on these differences, refer to chapter 3.4) 
An interesting question that arises from this segment is whether these internal 
movements from camp to city are related to or encourage further 
international movements. A first element to consider in answering this 
question is that the majority of irregular secondary movements start from the 
cities and not from the camps, given the availability of resources (transport, 
networks and intermediaries)57. Moreover, secondary movers need resources 
and are therefore more likely to live in cities rather than in camps, as has 
been described above.  
The study reveals, however, that most of the Somali refugees interviewed in 
Europe who first settled in Somalia’s neighbouring countries did not transit 
through the camps but went directly to the cities, either already intending to 
move further, or taking the decision later on. Only a small number resided in 
camps (exclusively in Kenya and Yemen), but their trajectories do not 
support the hypothesis that moving to the city leads to further international 
secondary movements. Most often, the decision to move abroad is taken 
while residing in camps and thus the movement to the city is only a 
transitional step. In other cases, after having stayed in a camp for some time, 
the person or the family decided to return to Somalia, where the strategy for 
international migration was implemented.  
 
57 However, regional international movements can also begin in camps. 
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I decided to leave Kenya since life in the refugee camp was extremely difficult and 
unsafe. I lived there for two years and those were very difficult years. I just could 
not take it anymore. I had hoped that the situation would have improved in Somalia 
meanwhile. I preferred to go back to Somalia. But unfortunately, Somalia was still 
very unsafe and I looked for other solutions to leave the country again. I left the 
country as soon as I found an agent who organised my journey to go to the 
Netherlands (The Netherlands, male). 
In summary, it is worth noting that refugees who move from camps to cities 
do so mainly because they expect to find better living conditions and/or better 
opportunities for self-reliance. In this sense, internal movements may be 
considered as an alternative strategy to international movements, though they 
may, in some cases, be a step in the long journey to resettle in another region.  
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5 Secondary movements 
5.1 Scope of (Irregular) Secondary Movements 
The exact scope of irregular secondary movements of Somali asylum seekers 
cannot be deduced from the (rare) existing statistics. However, by combining 
available statistics with the findings of this study, we can delineate certain 
trends58. 
An important finding is the overall decrease in the numbers of Somali 
refugees from 800,000 in 1992 to 390,000 at present. The percentage of 
Somali refugees in neighbouring countries has also diminished, but has 
simultaneously increased in countries further afield, especially industrialized 
countries. According to UNHCR figures, the share of Somali exiles in 
industrialized countries has increased from almost nil in the beginning of the 
1990s to approximately 36% in 2004, corresponding to roughly 140,000 
persons.  
However, data show that since the beginning of the 1980s, 260,000 asylum 
applications have been filed by Somalis in industrialized countries, a large 
majority of it in the 1990s. The difference between these figures (260,000 
applications and 140,000 current refugees) can be attributed to a combination 
of naturalization, return, disappearance (irregular status and/or secondary 
movement) and rejection of asylum applications. 
Many factors explain this gradual shift. First of all, approximately 460,000 
Somali refugees repatriated to northern Somalia, mainly from neighbouring 
countries (returns from industrialized countries being more rare). Then there 
are the trends in regular secondary movements: Some 66,000 Somali 
refugees have been resettled in industrialized countries, with an unknown 
number benefiting from family reunification59. In total, these trends have 
worked successfully to reduce the overall numbers of refugees inhabiting 
 
58 Unfortunately, the statistics available are limited. In developing countries, the main 
statistical resource is UNHCR, which, although useful, needs to be utilized comparatively 
with other sources like official government statistics. Moreover, undocumented Somalis 
are not included in these statistics and it is often difficult to estimate their numbers. The 
figures in this chapter are from Profile of Somali Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: Levels, 
Trends and Characteristics (UNHCR 2005b). 
59 The majority of Somalis resettled abroad went to the USA. The figures of resettlement 
for the USA, unlike those for the other countries, also include persons reunited with 
family members.  
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Somalia’s neighbouring countries, though many more continue to live in 
harsh, challenging environments.  
5.1.1 Regular Versus Irregular Movements 
Taking into account that there are very few ways to enter most industrialized 
countries regularly and that regular entries (i.e. resettlement and family 
reunion) are not included in the number of asylum applications, it can be 
argued that the large majority of all Somali asylum-seekers (i.e. 260,000 in 
the last 20 years) travelled irregularly. The number of applications is the only 
one on which we can found our estimates since the refugee population does 
not include naturalized refugees and asylum-seekers (figures which may vary 
significantly between countries depending on their practice). Despite the 
comparatively high resettlement rates for both the United States and Canada 
(91%), their global proportion of asylum applications is only 18% of the total 
number in all industrialized countries. From these figures we can deduce that 
irregular movers find it easier to enter Europe than North America. Although 
restrictions and barriers have also increased considerably, access to Europe is 
comparatively easier because of the relatively cheaper costs and geographic 
proximity.  
A clear majority of sample interviewees in Europe (94%) arrived illegally 
because they had no legal alternative, a fact acknowledged both by 
policymakers and existing literature. According to Pérouse de Montclos, 
about 90% of Somali arrivals since the 1990s came to Europe illegally and 
generally with the assistance of smuggling networks (2003: 47).  
5.1.2 Direct Versus Secondary Movements 
An important question to consider at this stage is whether these irregular 
movers are also secondary movers. Although statistical data do not provide 
the answer, the research findings can be extrapolated, albeit cautiously, if one 
considers both ends of the trajectories, i.e. the future plans of potential 
secondary movers, and retrospectively, the trajectories of Somali refugees 
currently living in non-neighbouring countries.  
The research shows that 45% of all interviewees are secondary movers 
(Table 13 in chapter 4.2); in fact, current trends indicate a general decline in 
secondary movement which is facilitated by increased opportunities for more 
direct trajectories from Somalia to Europe and beyond. The difference 
between the percentage of secondary movers in the Netherlands (88%) and 
Switzerland (55%) can, for instance, be explained by this trend which is 
depicted in the survey. While interviewees in the Netherlands had mostly 
arrived during the 1990s, many of those in Switzerland arrived in 2000 and 
later. The Swiss sample shows clearly that those who arrived later had 
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benefited from more direct journeys from Somalia (although still with 
transits). 
The decline in the absolute number of Somali refugees still living in 
neighbouring countries, combined with higher numbers of Somalis both in 
Somalia and in industrialized countries, are therefore also part of the 
explanation. Indeed, many Somali refugees have returned to Somalia to 
organize their journey to other countries, preferably in industrialized 
countries, because of the ongoing hardships in the immediate neighbouring 
countries. These transitions and journeys are further facilitated by relatives 
and friends already living abroad, who provide the necessary information and 
finances to organise such a trip. 
Regarding the prospective view, the willingness of interviewees to move 
onward is captured in two crucial questions in the survey. The first question 
asks where refugees imagine living in the future with the options of current 
host country, in the homeland or elsewhere (with the possibility of answering 
“I don’t know”). The second question concerns their future migration plans, 
whether legal or not.  
Table 20: Interviewees’ choice of future destination (in %) 
Choice of future destination % 
Host country 16 
Country of origin 16 
 Of which 14% with concrete plans to leave   
Elsewhere 42 
 Of which 22% with concrete plans to leave  





Question: "Where do you imagine living in the next years?" 
 
The most intriguing finding concerns the difference between the desire to 
move and concrete possibilities of doing so. Table 20 illustrates that roughly 
16% of interviewees envisage remaining in the host country in coming years, 
while another 16% plan to return to their country of origin. At the same time, 
a significant proportion of interviewees (42%) wish to live elsewhere, in 
places such as North America (46%), Europe (34%), Gulf States or Egypt 
(3%), Australia (3%), other African countries (1%), or in a yet unknown or 
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unclear place (13%)60. A quarter of all interviewees opted for the residual 
(“I do not know”) answer. 
It is clear from this survey that the low preference for the host country is an 
indication of refugees’ dissatisfaction with the protection and assistance 
schemes in place. The fact that an equal number prefer to return to the 
homeland underscores that social conditions in the camps are presumably the 
same as those in the homeland, where anarchy and chaos are the norm in 
many parts of the country.  
Interviewees’ future plans, in terms of destination, appear clearer if one 
adopts a comparative cross-country analysis. Table 21 displays the responses 
to the question concerning future travel plans by current host country. Those 
willing to move onward or return to the homeland are mainly based in Africa, 
whereas refugees based in the two European countries examined wish to 
remain there, namely 58% (the Netherlands) and 45% (Switzerland). Ethiopia 
and South Africa are the only African countries where a sizable portion of the 
interviewees are willing to remain in the country, 22% and 28%, respectively. 
This matches the evidence provided by the interviews in Addis Ababa as in 
Pretoria or Cape Town, where Somali refugees have found opportunities for 
integration in the urban context, although often through informal employment 
and undocumented residence. 
Table 21: Comparative analysis of refugees’ future travel plans (in %) 
Future plans KE ET YE DJ EG SA CH NL 
Host country 2 22 0 6 1 28 58 45 
Country of origin 2 34 21 29 4 9 7 16 
Elsewhere 38 21 49 37 76 46 7 23 



















Question: "Where do you imagine living in the next years?" 
 
Despite the hopeful intentions of interviewees, it is important to examine the 
distribution of the sample which actually possesses the means to move 
onwards. The study represents a significant gap between respondents with a 
desire to move vis-à-vis those who have concrete plans to travel. As Table 20 
illustrated, only 14% of interviewees wishing to return to their homeland and 
 
60 This preference for North America rather than Europe also appears in Horst’s research, 
where she finds that her interviewees perceive the former as allowing much more freedom 
than the countries of the latter (Horst 2003). 
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22% of those hoping to move farther have the actual resources and strategy to 
undertake their journey. It is quite clear from these figures that a majority of 
all those wishing to move further will not be able to achieve their desire to do 
so simply because they lack the financial and material plans necessary to 
organize such a journey.  
Statistics also serve as a useful tool in comparing the differences between 
refugee movements in various host countries. Indeed, as discussed in the 
trajectory chapter (chapter 1), not all countries play an equal role in the 
dynamics of movements. Table 22 illustrates the ratios of interviewees who 
have concrete plans for departure, depending on current host country. There 
are specific factors which enable these movements, for instance traditional 
labour migration paths to Gulf States via Yemen or opportunities for 
resettlement or family reunification in Egypt and Ethiopia, thus making these 
countries an excellent platform for organizing onward movements. Not 
coincidentally, Egypt and Ethiopia host the largest Somali exiles with 
concrete plans to move (21% and 20%, respectively).  It is interesting to note 
that while these countries are on the one hand enabling opportunities for 
onward movement (via resettlement or family reunification), they are on the 
other hand notorious in their inability to offer refugees an alternative durable 
solution such as integration. The convergence of these two possibilities 
produces a high likelihood of secondary movement, not all of which is legal. 
A similar situation is evident in the Netherlands, where roughly 10% of the 
interviewees (which is a high percentage in the European context) expressed 
interest and willingness to leave through legal avenues.  
Table 22: Interviewees with concrete plans to leave host country (in %) 
 KE ET YE DJ EG SA CH NL 




















The research presents a comparative analysis of the socio-economic 
conditions of interviewees and suggests that place of residence is also a 
strong indicator of onward movement. Statistics demonstrate that the vast 
majority (84%) of interviewees with concrete plans to move live in urban 
areas and in private housing (flats), which implies access to financial 
resources with which to plan such ventures. Conversely, encamped refugees 
are generally unable to explore similar options due to their bleak economic 
situation which prevents both autonomy and mobility. This analysis therefore 
suggests that despite the harsh living conditions of encamped refugees which 
produce powerful motivation for change, environment alone is insufficient in 
enabling movement. Such actions can only be initiated when there are not 
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only compelling stimulants (such as inhospitable living conditions), but the 
availability of resources – including information – which work in tandem to 
generate movement.  
Table 23: Interviewees with concrete plan to move by place of residence 
(in %)  
 % 
Private flat/town 84 
Refugee centre/camps 13 





5.1.3 Regular and Irregular Secondary Movements 
An important consideration at this point is to examine the particular movers 
and the types of movements they wish to undertake; that is, whether they are 
legal in nature (resettlement and family reunification) or illegal (essentially 
via smuggling networks).  
Table 24: Types of plans (legal/illegal) of interviewees with plans to move 
Current host country Illegal avenues Legal avenues Not clear N 
Kenya - 100 - 8 
Ethiopia 29 59 (12) 17 
Yemen (20) (80) - 5 
Djibouti (67) (33) - 6 
South Africa (33) (67) - 3 
Egypt 18 82 - 33 
Switzerland - (100) - 1 
The Netherlands 
 
- (75) (25) 4 
Total 22 74 4 77 
 
Table 24 reveals that a majority of respondents (74%) have concrete plans to 
move via legal channels, whereas only 22% intend to resort to illegal 
solutions. There is also a small segment of respondents (4%) whose plans for 
movement were unclear in terms of their legality. It is fair to assume, 
however, that the proportion of respondents considering illegal movement is 
slightly higher because of interviewee reluctance to disclose the full extent of 
their plans. In some cases, all interviewees awaiting family reunification are 
unlikely to receive such offers, thus forcing them to resort to other means of 
travelling, generally via illegal channels. Furthermore, one can also consider 
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interviewees in “unclear” situations as being prone to consider illegal 
avenues, although their chances of success are not always guaranteed. 
Table 24 also illustrates the differences in the movement plans of refugees 
living in different countries. Such plans are intricately linked to the long-term 
plans and policies of the host state and UNHCR towards Somali refugees, as 
well as to the existence of other kinds of opportunities which enable the 
migration of refugees, i.e. presence of foreign embassies for visas, etc. 
5.1.4 Return to Somalia 
It has already been stated that in many trajectories, there is a distinctive stage 
which involves the return to the country of origin with a subsequent new 
move out of the country. More generally, the return to the country of origin 
appears to have been a very sensitive issue for most respondents. While most 
interviewees hoped to return and live peacefully in Somalia, a significant 
portion did not concretely imagine returning, mainly for security reasons. As 
Table 20 confirms, only 16% of all interviewees envisaged a return to their 
country of origin, but only 14% of those had concrete plans to do so (i.e. 2% 
of the total sample). The vast majority are likely to return only when and if 
the country stabilizes and peace is guaranteed.  
While a minority would prefer to go back to their homeland rather than to 
stay in the difficult situation they live in, they do not appear to have the 
means to concretize such plans. For instance, an important segment of the 
Somali camp refugees in Ethiopia expressed a sense of being trapped in an 
impasse: 66% imagined going home (compared to 16% in the whole sample), 
while only 3 people (6% of camp refugees interviewed in Ethiopia) have 
concrete plans to leave the host country to return home.  
Yes, I want to move from Kebribeyah. But how, I don’t know. I cannot even 
manage my basic needs. But I want to go back to my homeland (Ethiopia, male). 
 
*** 
Two major conclusions can be drawn from these considerations. First, a 
majority of all interviewees (84%), regardless of their current host country, 
are not satisfied with the host country’s security and living conditions and 
therefore wish to leave. The majority of interviewees in Africa wish to leave 
the continent altogether, while those already in the Netherlands and 
Switzerland wish to move to another industrialized country: however, most 
do not have concrete plans or the means to do so in the immediate future. 
Simultaneously, a significant proportion of interviewees are simply not able 
to envisage their future plans, while others entertain hopes of returning to 
Somalia. It is quite evident that as long as there are obstacles to effective 
 
 105
integration and repatriation schemes in the current host countries, secondary 
movement will continue to be an option for refugees and asylum-seekers.  
Secondly, more movements towards more distant countries are a reality, 
fostered by better communication, transportation opportunities and by routes 
(both legal and illegal) opened by previous migrants. However, research 
findings suggest that over time, these movements do not become more of an 
irregular type nor of a more secondary type (see hypothetical tendencies in 
Table 25). 
Table 25: Types of movements by Somali refugees to industrialized countries 
 Regular movements Irregular movements 
Direct movements Almost inexistent since 
institutions (UNHCR, NGOs or 
embassies) enabling these types 
of movements are not available 
in Somalia anymore. Moreover, 
other types of migration paths 
(i.e. education or labour) have 
been reduced. 
 
Easier over time (open paths), 







 Hypothetical trend: Ô Hypothetical trend: Î 
Secondary movements Mainly resettlement and family 
reunification (with intermittent 
interruptions of resettlement 
programmes). Slightly 
increasing. 
Constant over time 
 Hypothetical trend: Ò Hypothetical trend: Î 
 
In other words, while irregular secondary movements, which are of greatest 
concern to the international community and host countries, constitute just a 
minority share of all the movements of Somali refugee, they are nevertheless 
necessitated by the lack of alternative options available for legal migration. 
This being so, these irregular movements (both secondary and direct) are 
likely to continue in the future as the main form of entry into Europe and 
beyond.  
5.2 Socio-demographic Profile of Somali Secondary 
Movers 
Before turning to an analysis of the motivations for secondary movements, it 
is useful to consider the socio-demographic profile of the Somalis who have 
undertaken a secondary movement. Indeed, it is interesting to analyse the 
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distinguishing features which differentiate refugees who have experienced 
movement vis-à-vis those in the first host country. Table 26 presents a 
comparative socio-demographic profile of the two groups, with numbers in 
bold indicating the most relevant differences between the categories. Such 
differences are then clearly indicated in the last column on the right hand 
side. First, the lack of gender differentiation is clearly evident between 
movers and non-movers, as both women and men are equally present in both 
groups. Differences only materialize when familial and social statuses are 
factored in. Statistics reveal that individuals with children are less likely to 
travel than married couples/individuals without children (40% vs. 30%). 
Furthermore, there appears to be more movement amongst single refugees 
compared to married refugees (33% vs. 23%).  
The differences between the two groups become even more evident if one 
considers the educational level and profession attained in Somalia. 
Respondents who had no formal education account for nearly one-half of all 
non-movers, whereas the proportion for illiterate movers is approximately 
one-third. Similarly, the data reveal that respondents who moved frequently 
had held decent jobs in Somalia which afforded them relatively stable income 
(small business owners, civil servants, etc.), a factor which contributes to 
their desire to relocate in order to regain self-sufficiency and financial 
security. Approximately 82% of the movers appear to have held some form 
of employment, with 18% of them declaring that had been without a job in 
Somalia. This proportion is 72% / 28% for the non-movers. 
Table 26 also provides useful information concerning the correlation between 
the year of departure from Somalia and the type/frequency of movement. It 
distinguishes movers by the time period when they left the homeland and 
suggests that there were more secondary movers in 1992-1996 than in 2001-
2005. This hypothesis is more convincing when one examines the cause of 
flight in the earlier years, which was primarily safety; in later years, 
movement was better organized and financed with a particular target 
destination. As illustrated in chapter 4.2, recent movements (2001-2005) and 
trajectories of respondents have become more direct, in which case refugees 
do not settle in in-between countries for long periods of time. 
From this socio-demographic overview, one can draw preliminary 
observations concerning refugees who experienced secondary movements. 
Access to resources is imperative if refugees are to move between different 
countries. Such resources entail access to finances to organize and commence 
the journey as well as educational and vocational skills to utilize in the new 
region of settlement. Experts noted that educated and skilled persons were 
more prone to undertaking secondary movements as a result of the frustration 
caused by their inability to utilize their knowledge and skills in the specific 
host country. Additional movement was organized with the intention of 
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achieving an environment more in keeping with their qualifications and 
competencies in an effort to improve their personal living conditions and 
those of their families. 









Sex Men  51 49 2 
 Women  49 51 -2 
     
Marital Status Single  33 23 10 
 Widow 8 13 -5 
 Divorced 7 7 -- 
 Married 52 57 -5 
     
With children? Yes 60 70 -10 
 No 40 30 10 
     
Education None 34 51 -17 
 Primary Ed 34 27 7 
 Secondary Ed 23 17 6 
 Higher Ed. 9 5 4 
     
Year of departure from S. Before 1991 30 27 3 
 From 1992 to 1996 33 21 12 
 From 1997 to 2001 30 26 4 
 From 2002 to 2005 7 26 -19 
     
Profession in Somalia Small business-
manual jobs 
24 17 7 
 Unemployed 18 28 -10 
 Children (less than 
16 years old) 
15 7 8 
 Students 13 10 3 
 Managers/officers 12 8 4 
 No answer 7 16 -9 
 Domestic workers 4 6 -2 
 House keepers 3 3 -- 
 Farmers 3 3 -- 
 Other activities 1 2 -1 
 
As previously mentioned, however, in most cases having children/dependents 
is an impediment to the capacity to move on. Indeed, the more dependants 
refugees/asylum-seekers have, the more difficult it becomes to engage in 
secondary movements, both in economic and logistical terms, particularly 
when they are unable to take all family members along. Several interviewees 
attested to the existence of this dilemma:  
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Since my husband is travelling I am stuck with the children (Yemen, female). 
Many female refugees are subjected to a lonely or single-parent status in the 
first host country, where they must protect and care for children and elderly 
dependents without the support of their husbands, either because he has 
embarked on a secondary movement (testament above) or because of death. 
Widows with children are reported as being among the most vulnerable 
refugees, generally lacking the resources to plan additional movement. In 
situations where the husband lives in another country, families can 
sometimes lead a relatively better livelihood, as a result of remittances sent, 
but they also face the risk of being “forgotten” by their husband after some 
time and thus finding themselves in situations similar to that of widows. 
Lastly, it is clear from this survey that the more educated and wealthier the 
individuals, the more enterprising they are. Their economic status often 
translates to better global and cultural knowledge, information networks 
which greatly improve their ability to move onwards.  
5.3 Motivations for Secondary Movements 
Although current literature on refugee studies has recently focused on 
understanding the motivations for the refugee community’s choice in settling 
in a particular European country (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2001; Efionayi-
Mäder et al. 2005; Havinga and Böcker 1999; Robinson and Segrott 2002), 
there is a dearth of critical analysis61 concerning the causes of secondary 
movement (factors inducing refugees to leave a first country of settlement for 
another). It is fair to say, however, that some of the above-mentioned 
literature is useful in assessing general guidelines for secondary movement. 
In fact, there is a general consensus among scholars that refugees reach one 
country as a consequence of a complex interaction among several factors:  
• Time of departure from homeland: in general, refugees leaving their 
homeland in the immediate aftermath of a civil war do not have many 
choices and often simply enter the closest country (Johansson 1990; 
Middleton 2005), whereas those moving later have more decision-making 
power over their destination (see chapter 4.1);  
• Personal (and material) resources like family networks and friendship ties 
or, in the case of longer journeys, remittances or access to smugglers are 
crucial in determining the choice of destination (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 
2001 show that family networks are by far more important than friends) 
(see chapter 5.3 on these aspects) ;  
 
61 With the exception of Legomsky (2003). 
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• Historical relations between a refugee-generating country and the 
destination state, which in part explains movements towards the UK or 
Italy; Havinga and Böcker (1999: 47-8) assert that the presence of 
colonial ties between the country of origin and the country of destination 
emerged from their multiple regression analysis as the most important 
reason for the country of destination, though its importance tends to 
decline over time;  
• Structural or contextual features, like the country’s asylum policy or 
economic infrastructure, but also the quality of welfare-related services 
that are delivered to refugees. 
There are, of course, other imponderable predictors which play a role in 
refugees’ movements; for instance, factors such as chance or rumour. It is 
evident that in many instances, refugees’ destinations are accidental because 
destinations are decided by smuggling agents and brokers who arrange the 
details of the undocumented mover, as described in chapter 4.3.4 (see also 
Havinga and Böcker 1999; Legomsky 2003). A case in point is described in 
this testimony:  
I had no intention to come to Switzerland. I wanted to go to England because I 
know some Somali people there. The smuggler told me that he would bring me to 
England. I don't know why he didn't. Once I realized that I was in Switzerland the 
smuggler had already left me (Switzerland, male). 
In other cases, rumours and the opinions of other refugees/asylum-seekers 
play an important role in the process of deciding on a destination.  
I heard people talking about Cairo and I heard that it was a very peaceful country 
and you could study and improve your future (Egypt, male). 
It is valid to claim that “asylum-seekers are dependent on certain fortuitous 
circumstances and these circumstances are structured by more general 
circumstances or opportunities which are not at all random” (Havinga and 
Böcker 1999: 57) and that “neither of these motivations singularly accounts 
for the destination countries of refugees, whilst it is likely that they are all 
part of the explanation” (Middleton 2005: 47). What remains unclear, 
however, is the hierarchical ordering of these circumstances; in other words, 
which motivations are more significant in guiding the decision-making 
process of refugee movement. Answering this query calls for a deeper 
examination of the data for clues on predominant motivations in the decision 
of the interviewees to choose a specific country, as well as to move from one 
country to another, by analysing their key concerns.  
This investigation was approached by using monovariate, bivariate and 
multivariate (multiple regressions) analyses. The results begin with bivariate 
analyses on the motivations that pushed Somali refugees to leave their first 
country of settlement and then on the motivations that pushed them to enter a 
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given country. Table 27 presents percentages of the importance of different 
reasons in fostering secondary movements. Based on previous studies, a 
detailed list of motivations was provided, whereby interviewees were asked 
to include or exclude such factors in their own reasons for leaving their home 
and choosing their host country.  
Interviewees were first asked to state whether a particular reason or 
motivation was relevant in their choice to leave their first country of 
settlement. For practical reasons, an aggregated version of motivators is 
presented in Table 27. Below is a brief synopsis of the push factors which 
compelled refugees to instigate a movement (based on the answers to the 
following question: Why did you decide to leave this country/place of 
settlement?). 
1. Poor life conditions comprises responses such as lack of adequate 
standard of living. 
2. Lack of physical safety comprises responses such as fear of forced return; 
fear of persecution; endangerment of physical safety; harassment by the 
police. 
3. Lack of access to fair asylum procedures and lack of secure legal status 
and documentation. 
4. Lack of so-called durable solutions comprises responses pertaining to lack 
of access to family reunification; lack of access to legal opportunities to 
migrate (which do not depend only on first settlement countries but also 
on the third states and international humanitarian actors); lack of access to 
“durable solutions” as defined by UNHCR, i.e. resettlement to an 
industrialized country, return to the home country or integration in the 
current host country. 
5. Lack of opportunities for education and work. 
 
Table 27 also indicates that the most important motivator pushing refugees to 
move out of the primary host country (mainly countries in Africa and the 
Middle East) relates explicitly to negligence on the part of the host country 
(gaps in asylum procedures and documentation, lack of physical safety, lack 
of integration opportunities) as well third-party responsibility, such as the 
limited availability or lack of durable solutions such as resettlement or 
voluntary repatriation schemes.  Each of these issues was mentioned by 
almost two thirds of the respondents. Many interviews underscore the 
particular importance of safety as a major stimulant for the secondary 
movement of women and girls. While gender-based violence is often a 
motivation for leaving Somalia, it is also a very important factor in the 
decision to leave a country of asylum. As previously stated, refugee camps – 
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in all countries studied – are often regarded as especially dangerous for 
women; as “places where women were likely to get raped and refugees would 
catch diseases”, as testified by a male refugee interviewed in Egypt when 
asked about the reasons for leaving (or avoiding) those camps (see also Abdi 
2005). Despite its prevalence in the camps, insecurity is often a problem for 
women living in urban settings. Interviewees noted sexual harassment or 
abuse by employers, police, general population (in the case of Yemen) and 
even by other refugees (in the case of poor Somali neighbourhoods in Cairo), 
which has been a key gender specific factor in moving onward. 
Table 27: Motivations for secondary movements (in %) 
Motivations % 
Lack of access to durable solutions 65 
Lack of access to fair asylum procedures and lack of secure legal status and 
documentation 
63 
Lack of physical safety 62 
Poor living conditions 54 





Percentages add up to more than 100% as more than one answer was allowed (for technical 
reasons South Africa and Yemen are excluded from this figure). 
 
These motivations partially explain some of the secondary movements 
undertaken in the region (between Somalia’s neighbouring countries). 
Indeed, many secondary movers explained that their journey from Kenya to 
Ethiopia was based on the need to avoid the dangers associated with Kenyan 
camps, in addition to obtaining some form of employment. The same holds 
true for those who left Ethiopia to go to Djibouti, where many expected to 
find a safe “Somali environment”, in addition to accessing (illegal) 
employment opportunities, thus attaining a sense of personal security, despite 
their undocumented status.  
Both poor living conditions and lack of opportunities for education and 
employment are critical push factors indicated by half the sample population 
as a reason for leaving the first country. And while these constraints are a 
major source of concern, their impact for the overall refugee population is 
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weaker than those of other motivators mentioned. This relative impact holds 
true for both genders and is not influenced by parenthood (cf. Table 28)62.  
Table 28: Motivations for secondary movements by gender, marital status 
and dependents (in %) 
Motivations Sex Marital status With Children 
 Male Female Single Married Yes No 
Lack of access to durable solutions 63 66 71 65 60 73 
Lack of access to fair asylum 
procedures and lack of secure legal 
status and documentation 
62 64 67 66 60 68 
Lack of physical safety 62 62 62 67 60 65 
Poor living conditions 58 52 55 56 52 59 
Lack of opportunities for education 
and work 















Percentages sum up to more than 100% as more than one answer allowed (for technical reasons 
South Africa and Yemen are excluded from this figure). 
 
Conversely, the study finds that the three overarching concerns for the 
refugee population were: (i) gaining legal status; (ii) accessing the asylum 
system of the host countries; and, (iii) opportunities for durable solutions. 
These factors were far more significant than the poor living conditions given 
that many refugees had become accustomed to harsh situations during the 
flight and displacement process. And although employment and education are 
crucial issues in the discourse of many, particularly those with children, the 
majority of respondents believe that the above-mentioned concerns will 
eventually contribute to an overall picture of social development, including 
work and schooling.  
In fact, the majority of parents are concerned about the lack of educational 
facilities not for personal reasons, but for the sake of their children. For 
instance, many interviewees in Ethiopia moved from the refugee camps to 
Addis Ababa because educational opportunities in the camps were either not 
available or inadequate. In Djibouti, some families sent their sons to study in 
Ethiopia (or even Somalia) because they did not have access to secondary 
 
62 Refugees without children mention labour and education opportunities more often as 
motivating factors than parents, which is probably related to the fact that this particular 




education in the refugee camps63. In Europe, education is a particularly 
important issue and parents who believe that educational opportunities are 
not satisfactory often organise another journey. In Switzerland, Somali 
refugees strongly resent the limitations on post-compulsory education related 
to subsidiary protection. Similarly, in the Netherlands, a justification for the 
motivation to move to the UK is because of the segregation of Somali 
children into special classes for children with learning disabilities, a notion 
that is rejected by parents as racist. A seventeen-year-old interviewee 
comments on the importance of education:  
I would like to remain in Switzerland, but only if I get the opportunity to be 
educated, otherwise I cannot stay here. Imagine, what sense would it have to stay 
here without education? Once I have to go back to Somalia, I will be like those 
who have just arrived from the bush. I will not be able to do anything without 
education (Switzerland, male). 
Since context is crucial, it is worth adding a comparative view enabling an 
analysis of the different features of each country. This is illustrated in Table 
29 where the same indicators are presented according to the first country of 
settlement. This table shows that although gaps at juridical protection level 
are important motivations everywhere, they become crucial predictors of 
movements of refugees settled in Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE) which 
are not party to international conventions concerning asylum. Another 
motivation which occurs as very important throughout all countries is the 
lack of durable solutions available to the refugee population. As discussed in 
previous chapters, the possibility of accessing legal opportunities to emigrate 
or integrate in local contexts is rare, not to say non-existent, in all countries 
surveyed. The non-availability of these solutions emerges as an extremely 
important push factor, particularly in light of the fact that Somalis have been 
migrating from their homeland for more than fifteen years.  
On closely examining the role of “poor life conditions” as fostering 
movement, this appears most prevalent in Yemen, where 73% of respondents 
in the country cited it as the primary factor. A plausible explanation for the 
high level of dissatisfaction can be drawn from the underlying reasons for the 
initial migration to Yemen which was most likely related to employment 
(Yemen as a transit point to other Gulf States), as well as insufficient 
personal security in the urban and camp areas. These outcomes suggest that 
motivations not only concern the objective conditions in a given place, but 
 
63 This is in no way an easy choice for refugee families. In order to educate their children, 
refugee families need resources, which are often diverted from other priorities, such as 
selling some parts of the food rations, and/or having some of the family members working 
illegally to raise the funds.  
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also take into account preconceived expectations, the socio-economic reality 
in the host country as well as the social profile of refugees. Previous labour 
migration patterns to Arab countries contributed to optimistic hopes for better 
living conditions, which were not fulfilled in the Yemen case. 
Table 29: Motivations for secondary movements by first country of settlement 
(in %) 
Percentages sum up to more than 100% as more than one answer allowed. 
 
Having concluded an assessment of the motivations for leaving a country, it 
is equally imperative to examine the motivations for entering another. In so 
doing, the survey established a series of indicators and asked respondents to 
affirm whether or not a particular variable inspired or affected their choice in 
the current host country. The motivations established are presented in an 
aggregated form, and they cover the following aspects: 
1. Proximity and “easy” access, which comprises responses such as chances 
of entering the country easily; proximity and journey costs not too high. 
2. Legal aspects, which comprises responses such as strong chances of 
obtaining refugee or equal status; rule of law and democracy. 
3. Social networks, which comprises responses such as high number of 
compatriots in country; relatives and friends in host country64. 
4. Good life standard, which comprises responses such as high level of 
welfare provisions; high life standard. 
5. Good opportunities for education (for themselves or for their children). 
6. Good working opportunities. 
 
64 Social networks as they are described here do not include smuggling networks. 
 KE ET DJ YE SAU UAE 
Poor living conditions 48 55 46 73 57 67 
Lack of physical safety 63 49 38 54 95 50 
Lack of access to fair asylum procedures 
and lack of secure legal status and 
documentation 
59 58 38 50 91 83 
Lack of durable solutions 57 66 62 62 84 83 
Lack of opportunities for education and 
work 


















Table 30 shows that for the large majority of Somali refugees interviewed in 
this survey, the proximity of the country and the fact that entering was not 
considered too difficult was an extremely important motivation in their 
movement towards the host country. The importance of proximity and easy 
access (e.g. the possibility of crossing the borders without being intercepted 
by the police; the existence of traditional ‘cross-border’ paths; help from 
populations living near the border) obviously concerns Somalia’s 
neighbouring states, which represented the first accessible ‘safe haven’ for 
refugees. Proximity aside, ease of access is also a crucial factor in entering 
non-neighbouring countries like Egypt where a high number of interviewees 
entered the country because of its loose admission policies. Beside proximity, 
another important reason is represented by the possibility to enter a safe and 
not-devastated country (rule of law and democracy), which has emerged in 
other studies as an important pull factor (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2001), as well 
as the possibility of obtaining refugee status: this could perhaps provide 
empirical evidence for theories assessing the importance of state policies in 
making a country “attractive”. While other factors such as employment, 
education and adequate standard of living are important, the third most 
critical pull factor is the role of families and acquaintances in the destination 
country. These ties are essential in facilitating financial and human resources 
which enable the newcomers to enter, settle and adjust to the new 
environment.  
Table 30: Underlying motivations for entering current host country 
Motivations % 
Proximity and accessibility 73 
Motivations linked to legal aspects 64 
Networks 58 
Good working opportunities 29 
Good opportunity for education 24 
Good life standard 23 
  
N 567 
Percentages sum up to more than 100% as more than one answer allowed (for technical reasons 
South Africa and Yemen are excluded from this figure). 
 
However, although the survey was similar for all country studies, the 
responses varied significantly. For example, in the case of the European 
countries, 38% of respondents in the Netherlands and 25% in Switzerland 
noted that they had not chosen their host countries as their intended 
destinations. It appears that such a decision was either the responsibility of 
the smuggling agent or that the refugees were simply deceived by being 
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dumped at the first available transfer point in Europe due to immigration 
restrictions. Irrespective of the decision-maker and their intended destination, 
most refugees who entered European countries under these circumstances 
have since applied for asylum and continue to remain in their host countries.  
The underlying motivations for settling in one country (for those able to 
decide) vary according to gender, marital and parental status. These aspects 
are presented in Table 31 suggesting that proximity and the possibility of 
entering a country without too much risk are slightly more effective for men. 
In choosing to migrate to a particular country, women often pay more 
attention (than men) to the legal aspects (perception of fair asylum 
procedures, documentation) and to social networks (whether husbands or 
other relatives are already in the country of destination).  
Women are particularly attracted to countries where they have good social 
networks or support systems. Generally, they join their husband or other 
family members, although in many cases husbands also join wives, who play 
a crucial role in assisting the settlement of the family. In a situation where 
there are no husbands or close kin, socially isolated women tend to move to 
areas where they can find community support in lieu of family help. This 
situation is evident from European interviews where many single mothers 
envisage a move from both Switzerland and the Netherlands to the United 
Kingdom, where they believe they can lead a life “within their community”. 
This is not possible in the current host country because of the numerous 
restrictions limiting freedom of movement and/or housing. It seems natural 
that more economically vulnerable persons seek environments where they 
can rely on community solidarity, in contrast to the young and single 
generation who are far more adept at integrating in the independent lifestyle.  
Table 31: Motivating factors for entering current host country by gender, 
marital status and dependents (in %) 
Motivations Men Women Married Single Parents  Not 
Proximity and easiness  79 68 75 73 74 74 
Motivations linked to legal aspects 62 67 64 66 64 66 
Networks 56 60 61 54 59 56 
Good working opportunities 29 29 33 22 32 24 
Good opportunity for education 25 23 22 31 22 29 
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Whereas the primary pull factor for married refugees is the need for social 
networks (to facilitate settlement and enable resource accumulation for 
undertaking family reunification plans), single refugees are more preoccupied 
with gaining access to education and employment opportunities in the host 
country. The social development of young refugees was interrupted by the 
civil war; hence, their urgent need to regain the knowledge and skills lost in 
the intervening years. Finally, refugees with offspring are more interested by 
good working opportunities (they need to support their family) than those 
without children. Conversely, the latter are more attracted than the former by 
opportunities for education (mainly because they are young) and by the life 
standard of the potential host country.  
Motivations for entering one country are quite different from another. Table 
32 presents the list of motivations which interviewees gave for entering their 
current host country. 
Table 32: Motivating factors for entering host country/region (in %) 
 Europe Egypt Neighbours 
Proximity and/or easy access 46 91 73 
Motivations linked to legal aspects 43 93 51 
Good life standard 50 33 8 
Networks 49 67 51 
Good opportunity for education 29 44 13 
Good working opportunities 30 18 44 
 
N 686  
   
Percentages sum up to more than 100% as more than one answer allowed (for technical reasons, 
South Africa and Yemen are excluded from this figure). 
 
This table clearly shows that European destinations were chosen mainly for 
the quality of their living standards and the existence of networks and social 
ties which enabled the movement. In contrast, neighbouring countries were 
chosen due to their proximity and ease of access; in some cases, the presence 
of family members or acquaintances already in the country facilitated the 
decision. In all cases including Egypt, the presence of family or social ties 
was a decisive factor in the choice of a destination – irrespective of distance.  
The analysis presented above provides empirical evidence on a number of 
motivating factors which prompt the movement of refugees. The analysis 
does not, however, allow for a clear establishment of key factor(s) which can 
best predict this type of movement. Hence, the use of multivariate analysis is 
useful in establishing a comparison of important predictors (i.e. motivating 
factors) to estimate the relation, positive or negative, between the predictors 
and the decision to move onward.  
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Multivariate analysis of motivating factors for secondary movements 
We tested a model of multivariate analysis focused on the past experiences of 
movements. We built a logistic regression model for this analysis because the 
variable at our disposal (whether the respondent settled or not in more than 
one country) was dichotomous (yes/no). Logistic regression is used to predict 
the probability of an event occurring (in this case, a secondary movement), 
given known values of certain predictors. For the logistic regression, we 
opted for a backward method, which is the preferable method when very little 
research exists upon which to base the testing of hypotheses; in addition, this 
schema provides a more exploratory view.  
This type of model begins with all predictors and in sequence the computer 
tests if any of the predictors can be isolated from the model without 
producing a substantial effect on how well the model fits the observed data. 
The best interpretative key to the coefficients presented in Table 41 in the 
annex is provided by the significance indicators: i.e. the more asterisks, the 
stronger the relations. The analysis produced 14 models, but for practical 
reasons Table 41 in the annex presents only the first and last ones. In the first 
model, we can see that the system has examined all the predictors, including 
socio-demographic and contextual ones. But the one which counts is the last 
model produced by the computer (model 14), which substantiates that there is 
only one factor which counted more than all others in motivating past 
movements, and this factor is the lack of a proper legal status formally 
conferring protection.  
 
*** 
Both simple statistical analysis and complex models (logistic regression) 
clearly illustrate that lack of a legal status conferring protection is the most 
important factor motivating secondary movements. As stated previously, 
legal status is an important starting point for gaining access to other rights. In 
almost all countries, access to education depends on the possession of a 
recognized document, while employment opportunities are strongly affected 
by the type of legal status a person enjoys. Lack of a proper legal status 
translates into lack of (or limited) mobility rights and freedom of legal 
movement and, more generally, it means loss of opportunities to resettle or 
even integrate locally.  
But the importance of a recognized and appropriate legal status revealed by 
this survey reflects other important aspects of forced exile. Adequate 
documentation and an appropriate status are necessary elements in restoring 
dignity to exiles following the trauma of displacement. Numerous 
interviewees noted that their insecure status in African countries as well as in 
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Switzerland was and continues to be a difficult experience. Their 
displacement only compounds their feelings of personal and emotional 
insecurity given their social isolation from the host community. Kleist (2004) 
argues that a primary justification of Somali refugees’ refusal to define 
themselves (and be defined) as nomads is the need to reverse the situation of 
exclusion that asylum represents. The history of refugees is a history of 
exclusion, displacement, and suffering and as such, one of their most pressing 
needs is to find opportunities for social inclusion in the host country. The 
acknowledgement of a recognized legal status, with the rights, privileges and 
duties endowed, is an important step in enabling exiles to overcome their 
experience of exclusion and to restart a new chapter in their lives. This need, 
however, has yet to be addressed in all countries surveyed in Africa, Europe 
and Middle East.  
Legomsky’s (2003: 568) observation concludes the chapter quite effectively: 
“the shortest distance between a persecutor and a permanent safe haven is 
seldom a straight line. Perhaps it was never unusual for refugees to travel 
circuitous routes through several countries before reaching their intended 
final stop. It is certainly not unusual today”. Indeed, it is not unusual for 
refugees to move across countries in search of refuge; however, this study of 
Somali refugees has provided valuable evidence that ‘to travel circuitous 
routes’ is rarely a deliberate choice on the part of refugees but rather of 
circumstance. The extensive interviews reveal that numerous causes 
contribute to secondary movements of Somali refugees, ranging from 
inadequate living conditions in or outside Somalia to refugee policies and 
attitudes in host countries. Undoubtedly, the long-term nature of the Somali 
conflict has added a significant dimension to the dynamics of refugee 
movements, which were unpredictable at the time when the Somali State 
collapsed and were thus underestimated by all stakeholders, including the 
refugees themselves, as well as host countries, UN agencies and the 
international community. 
5.4 Networks, “Facilitating Agents” and Collective 
Coping Strategies 
The motivations causing secondary movements have been described in detail 
in the previous chapter. However, these motivations alone are not sufficient 
to explain the movements of Somali refugees, who also act on specific 
strategies, mostly on a collective or family level. 
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Figure 2: Explanatory model of (irregular) secondary movements 
 
 
Furthermore, as has been stated above, interviews revealed that a significant 
share of interviewees wish to live somewhere other than the current host 
country because of deep dissatisfaction with social conditions and protection 
schemes in place. However, only a minority of the population is likely to 
experience legal movement by way of resettlement or family reunification 
programmes. The rest have to resort to their own devices, i.e. financial 
means, familial support, social networks or smugglers, if they want to leave 
their current host country. These elements should not be considered as 
causes, but as facilitating agents of irregular secondary movements (and of 
migration movements in general). These diverse mechanisms are not the 
causes of secondary movement (although the social network may be part of 




Although these issues are not the principal focus of the study, (irregular) 
secondary movements cannot be explained without explicit reference to at 
least two elements: facilitating agents and collective strategies. Together with 
the causes and basic motivations, they form a comprehensive explanatory 
model of the secondary movements of Somali refugees (Figure 2). This sub-
chapter is therefore dedicated to a brief explanation of the two elements in 
the diagram that have not yet been described. 
5.4.1 The role of networks and other facilitating agents 
As in most (if not all) migrations, facilitators and intermediaries are an 
essential component at every stage of secondary movements. In the case of 
regular migrations, these facilitating agents are mostly of an institutional 
kind, i.e. travel agencies, UN agencies or international organisations, foreign 
embassies, etc. In situations of irregular movements, facilitating agents 
become more informal and the role of personal social networks and resources 
becomes crucial: the more distant the country of destination, the more urgent 
the need for facilitating elements. Different networks play specific roles at 
every stage of the migration trajectory: in the decision-making, in the choice 
of the person(s) who will leave, in the organization of the travel, in the choice 
of the destination country, in the settlement in the new host country, etc. 
Dahinden (2005b), in her work on Albanian migrants and asylum-seekers 
networks, found three major types of networks taking an active role in the 
migration process: the household, the transnational community acting as 
bridging networks, and the “realisation network” made up of acquaintances, 
persons met by chance and smugglers.  
The importance and interactions of facilitating agents are evident in this 
research. One of their role is to provide (even partially) the finances which 
are essential for all movement, irrespective of destination. Some of these 
resources can be obtained by the traveller, either by working and saving the 
earnings, or by selling personal belongings, which, already, should be 
considered on a collective level. Most of the time, however, family members 
abroad, in the host country, or in Somalia participate in financing the trip. 
This help is not only an act of pure solidarity, but also a burden-sharing 
mechanism used by transnational families to help family members living in 
Somalia or in other poorer countries. A case in point is the situation of an 
interviewee in Switzerland who was sent there by her parents, in consultation 
with an uncle living in the USA. The uncle, who organized and financed the 
trip, had been solely responsible for financially supporting the family through 
regular remittances. Although not explicitly expressed in the interview, there 
is a strong likelihood that the young woman is being sent in order to take 
over financial responsibility for her family.  
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The transnational social network also participates in the organization of the 
trip through information sharing on various destination countries and means 
and mode of travelling. Information is generally obtained in person, but 
difficult or complex situations require the use of professional agents or 
smugglers. The tighter immigration restriction imposed by industrialized 
countries has created an important and lucrative niche for smuggling 
businesses that deal in the transfer of illegal immigrants. (See chapter 4.3.4 
on the issue of smugglers). Social networks and smugglers contribute 
significantly to the choice of destinations (see for instance Efionayi-Mäder et 
al. 2001; Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2005), and this is validated in this study 
where 58% of the respondents mentioned the presence of family members, 
friends or at least an important Somali community as a reason for choosing a 
host country (cf. chapter 5.3). But for those who do not have a specific 
destination or who cannot find a smuggler to take them to the country of their 
choice, agents may play the central role in the decision-making process. The 
following example shows the interaction of different types of networks at 
different stages of the migration process, specifically in secondary 
movements. 
The situation in Nairobi was desperate: no work, no money, and no school for the 
children. Our relatives in the US and in Italy were sending us some money, which 
enabled us to survive. After eight months, when I had given birth to my fourth 
child, my husband and I decided that I would be sent with the children to Italy. We 
had relatives there and we thought that I could stay with them. We decided to send 
me because it was easier to get a visa for a woman with children than for a man. 
Someone organised the whole trip for us. He gave me a passport, which said that I 
was his wife. He brought me to Rome. There, I couldn't stay with my relatives: I 
could not find a job, I had no money, no legal status, no room or apartment. My 
friends, relatives and other Somalis told me to go to Switzerland. They said that the 
country was very close, that the border was easy to cross and that I could get 
asylum there. Moreover, I had two sisters and my mother who were staying in 
Switzerland. After 20 days, I left Italy for Switzerland. Eight of my brothers and 
sisters are still living in Somalia, near the border of Ethiopia, I think, but I don't 
know exactly. It is not possible to get in contact with them. Six brothers and sisters 
are living in Kenya, all of them near Nairobi. Five brothers and sisters live in the 
US and in Canada. Three of them stayed in Switzerland before they left for the US. 
One of my sisters won a green card. She then went to the US with my mother who 
was staying in Switzerland by that time. The two other sisters had contacts with 
Somalis in the US. They wanted to get married to them. Both of them got a visa 
from those men and got married to them (Switzerland, female). 
It can therefore be stated that social networks are very important in sustaining 
migration, as they are “the vehicle for the transmission of migratory cultural 
capital” (Van Hear 1998: 60). These networks provide the resources – 
financial, communication, support, etc. – required by refugees throughout the 
organisational and migration stages. Networks are constantly changing and 
shifting, constituting a web of opportunities and resources to which they can 
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resort. The larger and the older the transnational network, the better it can act 
as a facilitating agent for new potential migrants and reduce the costs and 
risks of the movement (Brettell 2000; Massey et al. 1996), even more so 
when this is irregular. 
Networks also have an important role in the settlement and integration of 
newcomers. Family members, friends and even unknown Somalis are the 
ones who welcome new people and introduce them to their new environment 
by providing important information about the asylum system and other social 
services available. Friends and relatives also play an important role in terms 
of building solidarity, particularly when acculturating to new host cultures 
where social customs are unusual and challenging. Custody of children 
amongst the refugees is a common coping mechanism, particularly in 
dangerous or insecure environments, as depicted in the case of the 
undocumented widow living in Nairobi: 
I don’t live with my children, because I don’t have a house. Four of us live in a 
small room. I live with some friends and my children are living with some relatives 
in different parts of the country. When I want to go and see them, I have to have a 
little money to pay the police at the police checks (Kenya, female). 
In most countries studied, refugee Somalis living in urban settings are 
concentrated in Somali inhabited areas (Addis Ababa, Aden, Cairo, Cape 
Town, Johannesburg, Nairobi, Pretoria). In contrast, asylum-seekers are not 
allowed to choose their place of residence at least during the first period after 
arrival in Switzerland and in the Netherlands. As a result, many interviewees 
suffered greatly from the cultural and social isolation imposed by the 
restrictions. However, even in those countries, newcomers still rely most on 
the Somali community, relatives and friends upon arrival. 
*** 
In summary, it appears clearly that transnational social networks played a 
crucial role in the majority of trajectories of the Somali refugees interviewed, 
either in financing, organizing and informing, or in welcoming their friends 
or relatives. It is important to point out that these networks do not operate 
solely on the basis of humanitarian and altruistic motives. It is clear in the 
case of smuggling networks that although smugglers may behave 
compassionately, their operations are financial and driven by profit65. 
Interviewees remain relatively ambivalent about the ethics of smuggling, 
with most individuals referring to their smugglers as “the person I travelled 
with” or “the man who organized my trip”. Some remain divided over the 
 
65 This does not include human trafficking networks which, unlike smuggling, are 
characterised by the use of force and human exploitation (United Nations 2000). 
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role of smugglers – with many considering them as heroes or saviours who 
rescue individuals in difficult circumstances while others see them as 
profiteers taking advantage of human misery (on this topic, see also Farah 
2003; Van Liempt and Doomernik forthcoming). 
Social networks are equally complex social arrangements with a myriad of 
underlying motives. It can be argued that the majority of Somali refugees’ 
migratory movements, and specifically secondary movements, are part of 
broader strategies that include the extended family and, in some cases, even 
larger groups (sub-clan or other). As such, movement is not organized for the 
benefit of one or two individuals, but rather, it is a series of arrangements 
designed to promote the collective interest of the entire group. Arranged (or 
forced) marriages are one of the strategies highlighted in the interviews, 
where marriage becomes a viable option for escaping the deprivation of 
refugee life. The role of the networks in the collective livelihood strategies is 
the object of the following sub-chapter. 
5.4.2 Collective Livelihood Strategies 
As has been meticulously demonstrated, secondary movements are generally 
a mechanism to escape the disadvantages of refugee existence in order to find 
legal and social security. These systems are also part of collective coping 
strategies aimed at diversifying the risks related to refugee situations and the 
resources of the extended family. In this sense, relatives sometimes 
deliberately choose to live in different countries as an effective means of 
minimizing legal insecurity and economic and social vulnerability under 
conditions which are largely unpredictable and beyond their control. These 
rational coping mechanisms involve collective decisions about family 
members who are scattered in different places according to their specific 
needs and skills (on this topic, see notably Al-Sharmani 2004a, 2004b; Fink-
Nielsen et al. 2004; Horst 2002a, 2003).  
In this study, such strategies are apparent both at the national level, with the 
scattering of family members between camps and cities, and at the 
transnational level where they are dispersed in several countries or even 
continents. They explain, to some extent, why in Djibouti for instance, 
women and children often stay in camps while men and daughters work 
illegally in the city, mainly to supplement the resources of the family, which 
in turn enables families to send older sons to Ethiopia or Somalia for 
secondary education. It is evident in the situation of refugee women in Egypt 
separated from their husbands who support them financially through illegal 
employment in Saudi Arabia, while they take refuge in secure environments 
which might yield possibilities of resettlement in a third country. Another 
example of these strategies entails sending girls or young women to Europe 
to avoid precarious security situations in camps (rapes) or urban areas in 
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Africa. Their security is certainly at the heart of the decision, but different 
experts and community leaders also declare that sending young women (as 
opposed to males) to industrialized countries is an act of investment because 
females are more loyal and caring and will contribute to family income 
through regular remittances.  
The rules of solidarity and of reciprocity are complex and require further 
analysis, but it is important to remember that these rules are not fixed and 
that they are, at every stage of the migration process, constantly negotiated, 
reinforced or dissolved (Dahinden 2005a). Remittances, for example, are not 
guaranteed and can cease at any time because of changes in the situation of 
the sender (loss of a job, change in legal status, etc.). Other changes in the 
remittance scheme can be arbitrary, where husbands terminate their family’s 
income support by remarrying and assuming new responsibilities.  
Though generally beneficial, solidarity links can also create dependency and 
breed negativity as a result of unfulfilled expectations. When a family 
“sends” one of its members to an industrialized country, there is an unspoken 
rule that the individual will reciprocate by supporting the family, a duty 
which can sometimes remain unfulfilled (as a result of unemployment, 
limited income, etc.). Collective strategies and solidarity networks can also 
fall prey to the challenges of globalization when new immigrants do not have 
access to well-paying jobs that can adequately support both the individual 
and the family unit in Africa. These challenges have been cited by 
interviewees as well as other literature as contributing to increased tension 
amongst families and even separation and divorce amongst married couples.  
In summary, one must remember that decisions are very rarely individual, 
and that they generally concern the whole group (usually the family), as the 
next quotation shows. 
I do not work because it is not allowed. I asked my sister who lives in London to 
support us until UNHCR grants me a resettlement to another country in order to 
work and help my family and she agreed (Egypt, male). 
These coping mechanisms, illustrated here with just a few examples, show 
how different criteria (mostly based on specific needs, skills and 
opportunities) interplay in the collective decisions of which family member 
moves where, and how these criteria may sometimes be conflicting. What is 
important is that, in these collective livelihood strategies, places are 
repositories of rights and possibilities (Kibreab 1999). Furthermore, it 
appears that the interests underlying certain decisions are not always clear to 
the refugees involved themselves. In Switzerland and the Netherlands, there 
were several examples of exiles being encouraged by their relatives to move 
further to other countries. 
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In Paris, relatives came to pick me up at the airport. I stayed some days with them, 
but they didn’t want me to live among them. They told me that I had to go to 
Switzerland because I wouldn’t be able to survive in France. They organised a car 
for me. Before I left, they took my documents and all the money I had. They told 
me that I had to travel to Switzerland like that, without anything. As I was afraid 
and did not know what to do, and as I was dependant on those relatives, I did 
everything they wanted (Switzerland, female). 
Although this individual was still unaware of the underlying rationale for her 
sudden departure to Switzerland, it is evident from the advice of her relatives 
that they were looking out for her best interest as a result of their familiarity 
with the asylum policies in Europe (Switzerland, in their view, offering better 
conditions to a single mother with two children than France). It is also 
plausible to assume that their decision may have been influenced by other 
factors such as the need to diversify the family’s settlement patterns in order 
to minimize risks and maximize opportunities for the collective entity.  
*** 
Some researchers (Bang Nielsen 2004; Horst 2003; Kleist 2004) argue that 
these strategies are linked to socio-cultural characteristics of Somalis, and 
therefore specific to these refugees. Although it is true that the historical 
nomadism of some Somalis, as well as the large diaspora that has been 
created over the years, may influence and facilitate movement strategies, it 
would be too simplistic to restrict such coping mechanisms to one group. 
Similar survival strategies are continuously being adopted and modified by 
non-Somali migrants and refugees who lack legal avenues for migration. 
Analysis of such strategies, in comparison with other groups of refugees, 
would highlight specificities as well as generalities of such causes and thus 
contribute to a better understanding of the causes and channels of secondary 
movements of refugees worldwide. 
In conclusion, the assessment of different aspects of the situation confirms 
that secondary movements will always exist, primarily as a result of family 
ties but also because of an innate desire to attain better legal, economic, and 
social conditions. However, it seems that regional solutions targeted at 
improving the protection schemes – expanding or reinforcing refugee rights, 
enabling local integration, etc. – would have an effect on the scope and pace 
of these movements. These measures are particularly useful to a segment of 
the population which is not interested in moving to industrialized countries 
and is in fact adamant about remaining in the host country until they can 
return to their country of origin, either because of particularly strong ties with 
it (family ties, property, etc.) or because of negative views and fears linked to 




The findings in this study depict the myriad causes which contribute to 
secondary movements of Somali refugees. These causes and motivations 
range from inadequate living conditions in or outside Somalia to refugee 
policies and attitudes in host countries as well as the coping strategies of the 
Somali community or individuals. The interplay of these factors shapes 
refugee movements which have developed their own dynamics in the absence 
of a credible peace settlement in Somalia. While other concerns and conflicts 
have dominated the airwaves in recent decades, the international community 
has only recently become aware of the impasse refugees face in camps and 
urban settings – the inability either to return or to settle effectively in the host 
country. In the meantime, a generation of young people who have spent most 
of their lives in camps has grown up.  
Under these circumstances, secondary movements are in many cases attempts 
at restoring vitality by people who have in many instances lost hope in their 
ability to make a difference. It is especially crucial for children and young 
people who need to grow up in an environment conducive to social change. 
This study maintains that in the absence of alternative solutions, secondary 
movements often constitute the only way for refugees to regain some control 
over the course of their lives. Hence a considerable potential for secondary 
movements will probably exist as long as return and local integration remain 
impossible. More movements towards countries further afield are already a 
reality, fostered by better communication and transport opportunities, and by 
routes (both legal and illegal) opened by the prior migration of Somali 
refugees. However, our findings suggest that these trajectories do not tend, 
over time, to become more of an irregular type, nor of a more secondary type, 
but represent a minority share of all movements. However it is true that 
irregular – secondary, but also direct – movements constitute the main form 
of entry of Somalis in Europe. 
This is not to say that irregular movements are unproblematic for the host and 
transit countries, especially if refugees and asylum-seekers follow illegal 
paths and elude state control; however, the fight against irregular secondary 
movements is only credible if it simultaneously pays attention to the pre-
conditions and offers alternative opportunities. This includes re-examining 
the policies and attitudes of implicated actors in the region, where secondary 
movements usually start, even if there is not always a consensus about the 
national and international responsibilities in legal and even more so in 
practical or pragmatic terms.  
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6.1 Responses of Host States and Societies 
Since the outbreak of the Somali civil war, neighbouring countries – 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Yemen and Djibouti – have hosted a disproportionate share 
of Somali refugees and displayed extraordinary levels of generosity: from 
almost 100% during the initial years after the mass outflows, their share of 
the global Somali refugee population still constitutes close to two-thirds 
(64%) in 2004 (UNHCR 2005b). A decade later, however, these countries are 
less inclined and capable of maintaining the same level of hospitality. 
Convergent trend to declining acceptance of refugees 
The perceptions of host societies are influenced inter alia by the deteriorating 
economic and sometimes difficult political situation of the states concerned. 
Particularly in Kenya, but to some extent in Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt and 
South Africa as well, debates have in recent years emerged about refugee 
affairs, sometimes with striking similarities to “older” developments in the 
Netherlands and in Switzerland. Refugees are increasingly viewed by host 
populations and/or depicted by politicians as a threat to security, specifically 
due to arms or drugs trafficking; and they are perceived as taxing social 
services and straining the environment, particularly in regard to large camps 
in Kenya and Ethiopia. This “shift towards xenophobic restrictionism” 
(Kibreab 1999: 400) is found in many African countries and often linked to 
the democratization processes where politicians are at the mercy of the public 
opinion (Kibreab 1999; Rutinwa 2002). 
In South Africa, for instance, public opinion reflects a new trend in 
immigration. Many respondents in this survey complained about xenophobia 
and perceived hostility toward foreigners, which are related to the widespread 
perception that there are “floods” of illegal immigrants coming into richer 
South Africa. The perception is that these illegal immigrants are poor and 
unskilled and will therefore compete with South Africans for scarce public 
resources, such as work and health care.  
The same can be said for Egypt, where refugees are often depicted as a 
national threat in the media and where they must face discrimination (by 
landlords or shopkeepers who charge them more than Egyptians) or racism 
(refugee children being bullied at school by other children). Despite the 
increase in anti-immigration sentiments in both African and European 
countries surveyed, there are still tolerant and supportive masses which have 
facilitated the entry and settlement of refugees and asylum-seekers in their 
host countries.  
In Ethiopia, things are slightly better for unregistered urban refugees of 
Somali origin who live and work relatively peacefully in Addis Ababa, 
without being harassed by police forces or by the local population. The 
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political links between the Ethiopian and Somali governments are at the heart 
of this situation, but these are subject to change at any time. Interestingly, it 
appears that not all refugees are treated in the same way and that refugees of 
different origins are differently perceived in host countries. While the 
Somalis benefit in Ethiopia from relative tolerance in the cities, Sudanese and 
Eritrean refugees do not experience similar benevolence and thus rarely leave 
the camps. In Egypt, on the contrary, Sudanese, who benefit from Christian 
based refugee programmes, and Palestinians, who enjoy more rights 
regarding access to employment, are better off than Somali refugees. 
Affinities and shared identities in terms of clan affiliation, language or 
religion thus have an effect on the acceptance of particular groups of refugees 
(Loescher and Milner 2005), which may manifest itself in informal help by 
the host population (for instance in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen) or 
through political support by local or national authorities. However, the latter 
can change rapidly, as has been the case in Djibouti with the expulsion order 
of formerly tolerated undocumented residents, including many Somalis, in 
2003. Moreover, historical and cultural antagonisms are a reality as well as 
affinities and, although European public opinion tends to have homogenised 
perceptions of the cultural and political diversity of the African continent, it 
is certainly erroneous to imagine that African refugees are by definition 
welcome in African states. Proximity to the place of origin may in some 
cases be an advantage, but should not guide decisions without examining 
opportunities and risks of local resettlement.  
On the whole, the attitudes of states and populations toward refugees have 
become less welcoming in African countries, as in the rest of the world, and 
the labelling of refugees as scapegoats is common in politicians’ as well as in 
media discourse. Diminishing international support and so-called “donor 
fatigue” in relation to protracted refugee situations in general, and Somalis in 
particular, has further exacerbated the pressures on states in the region. The 
lack of resources in first asylum countries is liable to undermine liberal 
asylum regimes. Security concerns and the global war on terror have also 
pressured states, for instance Djibouti and Yemen, to tighten their borders 
and take harsher measures against refugees and undocumented immigrants. 
In this context and in spite of other differences among surveyed countries, 
these trends reveal emerging parallels in refugee policies, which are likely to 
induce further secondary movements on the part of refugees. 
Limited opportunities for local integration 
Most governments in the countries surveyed are overtly or implicitly opposed 
to local integration because they fear, on the one hand, that generous asylum 
policies might strain resources and fuel negative public opinion and, on the 
other, that they act as pull factors for growing numbers of immigrants. This 
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context is unfavourable to active dissemination of information about refugees 
and their rights, which has proved to be indispensable in order to avoid 
frequently observed discrepancies between policy intentions and actual 
implementation. In this regard, the reluctance toward integration often 
crystallizes in the denial of the right to leave the camps, in limitations on 
rights linked to subsidiary protection (for instance in Switzerland) or even to 
the status of refugees (reservations to the 1951 Convention by Egypt and 
Ethiopia). An extreme form of denying integration is the refusal of 
registration and thus of legal status which has been reported in several 
African countries. Other forms include the restrictive access to labour market, 
services and eventually to citizenship, which is de facto virtually unattainable 
(or extremely rare) in most countries surveyed (except for the Netherlands 
and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland).  
In most countries of the region (Africa and Yemen), and to some extent in 
Switzerland, Somali refugees are considered at best as temporary guests who 
will leave as soon as conditions allow repatriation to the country of origin. 
This underlying principle guiding most policies has consequences not only on 
the rights of refugees, but also on the way they perceive their own condition 
and their strategies to improve their situation. 
Accordingly, the results of this study underscore the utmost importance of the 
lack of legal status in inducing secondary movements from a country of 
(potential) asylum. Proper refugee registration and documentation, insofar as 
it is recognised by host states, proves to be an important prerequisite for 
protection and opportunities for refugees to create a new existence, though 
evidently not a sufficient condition to guarantee both. In a sense, this is the 
starting point for economic self-reliance in the short term and eventual access 
to local integration in the long term. This finding also underlines the 
inextricable connection between legal status and the socio-economic 
subsistence of refugees and draws attention to the need for active 
involvement of host countries in defining and implementing refugee policy 
which is considered by many refugees as the sole competence of UNHCR 
and the international community. 
6.2 The role of international actors 
Although international agency personnel stress that receiving states, rather 
than international organisations, are legally responsible for refugees on their 
territory, in reality UNHCR is heavily involved in the daily operation of the 
asylum system, while most activities are entrusted to implementing partners 
“in the field”. The precise distribution of competencies between different 
actors involved in refugee affairs varies greatly between states and over time. 
In the European countries and to a lesser extent in South Africa, the central 
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government is responsible for managing affairs whereas UNHCR is only 
marginally involved. In Egypt and Somalia’s four neighbouring countries, 
UNHCR plays a more important role, although the tendency has recently 
been toward a slight shifting of the responsibilities from UNHCR to the host 
governments, which are in a process of (re)building legal and institutional 
capacities (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Yemen). The active involvement of states at 
every policy stage is absolutely crucial, particularly when it comes to 
effective protection in and outside camps, self-settlement in urban or rural 
areas and eventually local integration. 
When the civil war broke out in Somalia, the governments of its 
neighbouring states were not in a position to handle the influx of refugees 
and called on the international community for help,66 which led to the 
establishment of several new camps. The decrease in total refugee population 
and ongoing repatriation programmes in neighbouring countries has enabled 
international agencies to coerce host states to involve themselves in the 
asylum process, although international assistance for refugees will be 
necessary for the foreseeable future. Currently, refugee camps in Ethiopia 
and Djibouti, are managed by government bodies (ARRA and ONARS, 
respectively), but they are essentially financed by UNHCR.  
Shared responsibilities 
These schemes of shared responsibilities (between international agencies and 
governments) are not without risks, as the collaboration between different, 
and sometimes changing or conflicting, actors entails a great deal of 
coordination, which is unfortunately lacking in several countries (for instance 
Yemen, Djibouti, Kenya, Egypt). The deficiency in information-sharing 
amongst various governmental agencies or contradictions between 
governmental and UNHCR discourse may cause confusion among refugees 
and undermine the efficiency of the asylum policy. Many interviewees 
reported difficulties in accessing the chain of intermediaries in order to 
register or communicate with UNHCR, which was responsible for actions 
taken by implementing partners. 
Such difficulties appear to be particularly relevant in several re-registration 
initiatives (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Yemen), while the shortcomings are associated 
with either governmental organisations, implementing partners in charge of 
camps, UNHCR or refugees’ refusal to comply with registration requests. 
Similar problems are raised in connection with registration processes in 
 
66 Kenya remains an exception since its government managed refugee affairs with 
implementing partners until 1992, when the state handed these responsibilities to UNHCR. 
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general and the issuing of recognised documentation. In addition to the lack 
of political will (or corruption), insufficient resources are frequently referred 
to as the main reason for these shortcomings. Though such difficulties might 
not always be entirely avoided, clarifications about responsibilities, better 
information and access for refugees to UNHCR (or governmental refugee 
desks as in South Africa) as well as revision of registration and 
documentation practices, need to be developed and implemented (cf. 
recommendations below). 
Protracted refugee situations in camps 
At the same time, the fact that developed states have become less willing to 
accept new refugees and tend to advocate for solutions in the “region of 
origin”, may not be very conducive to strengthening North-South dialogue 
which seems to be a condition for increased commitment from African states 
in terms of protection and local integration of refugees. This point also raises 
questions about camp confinement policies, which may be signs of host 
governments’ unwillingness or inability to allow local integration of 
refugees.  
The findings of this study, corroborated by a large body of international 
refugee research, underscore the negative outcomes of long-term camp 
confinement. Apart from impacts on receiving countries in terms of security 
(Lischer 2003), environment and socio-economic outcomes, evidence relates 
to the refugees concerned (Abdi 2004). A most important aspect in this 
context concerns the particular vulnerability of women in refugee camps who 
are degraded to “sub-citizen” levels, lack guaranteed security from family, 
community and government and face frequent rapes and violence (Abdi 
2005). Such actions underscore the necessity for families to send youngsters, 
especially women to industrialised countries, both for personal safety and as 
a means of income security for the family. 
Most international experts and policymakers do not defend prolonged 
encampment as a general principle; though they cite exceptional 
circumstances to justify particular applications. But in spite of declared 
objections and negative evidence, there seems to be a sort of objective 
alliance in favour of camps, which has impeded a resolute search for 
alternatives. It appears that powerful bureaucratic and political factors in host 
states as well as at the international level play a role in supporting camp 
policies. As Betts puts it: “This is because UNHCR and other Inter-
Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and NGOs will take responsibility for 
protection, care and maintenance within camps but rarely outside of camps. 
This stacks most Governments’ cost-benefit analysis in favour of the status 
quo of ‘warehousing’. Providing a mechanism for international support for 
host country expenses incurred as a result of refugee protection outside of 
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camps would be one means to overcome such perverse incentives” (Betts 
2005: 36). 
Even if the responsibility for refugees belongs rightfully to receiving states, 
who sometimes fail to assume it, the international community ought to 
assume at least some responsibility for the consequences of humanitarian 
action, particularly in sustaining situations where Convention rights cannot 
be guaranteed. 
New approaches to assistance 
A rethinking of camp confinement and conventional assistance strategies 
could contribute to a more durable developmental approach, rather than 
focusing solely on emergency relief. Such a reorientation would foster 
empowerment of refugees and of the local civil society, as an alternative to 
placing refugees in the position of total disempowerment as spectators of 
their own lives. There is plenty of evidence that Somali refugees – and 
refugees in general – need not be passive victims but rather become active 
participants in developing initiatives which current policies should take into 
account and build upon by opening a dialogue with the persons concerned. 
As different marginalized groups among citizens suffer from deprivation, the 
most effective protection and integration of refugees is more likely to take 
place through cross-mandate, bottom-up programmes in which the urban 
poor (nationals and non-nationals) take the initiative and are given 
institutional and financial support for their self-betterment. 
Such a stance integrating the perspectives of refugees would help to 
overcome the strong distrust between the refugees and the agencies in charge 
of refugee affairs (UNHCR, implementing partners, governmental agencies). 
Institutional actors are frequently unaware of the problems encountered by 
the refugees they are in charge of. That being so, more involvement by the 
refugees, at least at implementing level, would have positive effects on the 
relations and allow a dialogue between the actors involved, as well as a better 
flow of information in both directions. If the responses adopted at national 
and international level are to be constructive, the causes, motivations and 
meaning of secondary movements must be considered in relation to policy 
implications. 
6.3 Movement strategies of refugees and policy 
implications 
The lack of a proper legal status conferring the basic rights of refugees 
(according to the 1951 Geneva Convention) is a major reason underlying 
secondary movements. These rights encompass recognized documentation, 
physical safety, access to assistance, health services, education for children 
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and access to the labour market; more generally – at least in the longer-term – 
they include opportunities for self-reliance and durable solutions. As many 
refugees do not view voluntary repatriation as a viable option, and 
resettlement opportunities are very limited, local integration is an essential 
alternative which is often embraced by refugees. Improvements in policies in 
this sphere would enable those who stay to enjoy better social conditions and 
protection and consequently reduce the flow of secondary movers, but it 
would not stop all of them. 
Realising that they will not be able to integrate and at best become 
temporarily self-sufficient in their host country, while a return to Somalia is 
not an option, many arrange their lives entirely with a view possible onward 
movement, mostly in the hope of being resettled in an industrialized country. 
In Egypt, where this aspiration is particularly strong (notably because of 
relatively good resettlement programmes), some refugees are reluctant to 
send their children to local schools because they are inadequate in preparing 
the children for their “life in the West”, despite the lack of guarantees of 
resettlement. Clearly, the consequences of such grandiose, albeit unfulfilled 
hopes, can only be described as devastating for affected refugees67.  
Although not all Somali refugees can or want to move to industrialized 
countries, many others attempt risky and costly ventures to make the voyage 
to European ports or cities. The legal differentiation between refugees and 
economic migrants has been revised in the academic discourse and it is now 
recognized that few (migration) movements are neither only “voluntary” nor 
just “involuntary” (Van Hear 1998). Although the level of constraints and 
urgency differs, some part of human agency exists in all flight histories. 
Secondary movements as coping strategies 
In considering the findings of this survey, there is strong evidence that 
secondary movements by Somali refugees belong to collective coping 
strategies designed to deal with transnational legal and social insecurity by 
diversifying both the risks related to refugee situations and available 
resources of members of the extended family. If recognized by policy 
makers, these livelihood strategies and solidarity links could in many cases 
be built upon rather than fought against. 
Naturally, the first policy field in which this point is important concerns the 
opportunities for local integration. In spite of the limitations mentioned above 
 
67 Somalis in some parts of the world (Kenya and Egypt at least) have named the physical 
and psychological pains associated with the yearning for resettlement as Buufis, a 
phenomenon examined in detail by Cindy Horst (2003). 
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there is strong evidence – though seldom documented in research – that in 
many places Somali refugees have been able to develop self-sufficiency in 
urban settings, but also in some instances in and around refugee camps68. The 
major inconvenience of de facto integration is precisely that refugees lack 
status confirming the lawfulness of their presence, which places them in a 
particularly vulnerable situation.  
Community based support fulfils important functions, but it appears that in 
some cases refugees prefer to hide these initiatives from the authorities or 
international agencies because they risk being penalized. This showcases the 
sensitive nature of asylum-seekers and their inability to function as self-
sufficient exiles and the urgency of a real dialogue between refugees and the 
institutions in charge of related affairs in order to overcome misconceptions 
on both sides. Self-help is in some cases discouraged by wrong incentives or 
simply because limited assistance is only granted to the most vulnerable 
individuals who have lost every other type of support (poverty trap). 
In the Netherlands and Switzerland, the determinants related to extended 
families and collective coping strategies appear to challenge most current 
policy conceptions. The granting of rights, which often leads to better 
economic integration, has an effect not only on the situation of the 
individuals concerned, but even more on family members who stay in the 
region of origin. Remittances sent by refugees to help sustain relatives in 
other countries are now recognized as a parallel and alternative means of 
development of poorer countries and their inhabitants.  
An aspect which needs further investigation by researchers in the future is the 
correlation between personal achievements in a given host country and the 
propensity to return to the country of origin when conditions start to stabilise. 
While it is sometimes argued that the better integrated and more self-reliant 
refugees become in their host country, the less likely they are to return home, 
there is evidence of the opposite as well (for example Lin 2001 cited in Crisp 
2003). This view argues that the more resources and capital (in terms of 
education, skills, and finances) refugees could accumulate during exile, the 
better prepared they are to go home. This principle serves notably as the basis 
of Crisp’s argument for a new fourth durable solution which he calls 
“promotion of self-reliance pending voluntary return” (Crisp 2003b).  
Other researchers highlighted the importance of gaining the citizenship of a 
developed country as an important resource to return to the country of origin 
 
68 Integrated individuals do not appear as interviewees in this study, because they are no 
longer considered as refugees. 
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or to countries closer (geographically or culturally) to the country of origin. 
This should remind us of the fact that secondary movements are not always 
in the South-North direction, but that it can be strategically more interesting 
for Somali refugees to move from a developed country in which they have 
obtained citizenship to a country where their resources (including this 
citizenship) allow them better living standards, access to better education 
systems according to their values, etc (on this issue, see the extended research 
of Al-Sharmani 2004b in Egypt).  
Legal avenues to movements 
Lastly, although a specific focus should certainly aim at improving the legal 
and social security of the refugees in the first countries they reach, legal ways 
of migration constitute a valuable alternative to irregular (secondary) 
movements, namely programmes of resettlement and of family reunification. 
Indeed, as long as conditions of living remain extremely precarious, some 
Somali refugees will try to move further. Another strong motivation concerns 
the wish to join family members abroad. While it is clear that all secondary 
movements cannot be supported by the international community, it seems 
quite legitimate and practical that – after years of separation – family 
members should try to reunite, even by irregular means. Pragmatic family 
reunification programmes are an important means to regularize the 
movements of people who may attempt movement at any cost. An example is 
children whose parents are in Europe but who are not entitled to join them, as 
is the case for subsidiary admitted refugees in Switzerland (see quotation in 
the epigraph of the report). Moreover, family reunification is not only an 
advantage for the families concerned, but also for the host countries which 
can expect the reunited families to integrate better.  
Differences in rights related to family reunification or to assistance, access to 
labour and education or freedom of movement may constitute an important 
motivation for secondary movements, not only between the region of origin 
and the North, but also between industrialized countries. While in European 
States, international and supranational legislations guarantee some coherence 
in rights conferred to Convention refugees, this is not the case when it comes 
to subsidiary protection. Such aspects may be of minor importance in the 
short term, but they naturally become paramount when the “ideal” option of 
repatriation is out of immediate reach and life in exile is prolonged. 
Therefore, establishing effective harmonized asylum systems in accordance 
with the European Union’s values, as recommended in the Hague Programme 
of December 2004, is in the interest of states as well as of refugees. Regional 
protection programmes under the Fifth Priority seek to fulfil the following 
goals: “third countries receiving this support shall adopt or amend their 
national asylum legislation, thus conforming to international standards and 
namely to the obligations entailed under the Geneva Convention; reception 
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and admission standards should therefore be enhanced. The Programmes will 
also provide general assistance for the improvement of the local 
infrastructure and assistance for return to countries of origin and 
resettlement” (Council of the European Union 2004). 
Undoubtedly, the long-term nature of the Somali conflict was unpredictable 
at the time the Somali state collapsed and its consequences could not be 
anticipated by the stakeholders, including host countries, UN agencies, the 
international community and refugees themselves, though protracted refugee 
situations are far from being exceptional in the African context. In retrospect, 
some policy options now appear short-sighted inasmuch as successive 
orientations were adopted and later abandoned for reasons which were 
sometimes related to incoherent or conflicting approaches, poor 
implementation and finally a lack of sufficient resources. Once the 
emergency phase passed and after 14 years of political limbo and 
statelessness in Somalia, the focus of the media and the international 
community has moved on to more spectacular global crises. This trend is 
regrettable inasmuch as it affects the resources allocated to viable solutions, 
but it could also constitute a chance if actors involved, while being off the 
radar screen of international attention, tried to find more durable responses to 
secondary movements and precarious (protection) situations of Somali 
refugees in their respective environment. With regard to the results of this 
study, this can best be done in a cross-mandate, North-South cooperation, 
which builds on an evidence-based analysis of the past and current situation 
and considers the interests of various host or transit states, as well as those of 
the concerned refugees and the international community. 
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7 Recommendations 
At the level of individual refugees:  
• Improve the access of refugees to registration in camps and urban areas 
(governmental registration desks or international organisations); 
• Foresee effective information to refugees about possibilities of registration 
and particular conditions, about access to camps, etc.; 
• Adapt procedures for registration and documentation to recommended 
standards (personnel documentation, regular revalidation, etc.); 
• Avoid frequent practice changes and exceptions in practices (waiting 
periods for registration, suspended adjustment of ration cards to family 
size); 
• Assure access to rights in camps and urban areas: safety, assistance, 
freedom of movement, health care; 
• Foresee legal access to labour market and education (including higher 
education); 
• Promote vocational programmes and self-generating activities for youth 
and unemployed refugees; 
• Empower and strengthen the capacity of refugees to take control of 
activities that affect their lives;  
• Create positive incentives for individual and collective self-help 
initiatives; 
• Enhance conditions for self-help, self-reliance and finally local 
integration; 
• Consult beneficiaries to avoid incapacitating and paternalistic tendencies. 
Meso level of implementation, associations, institutions and 
networks: 
• Adopt grass-roots, bottom-up approaches (as opposed to top down); 
• Promote capacity building as a critical bridge in the transition from relief 
to development; 
• Build on local aid capacities on clear merit-based systems that address 
local needs; 




• Support relations between local population and refugees, between civil 
society and refugee associations; 
• Improve information and coordination between implementing actors, 
clarify responsibilities and make them transparent; 
• Avoid compulsory camp confinement and foresee clear phases for 
interventions and assistance (encampment – self-reliance – durable 
solutions). 
National and global refugee policies: 
• Inform population of receiving states about refugee issues; 
• Global level: sensitise populations in the North about refugee situations in 
the South and vice-versa; 
• Support research and evidence-based policy-making; 
• Involve receiving states at every level of policy-making through an 
improvement in relations between host states, international actors, local an 
international NGOS, etc.; 
• Foster legislative and institutional capacity building (expertise, resources, 
best practices…); 
• Promote dialogue between states in the South and North; 
• Enhance avenues for legal movements and migration: resettlement, 
sponsoring, family reunification 
• Harmonise conditions of protection and assistance at regional, 
supranational (EU) and international level for Convention refugees and 
subsidiary protection; 
• Increase resources for protection and development in the region as the 
Hague Regional protection programmes propose among the priorities of 
the next five years; 
• Promote durable cross-mandate (cross-sectoral) dialogue and initiatives 
nationally and internationally; 
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Sample profile 
Table 33: Sample by current host country 
 Total KE ET YE DJ ZA EG CH NL 
N 814 60 120 120 120 120 165 60 49 
Table 34: Sample by gender  
Sex Total KE ET YE DJ ZA EG CH NL 
 N=814 N=60 N=120 N=120 N=120 N=120 N=165 N=60 N=49 
Male 50 52 50 44 43 68 41 58 55 
Female 50 48 50 56 57 32 59 42 45 
Table 35: Sample by age category 
Age 
class 
Total KE ET YE DJ ZA EG CH NL 
 N=806 N=60 N=115 N=120 N=119 N=119 N=165 N=60 N=48 
> 20 5 8 3 2 3 6 2 18 8 
20-30 31 28 20 32 18 34 39 40 38 
30-40 33 18 35 36 38 34 34 18 35 
40-50 21 25 25 17 23 19 19 20 17 
50-60 7 15 10 3 14 7 4 -- 2 
60 + 3 5 3 10 3 1 1 3 -- 
Table 36: Sample by level of education  
Years of 
education 
Total KE ET YE DJ ZA EG CH NL 
 N=801 N=60 N=119 N=120 N=117 N=120 N=162 N=59 N=44 
None 43 38 61 38 65 66 27 12 -- 
0-8 30 37 15 32 16 19 42 61 40 
9-12 20 18 18 23 15 8 27 20 30 
13-20 7 7 6 7 4 7 4 7 30 
Table 37: Sample by marital status  
Marital 
status 
Total KE ET YE DJ ZA EG CH NL 
 N=812 N=60 N=120 N=120 N=120 N=119 N=162 N=60 N=48 
Single 27 20 18 18 16 43 36 48 21 
Widow 11 25 15 7 10 11 8 3 10 
Divorced 7 8 3 17 7 -- 4 8 15 
Married 55 47 63 58 67 46 52 40 54 
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Table 38: Sample by legal status  
Legal status Total KE ET YE DJ ZA EG CH NL 
 N=814 N=60 N=120 N=120 N=120 N=120 N=120 N=60 N=49 
Asylum seeker 9 -- -- -- -- 40 8 7 14 
Convention 
refugee 
19 -- 7 -- -- 56 45 7 4 
Prima facie 33 42 42 92 72 -- -- -- -- 
Subsidiary 
protection 
7 -- -- -- -- -- -- 71 29 
Undocumented 17 51 51 4 18 4 5 -- 6 
Other* 14 7 -- 4 10 -- 42 15 47 
* The category “other” refers to refugees with mandate letters  from UNHCR HQ in Nairobi who 
are allowed to live in the city for medical treatment in Kenya; to recognized refugees having lost 
their cards in Yemen; to rejected asylum seekers in Djibouti; to refugees recognized under the 
OAU 1969 Convention in Egypt; to (annual or permanent) residents or naturalized citizens in 
Switzerland, and to permanent residents and naturalized citizens in the Netherlands. 
Table 39: Sample by type of place of residence 
Place of 
living 
Total KE ET YE DJ ZA EG CH NL 
 N=813 N=60 N=120 N=120 N=120 N=119 N=120 N=60 N=49 
Camp 22 -- 42 22 84 -- -- -- -- 
Refugee 
centre (town) 
3 15 -- -- -- -- -- 23 -- 
Flat (town) 72 75 55 74 13 96 99 75 100 
Other (town) 3 10 3 4 3 4 1 2 -- 
Table 40: Sample by current professional activity 
Current 
activity 
Total KE ET YE DJ ZA EG CH NL 
 N=814 N=60 N=120 N=120 N=120 N=120 N=120 N=60 N=49 
Domestic 
workers 
11 3 2 24 7 2 23 3 6 
Small 
business 
8 3 9 7 5 23 4 -- 2 
Manual 
workers 
10 8 5 12 6 16 7 15 18 
Other 
activities 
8 7 7 11 7 7 7 3 25 
Housework 5 5 2 1 7 -- 12 5 6 
Students 3 -- 6 1 2 -- 2 1 12 
No activity 55 74 69 44 66 52 45 59 31 
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Multivariate analysis (table relating to chapter 5.3) 
Table 41: Reasons for onward movement (linear regression model) 
Predictors Onward Movement Onward Movement 
 Model 1 Model 14 
 Wald Exp. (B) Wald Exp. (B) 
Gender 2.330 .169  -- -- 
Age .267 .763 -- -- 
Education 1.513 .430 -- -- 
Married .258 .735 -- -- 
With Children .887 .184 -- -- 
Year of departure from 
Somalia 
.596 .601 -- -- 
Place where interviewee 
lives 
.125 .590 -- -- 
Employment .766 .312 -- -- 
Remittances .025 1.210 -- -- 
Fear of forced return .143 .558 -- -- 
Fear for physical safety .052 1.369 -- -- 
Lack of legal status 4.476 .046 5.429 .076** 
Poor living conditions .182 1.702 -- -- 
Lack of opportunities for 
education and work 
 
1.044 3.263 -- -- 
Nagelkerke .338 .162 




Note: The figures represent coefficients (expected Beta) using logistic regression models 
(Backward: LR model).  
Predictors : 
Gender: male (1), female (2). 
Age: six-point scale based on respondent’s age, from over 60   (1) to under 20 years old (6). 
Education: four-point scale based on respondent’s highest level of education from no education at 
all (0) to tertiary education (4). 
Married: yes (1), no (2). 
With children: yes (1), no (2). 
Year of departure from Somalia: four-point scale based on respondent’s year of departure, from 
“before 1991” (1) to “from 2002 to 2005” (4). 
Place where interviewee lives: refugee centre (1), private flat (2), other (3). 
Employment: yes (1), no (2). 
Remittances: yes (1), no (2). 
Fear of forced return: yes (1), no (2). 
Fear of physical safety: yes (1), no (2). 
Lack of legal status: yes (1), no (2). 
Poor living conditions: yes (1), no (2). 
Lack of opportunities for education and work: yes (1), no (2). 
Onward movement (experienced in the past): yes (1), no (0).  
n: 206 
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